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The thesis studies aspects of the cost of equity trading in the emerging stock market of 
Ukraine. The market is quite new (opened in 1997 but started to operate actively only in 
2004) and little research on this market has been done so far. The market appears to offer 
lucrative investment opportunities that attract attention of both Ukrainian and foreign 
investors but the cost of trading Ukrainian stocks is quite high and can considerably 
decrease the returns to investors. The empirical part of the thesis is based on the transactions 
data from the main trade floor in Ukraine, PFTS, for 59 Ukrainian stocks during 2004-2006. 
The cost of equity trading in Ukraine is found to be quite high compared to many other 
stock markets, both developed and emerging. An in-depth study has shown that the 
medium-sized trades are the cheapest to execute, followed by large and then small trades. 
The reason for the pattern is seen in the price improvement suggested by brokers to the 
larger, more valued customers in order to keep the business with them and is in line with the 
findings in other literature for dealership markets (Reiss and Werner (1996), Hansch et. al 
(1999), and Huang and Stoll (1996)). The average cost of institutional sale trades exceeds the 
average cost of institutional buy trades at any market condition (falling, neutral, or rising), 
which is a puzzling result given that sales are often found in the literature to be more 
expensive in falling market, while purchases are more expensive in rising market.  
The efficacy of a number of measures of liquidity is studied. In line with findings for other 
emerging markets, it is shown that the proportion of zero daily returns (Lesmond (1999)) 
and the proportion of no-trading days are the most reliable liquidity measures for the 
Ukrainian stock market. Turnover, a measure widely applied in literature for developed 
stock markets, has a very small power for measuring liquidity in Ukraine.   
The spread components are estimated by applying three spread decomposition models most 
frequently referred to in literature: Stoll (1989), Glosten and Harris (1988), and Huang and 
Stoll (1997). The estimation results show a low importance of the asymmetric information 
component, which is surprising given that insider trading is considered a serious risk in 
Ukraine.  
To present the importance of incorporating the transactions costs into portfolio return 
analysis, a momentum trading strategy is examined. It is shown that momentum portfolio 
returns decrease considerably when the cost of trading is taken into account.  
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Moderate returns and high co-movement in the stock prices in the developed stock 
markets have urged investors to look for new opportunities for reduction of 
portfolio risk and enhancing of portfolio return. In the end of 1980s – beginning of 
1990s new destinations for investment became available with the opening of many 
emerging markets to the foreign capital inflows. Net portfolio equity inflows to 
emerging markets grew year by year from USD 11.4 bln. in 1999 to USD 24.1 bln. in 
2003, USD 68.8 in 2005, and USD 145.1 in 2007 (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2008). Literature has 
documented substantial diversification benefits from investing in emerging equity 
markets (DeSantis (1994), Divecha et al. (1992), Harvey (1995), Bekaert and Urias 
(1996), and other), though transaction costs were rarely taken into account in the 
studies. The costs of equity trading in emerging markets are considerably higher 
than in the developed markets (Jain (2003)) and they can considerably decrease high 
gross returns on emerging markets portfolios documented in literature (Domowitz, 
Glen, and Madhavan (2000)). 
 
Among the established equity markets with a long history, as, for example, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange founded in 1891 and Buenos Aires Stock Exchange 
founded in 1854, there is a group of very young emerging stock markets located in   
Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (CEE/FSU) that started 
their operation only in the beginning of 1990s. Portfolio investment to CEE/FSU 
region represent a relatively small, albeit growing share of the portfolio inflows to 
developing countries. Net portfolio equity inflows to CEE/FSU region were USD 0.4 
bln. in 1995 (or 2.8% of the total net portfolio equity inflows to developing  
 2 
countries), and have grown to USD 11.1 bln in 2006 (or 10.6% of the total net 
portfolio equity inflows to developing  countries) (World Development Indicators, 
2008). 
 
The Ukrainian stock market is one of the CEE/FSU stock markets. It emerged in 
1990s after the breakdown of the USSR and beginning of privatisation of the 
previously state-owned economy. The market stayed fairly underdeveloped for 
about a decade and almost collapsed during the 1998 financial crisis. However, in 
2004 it revived and have started developing actively. By 2007 market capitalization 
of the Ukrainian stock market reached USD 111.8 bln. and the market became one of 
the largest in Eastern Europe (for comparison, market capitalization in Poland in 
2007 was USD 207.3, in Czech Republic – USD 73.4 bln., in Hungary – USD 47.7 bln., 
in Romania – USD 44.9 bln.). 
The Ukrainian stock market is remarkable because there is a substantial number of 
companies that are fairly large by international standards, a feature that differs 
Ukraine from many Central and Eastern European countries. Many of the 
companies have strong positions in the international markets of metallurgy, 
chemical fertilizers, machine building, agriculture, and food industry.  
Ukrainian stock market has a considerable potential for growth due to the active 
growth of Ukrainian economy (annual GDP growth rate averaged 7% between 2000 
and 2007) driven by well educated labour force of Ukraine, large domestic market 
(the population of Ukraine is about 50 mln. people), and access to a variety of 
resources including some of Europe’s best agricultural land, significant coal and 
metal reserves, and a strategic location connecting European, Russian, and Asian 
markets.  
 
The Ukrainian stock market is characterized by high returns, which are attainable 
neither in the Western European and the U.S. stock markets nor in the more 
developed Eastern European emerging markets. In 2007 Ukraine was second best 
performing stock market in the world (after China) with the growth of index PFTS, 
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the main stock index of Ukraine, by 135.4%. Taking a longer-term perspective, in the 
end of 2009, Ukraine was ranked as the stock market winner of the decade in terms 
of the gains on the stock index with the index PFTS gain of 900%. The top-ten list 
also included stock indices of Peru, Russia, Romania, China, Bangladesh, Slovakia, 
Kuwait, Estonia, and the Czech Republic (Financial Times, 18/12/2009). 
 
Nevertheless, high returns in the Ukrainian stock market are undermined by a 
number of risks common for many emerging markets such as low liquidity, high 
volatility, low transparency, low ownership structure disclosure, weak corporate 
governance, and weak protection of the property rights of minority shareholders. 
Low liquidity and information asymmetry in the Ukrainian stock market result in 
high transaction costs, which considerably decrease high equity returns in the 
market. Jain (2003) estimated the bid-ask spreads for a large cross-section of stock 
markets around the world and have found that the quoted bid-ask spread in the 
Ukrainian stock market in 2000 was 15%, which was one of the largest estimates 
among 51 developed and emerging markets considered in the study.  
 
Usually a decision to buy or sell a particular asset is based on the expectations about 
future performance of this asset. Buying a stock with high expected gross returns 
might result in considerably worse performance than expected if trading costs for 
this stock are high. Literature has documented that higher illiquidity was found to 
be associated with higher expected returns (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006)), 
while  the decline in transaction costs may have contributed to a fall of about 1% in 
the equity premium, which was documented for 100 years of data for the U.S. (Jones 
(2002)). 
 
Ukrainian stock market has considerably grown in the past several years, though 
such important area of research for a stock market as the cost of transacting has 
attracted almost no attention in Ukraine. The only study in the area, to our best 
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knowledge, is Ryzhkov (2007) that investigates the components of the bid-ask 
spread for Ukrainian stocks.  
A study of the cost of trading and liquidity is important not only for investors and 
portfolio managers, but also for stock exchanges, stock brokers, and stock market 
regulators. The cost of trading and liquidity are important determinants of the 
quality of a stock market. Brokers evaluate their performance based on the 
transaction costs of the trades executed by them. Regulators often try to promote 
policies that lower transaction costs and increase stock market liquidity. 
 
Liquidity and the cost of trading are a part of the market microstructure direction of 
financial research. Market microstructure is the branch of financial economics that 
investigates trading and the organization of markets (Harris, 2003). This field of 
study has substantially grown in size and importance in the last three decades being 
driven by substantial increase in trading volume, changes in the regulatory 
environment, and new technological innovations that affect securities trading all 
over the world (Madhavan, 2000). The recent literature is distinguished by high 
activity in the area of theory and extensive empirical examination of theoretical 
predictions. 
 
The market microstructure literature has studied numerous aspects of the cost of 
trading and liquidity for developed markets. It was shown that illiquid and assets 
with high transaction costs trade at low prices relative to their expected cash flows 
(Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Datar, Naik 
and Radcliffe (1998), and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001)). 
Liquidity was found to predict future returns and liquidity shocks were 
documented to be positively correlated with return shocks (Jones (2002) and 
Amihud (2002)). To allow researchers more flexibility in the design of their studies, 
a menu of liquidity measures was developed in the literature and the efficacy of the 
measures for measuring stock liquidity was studied (Lesmond et al. (1999), Amihud 
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(2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Hasbrouck (2004), Bekaert et al. (2006), Holden 
(2007), and Goyenko et al. (2009)).  
 
Various approaches to measuring the cost of trading were suggested in literature. 
They include quoted bid-ask spread, effective bid-ask spread (Roll (1984), Stoll 
(2000), Naik and Yadav (2003), Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll (1997), 
and Madhavan, Richardson, Roomans (1997)), price impact (Beebower and Priest 
(1980), Keim & Madhavan (1996), and Smith et al. (2001)), delay costs and 
opportunity costs (Treynor (1981) and Perold (1988)). Theoretical literature has 
predicted and empirical literature has documented that the cost of trading depends 
on the trade size (Lee (1993), Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Bernhardt and Hughson 
(2002), Reiss and Werner (1996), Huang and Stoll (1996), and Hansch et. al (1999)). 
An interesting finding in the microstructure literature is the asymmetry in the cost 
of trading for institutional buy and sell orders. It was found that institutional 
purchases are more expensive when the market is rising, while institutional sales 
are more expensive when the market is falling (Holthausen et al. (1987), Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993), Keim and Madhavan (1998), Saar (2001), Chiyachantana et al. 
(2004), and Bikker et al. (2007)). 
 
Theoretical and empirical findings related to the influence of information on the cost 
of trading have motivated researchers to find the ways of decomposing the bid-ask 
spread into its components (which include order processing cost, inventory holding 
cost, and information asymmetry cost). Various spread decomposition models were 
suggested and empirically tested in literature (Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988), 
Stoll (1989), George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), Glosten and Harris (1988), 
Huang and Stoll (1997), and Madhavan, Richardson, Roomans (1997)).  
 
While there is extensive and constantly growing literature on market microstructure 
for developed markets, there is surprisingly little microstructure research on 
emerging markets, perhaps because accurate and detailed data are difficult to 
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obtain. Some of the available studies are described below. Lesmond (2005) analyze 
the efficacy of various liquidity measures for measuring liquidity in emerging 
markets, while Bekaert et al. (2006) study the influence of liquidity on expected 
returns in emerging markets. Jain (2003) in his study of the influence of institutional 
design on liquidity of the world stock markets documents that the estimates of the 
quoted and effective bid-ask spreads for emerging markets are higher than those for 
developed markets. Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001) present estimates of the 
cost of trading (price impact) for 17 emerging markets and show that the high cost 
of trading in emerging markets significantly reduces the benefits of international 
diversification and dramatically changes the composition of global efficient 
portfolios. Hanusek and Podpiera (2003) study the components of the bid-ask 
spread in the Prague Stock Exchange and find that the value of the asymmetric 
information cost component is surprisingly low given the evidence of a high level of 
informed trading in the Prague stock exchange. 
 
Ukrainian stock exchange PFTS records detailed data, which includes quoted-bid 
ask spreads, both closing and intra-day, trade prices, quantities, and time of trade 
execution and therefore allows estimating various microstructure models. Based on 
the data the study aims at examining the aspects of the cost of equity trading and 
the effective ways of measuring liquidity in the Ukrainian stock market. By this the 
study aims at filling the gap in the cost of trading and liquidity literature for the 
Ukrainian stock market.  
 
The thesis contributes to knowledge in the following ways: 
 
1. The thesis presents a detailed overview of the Ukrainian stock market. The 
market is very young and is little known to international investor; available research 
on the Ukrainian stock market is scarce. The overview includes information on the 
history of the stock market development, describes the main characteristics of the 
largest Ukrainian stock exchange PFTS, and presents the main weaknesses of the 
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market that have an influence on the cost of trading, in particular, the level of free 
float, the Ukrainian corporate governance legislation and enforcement, and 
transparency of public companies. Also, the level of ownership concentration in the 
Ukrainian public companies is shown and the main institutional investors into 
Ukrainian equity are presented. Further, the process of trade execution and 
settlement in PFTS is described. The overview is supplemented by the insights of 
the Ukrainian investment professionals on the market operation gained through 
interviews carried out by the author. 
 
2. The thesis performs an in-depth study of the cost of trading, which has not been 
done for the Ukrainian stock market before. The cost of trading is estimated for 
Ukrainian stocks in terms of both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads. To show the 
dependence of the cost of trading on the trade size, the cost of trading is estimated 
separately for small, medium-sized, and large trades. The study shows the influence 
of the market condition (rising, falling, or neutral) on the cost of trading for buy and 
sell trades. Finally, in order to help investors and portfolio managers to design 
trading strategies that lower transaction costs, the importance of various 
determinants of the bid-ask spread is analysed (Chapter 4). 
 
3. The efficacy of liquidity measures for measuring liquidity in the Ukrainian stock 
market is studied. As an essential characteristic of a stock market and a significant 
input in many other areas of financial research, liquidity needs to be correctly and 
efficiently measured. The study investigates the efficacy of such liquidity measures 
as quoted bid-ask spread, turnover, Amihud’s measure (Amihud, 2002), the 
proportion of zero daily returns (Lesmond et al., 1999), the proportion of no-trading 
days, and the volatility of return for measuring liquidity of the Ukrainian stock 
market. Further, liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market is compared to the liquidity 
of other emerging markets based on different measures of liquidity (Chapter 5). 
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4. The components of the bid-ask spread are estimated. Theory suggests that there 
are three main components of the bid-ask spread: order processing cost, inventory 
holding cost, and information asymmetry cost. Taking into account low 
informational transparency of Ukrainian companies, weak corporate governance, 
and weak legal system of property rights protection of minority shareholders, it is 
expected that the cost of trading in Ukraine is large due to high asymmetric 
information component of the bid-ask spread. The components of the bid-ask 
spread are estimated for the Ukrainian stocks by applying Stoll (1989), Huang and 
Stoll (1997), and Glosten and Harris (1988)) models of the bid-ask spread 
decomposition. Three different models are applied in order to see whether the 
estimates provided by alternative models are plausible and consistent with each 
other.  
 
5. A study of the influence of the cost of trading on portfolio returns is performed 
based on investigating the performance of a momentum strategy with and without 
accounting for the cost of trading. The ability of the strategy to outperform the 











The Ukrainian stock market has emerged very recently, in 1990s after the 
breakdown of the USSR and beginning of the privatisation of the previously state-
planned economy. The market has been developing quickly and by 2007 became 
one of the largest stock markets in Eastern Europe by market capitalization.  
 
Ukrainian stocks have been giving high returns, which are attainable neither in the 
West European and the U.S. stock markets nor in the more developed Eastern 
European emerging markets. In 2007 Ukraine was second best performing stock 
market in the world (after China) with the growth of index PFTS, the main stock 
index of Ukraine composed mostly of large industrial companies, by 135.4%. After a 
fall during world economic recession of 2008, index PFTS was sixth best performing 
index in the world in 2009 with the index growth by 44.3%. Taking a longer-term 
perspective, in the end of 2009, Ukraine was ranked as the stock market winner of 
the decade in terms of the gains on the stock index with its index PFTS gain of 900%. 
The top-ten list also included stock indices of Peru, Russia, Romania, China, 
Bangladesh, Slovakia, Kuwait, Estonia, and the Czech Republic (Financial Times, 
18/12/2009). 
 
Nevertheless, high returns in the Ukrainian stock market are undermined not only 
by the risks of low liquidity and high volatility, which are the risks common for 
emerging markets, but also by a number of country-specific risks. Many Ukrainian 
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public companies have low transparency, low level of the ownership structure 
disclosure, and weak corporate governance. Also the system of protection of the 
rights of minority shareholders in Ukraine is weak.  
 
Even though market capitalization of Ukrainian stock market is quite large (USD 
111.8 bln., or 78% of GDP), trading activity in the market is quite low. Many large 
industrial companies, which are interesting to investors, have very small free floats 
(about 4%) as large stakes in them belong either to big private financial-industrial 
groups or to the state. Many private companies that are potentially interesting to 
investors but are not listed on the stock exchange yet, do not rush to go public. On 
the one hand, they are careful about being transparent due to, among other reasons, 
a weak system of property rights protection in Ukraine. On the other hand, bank 
capital is still easily available in Ukraine, while liquidity of the stock market is low. 
 
Stock exchange PFTS (First Stock Trading System) is the main trading platform in 
Ukraine. It has a dealership market structure with multiple brokers posting their 
quotes in an electronic trading system PFTS NEXT. The trading system is viewed as 
highly transparent and effective in regards to technology. Though, annual equity 
value traded on PFTS is quite low, only about USD 2 bln. 
 
This chapter aims at acquainting the reader with the Ukrainian stock market and 
providing a background for empirical research in the further chapters of the thesis.  
 
The study is based mainly on information from the following sources: State 
Commission for Securities and Stock Market (the Ukrainian stock market regulator), 
PFTS stock exchange, reports and studies conducted by international organizations 
such as World Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, USAID, 
and Standard & Poors'. The study is complemented by the insights of investment 
practitioners from the major investment companies in Ukraine on some aspects of 
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the Ukrainian stock market operation. The insights were gained through interviews 
conducted by the author. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a short history of 
development of the Ukrainian stock market, presents the market in the context of 
other Eastern European markets, and presents some statistical figures that describe 
the stock market and the stock exchange PFTS. Section 3 describes stock market 
legislation, corporate governance, and information disclosure in Ukraine. Section 4 
describes the process of trading on PFTS, while Section 5 suggests professionals’ 
insights on the operation of the Ukrainian stock market. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.2. History of the Ukrainian Stock Market Development  
 
Formation of the Ukrainian Stock Market 
 
A historical perspective is necessary to understand the reasons of low activity in the 
Ukrainian stock market, its specific features, and a lack of interest from the general 
public in investment of their savings through investment funds. 
 
Since the beginning of 20th century, when the communist government came into 
power in Ukraine and until 1991, when Ukraine proclaimed its independence, 
Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, a country where state was the sole owner of 
all enterprises and where stock market did not exist.  
While the stock markets were actively developing in many countries of the world, 
the state-planned economy predominated in the Soviet Union. The companies 
received financing from the state budget; a few generations of people invested their 
savings either in the Savings bank (which was state-owned too) or in the 
government bonds.  
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In 1990s the mass privatisation and deregulation of the economy became the 
starting point of the stock market development in Ukraine and other post-soviet 
Eastern European countries. This differs the group of countries from the other 
emerging markets (i.e. Asia and Latin America), where economy was initially 
private and the active stock market development started with the rapid growth of 
the export oriented industries. 
 
Privatization in Ukraine has been performed in two stages: mass certificate 
privatization (1992-1998), and privatization for money (from 1999 till present). 
 
Mass privatization in Ukraine was a rapid sale of a large number of enterprises to a 
"mass" number of investors - employees and the public. Large percentage of 
companies' shares (25% to 100% of each company) were sold in exchange for 
privatization certificates.  Privatization certificates were distributed free-of-charge to 
all citizens of Ukraine. In Ukraine, mass privatization involved the universe of the 
country’s approximately 10,000 medium and large industrial enterprises 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers/USAID, 1998). 
A mass privatization approach was chosen in order to provide the fastest transfer of 
ownership from public to private hands (Roland, 2000). The program aimed for 
rapid and equitable distribution to the public and the development of capital 
markets, while revenue generation was of a lower priority (IMF, 2002). 
Among all the enterprises, the government picked out a list of strategic ones 
(Verhovna Rada, 2000).  Enterprises in this group are monopolists (or hold at least 
35% of their product market). The enterprises are subject to privatization, but the 
state retains either a blocking minority (>25%) or a controlling share (>50%) in these 
enterprises.  
During 1992-1998, 10,480 medium and large enterprises were privatized (IMF, 2002). 




Subsequently, in 1999, the certificate privatization finished, the unused certificates 
were annulated, and since then the privatization has been continued in a form of 
cash sales (or "privatization for money"). 
 
In the process of privatization two types of joint-stock companies were created: 
closed joint stock companies and open joint stock companies. Closed joint-
stock companies (CJSC) are owned by a specified circle of owners and the 
existing stock holders have a primary right for buying the stocks that are sold 
by other stock holders. Companies of this kind cannot be traded on a stock 
exchange. Stocks of open joint stock companies (OJSC) can be sold freely. These 
companies can be listed on a stock exchange.  
As of July 2008, there were about 31 thousand of joint stock companies in Ukraine. 
The majority of them (about 21 thousand) were functioning in the form of a closed 
joint stock company. About 10 thousand of joint stock companies were open joint 
stock companies (World Bank, 2008). Listed companies comprise a small proportion 
of the total number of joint stock companies. 
 
Privatization in Ukraine provided securitization of the economy and created a basis 
for the stock market development. One of the Ukrainian stock exchanges, PFTS, was 
opened in 1995. Initially it operated as an electronic information system and over 
time became the biggest securities trading platform in Ukraine.  
 
Development of the Ukrainian stock market during 2000-2010 
 
The development of the Ukrainian stock market (USM) during the last decade can 
be divided into four main stages. First, the period of 2000-2004, when the market 
had very low trading volumes and had been developing very slowly. Second, the 
period of 2005-2007 - the time of market revival and subsequent active growth and 
development, which started after the Orange revolution of December 2004 and the 
arrival of new, more democratic government. Third, the period of January 2008 - 
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March 2009, the time of the greatest fall in the history of USM, resulted from the 
global financial crisis. Finally, from March 2009 till present (2010) the USM have 
been going through recovery and have seen further growth (See Graph 2.1.).  
During the first three periods PFTS was the main trading floor in Ukraine and 
accounted for about three quarters of the organized equity trading in Ukraine. PFTS 
had a dealership market structure and was characterized by large order sizes since 
most of the market participants were institutional investors. PFTS had an electronic 
trading system, though it was a common practice to pre-negotiate trades over the 
phone. An important characteristic of the 2009-2010 period was the start of 
operation of a new exchange, the Ukrainian Exchange (UX), which introduced to the 
market the long-awaited order-driven trading technology. The order-driven trading 
increased the speed of the order execution and the information transparency of the 
market. As a result, large volume of trading in liquid stocks has moved from PFTS 
to UX.  
 




The period of 2000-2004 
 
From 1990s, the time of origination of the Ukrainian stock market, and until 2004 the 
stock market of Ukraine had been developing very slowly.  
 
Firstly, supply of stocks was very limited. The stock market was hardly seen as a 
place to raise capital but rather as a means of ownership redistribution. The level of 
corporate governance, information transparency, and property rights protection 
was very low, which hindered Ukrainian companies from going public. At the same 
time, the availability of bank loans was high. Privatization of large and interesting 
for investors state-owned enterprises often resulted in shares going to the hands of 
the financial-industrial groups who aimed at acquiring large stakes in a company 
and exercising long-term control over the company. As a result, very little portion of 
a company stocks after privatization was left to float (about 4%), which greatly 
limited liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market. For example, Western NIS 
enterprise Fund and Sigma Bleyzer, two foreign funds among those very few 
foreign funds investing in Ukraine, had to work directly with the Ukrainian block 
holders instead of buying stocks through the organized stock market1. 
 
Secondly, demand for Ukrainian stocks from domestic institutional investors was 
low. After many collapses of the investment funds in Russia and Ukraine in 1990s, 
no mutual or private pension funds existed in Ukraine till the new Law “On 
Collective Investment Institutions” (2001) came into effect. In 2003 an investment 
company Kinto opened the first in Ukraine closed-end fund based on the new law. 
The first open-ended fund in Ukraine was opened by the same company in 2004. 
The funds were very successful and put a foundation for the development of mutual 
funds industry in Ukraine. The closed-end fund after three years of its operation 
brought 699.4% return, while the open-ended fund has brought more than 100% 
                                                
1 Natalia Zaderey. “Development of the Ukrainian stock market in 2004 fully depends on the 
Ukrainian top corporations”. 27.01.2004, Business Information Network, http://bin.ua 
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return after first year of its operation. New funds appeared in the market, though 
the industry has been developing very slowly and domestic investment funds have 
not become important players in the Ukrainian stock market. The growth of mutual 
fund investment was hindered by low trust to and understanding of the mutual 
fund investing among the Ukrainian public as well as high profitability of bank 
deposits at the time.  
 
Thirdly, foreign investors were retained from investing into Ukrainian stock market 
due to the lack of transparency in the property rights protection and distribution. 
There were many examples of unfair privatization, when companies interesting to 
investors were sold to the parties close to the government at a price, which was 
considerably lower than their fair value. One of the examples was privatization of 
Kryvorizhstal in 2004, one of the largest businesses in Ukraine and a globally-
important steel producer. There were both foreign and domestic investors interested 
in buying the plant but the State Property Fund of Ukraine (a government body that 
manages state ownership) created such privatization conditions that excluded 
foreign investors from bidding for the plant. It required that the acquirer of the 
plant had to have worked in the Ukrainian market for at least three years and 
produced at least 1 mln. tones of Ukrainian coke annually. As a result, the plant was 
sold to the Interpipe Group, a group closely related to the Ukrainian President, for 
USD 803.7 mln., while Russian company Severstal offered USD 1.2 bln. and a U.S. 
consortium LNM Group & US Steel – USD 1.5 bln. with an intention to invest 
further USD 1.2 bln. into the plant’s renovation. 
 
Those investors who dared to invest into Ukrainian stocks focused mainly on the 






The period of 2005-2007 
 
After the years of very slow development of the Ukrainian stock market caused 
largely by non-transparent property distribution rules in Ukraine backed by the 
Ukrainian authorities, 2005 became the turning point for the Ukrainian stock 
market. The presidential elections of December 2004 and the corrupt computation of 
votes in favour of the candidate favoured by the previous President of Ukraine, 
resulted in the “Orange Revolution”, when millions of Ukrainians went out on the 
streets with protests. Success of the Orange Revolution and arrival of new, more 
democratic government raised interest in Ukraine among the international 
community. 
Further steps of the new government assured international investors in the decrease 
of risks of investment in Ukraine and resulted in the inflow of foreign portfolio 
capital. This heated up the prices of Ukrainian assets, increased the volumes of 
trading, and gave a spur for the further development of the stock market. Among 
the steps was cancellation of the corrupt 2004 Kryvorizhstal sale and a further 
transparent and fair sale of the plant in 2005; the acquisitions of Ukrainian banks by 
foreign investors, and the first successful IPOs at the London Stock Exchange’s 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) by three Ukrainian companies. 
 
2005 have also seen first IPOs in PFTS. A Ukrainian retail network Retail Group sold 
10% of its shares and attracted USD 27.5 mln.2 A sequence of IPOs on PFTS 
continued with Rodovid Bank, a publishing house KP Publications, a large machine-
building plant Motor-Sich, and one of the leading producers of dairy products in 
Ukraine Ukrproduct. Though Ukrainian IPOs often were considered by 
international investors as not proper IPOs due to the lower requirements related to 
information disclosure.  
                                                
2 Anna Yeremenko, 26.12.05, Kommersant Ukraine. 
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2005 have seen three-fold growth in the volume of trading, from USD 206.8 mln. to 
USD 643.9 mln. and an increase of PFTS index by 138%. Arrival of foreign investors 
and an increased number of stocks in the Ukrainian stock market are seen as the 
main drivers of the growth. According to the PFTS 2005 Annual Report, “Like in the 
case with government bonds, increase in the volumes of trades with stocks occurred 
foremost due to the increased demand of foreign investors for Ukrainian assets.” 
According to some estimates foreign investors accounted for about 70% of trading 
volume in PFTS stocks3. Ukrainian mutual funds as institutional investors played a 
minor role in the Ukrainian stock market. They had low popularity among 
Ukrainian public due to low trust to mutual funds as a result of many cases of their 
collapse in 1990s, and a possibility to earn quite high interest on secure bank 
deposits. 
 
Higher activity in the stock market starting 2005 has led to the blue chip companies 
coming to their fair value and therefore becoming less popular among investors 
than they used to be over 2000-2004. Investors started to actively search for the 
undervalued assets and switching to the second and third tier stocks, many of 
which were still able to provide excessive profitability. According to the PFTS 2005 
Annual Report, “With their [foreign investors’] involvement during 2005, stocks of 
second tier experienced increased demand, while blue chips experienced stable 
demand”. 
 
The growth of trading volume and market capitalization of PFTS continued through 
2006 and 2007 being supported by positive domestic economic trends such as active 
GDP growth (real GDP growth rates were 2.6%, 7.1%, and 7.7% in 2005, 2006, and 
2007 respectively4), stable exchange rate, new tax code favourable for small 
business, and general deregulation of the economy. Among the global factors, high 
availability of capital in the world capital markets encouraged international 
                                                
3 Sergey Lyamets et al. Overview of the Ukrainian stock market in 2006. 15/01/2007, Business 
Information Network, http://bin.ua 
4 CIA World Factbook, 2010. 
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investors to look for new profitable opportunities, one of which was investing in 
Ukraine. 
 
Increase in trading activity increased liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market and 
resulted in the decrease of the bid-ask spreads for moderately liquid stocks from 
20% in 2004 to 10% in 2006.  
 
2007 was the best year in PFTS since its origination in 1997. Development of the 
market together with active growth of Ukrainian and world GDP and high 
availability of capital on the world capital markets resulted in even larger inflows of 
foreign portfolio capital than in previous years and increased the volume of trading 
in PFTS by 69% compared to 2006. Index PFTS (index of blue-chip companies) has 
grown by 144% from 496 in the beginning of 2007 to its historical high of 1,209 on 15 
January 2008. In 2007 Ukrainian stock market was the best performer in Europe and 
second in the world. 
 
Despite the positive changes, many problems in the Ukrainian investment 
environment kept risks of equity investment in Ukraine quite high. 
Some of the most important problems were weak system of property rights 
protection and weak corporate governance. Joint stock companies were regulated 
by a quite outdated Law "On Business Associations" adopted in 1991, a time when 
market changes only started in Ukraine. The weaknesses of the law gave room for 
manipulations and resulted in quite a few cases of dilution of the minority 
shareholders’ share. A big scandal occurred in 2006 when one of the blue-chip 
companies, Zaporizhstal, announced additional share issue which diluted minority 
shareholders’ ownership. The company, 80% of ownership in which belonged to 
three large financial-industrial groups, in June 2006 approved an increase of stock 
capital by USD 89 mln. through adding to the main company its five affiliates. The 
affiliates were mainly trading companies that sold Zaporizhstal’s produce and their 
value was considerably lower than the declared one. After the announcement the 
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company’s stock price dropped by 60% from $1.20 to $0.47. The minority 
shareholders were given an option to trade in their stocks at the market price 
prevailing at the time of sale, which resulted in the minority shareholders’ loss of 
USD 75 mln. and a decrease of their share from 8% to 3%5. The Law "On Business 
Associations" did not provide for compensation to minority shareholders during 
additional share issues and stated that the buyout price had to be no lower then the 
nominal share price. Therefore formally, the majority owners of Zaporizhstal acted 
in compliance with the law. Some of the minority shareholders of Zaporizhstal were 
large Ukrainian investment funds such as Dragon Capital, Concord Capital, 
Renaissance Capital, Sincom, and Kinto. They appealed to the court against the 
Zaporizhstal additional share issue but their appeal did not have any success. After 
the precedent, PFTS stopped trading Zaporizhstal’s shares and the company was 
excluded from the index PFTS, where it previously took weight of 15%. 
Other examples of dilution of minority shareholders took place in 2006-2008 and 
included such companies as Alchevsk Iron & Steel, Kievmedpreparat, Nikolayev 
Aluminuous Plant, and Prominvestbank. Such cases emphasized an appealing 
necessity of adoption of a new company law in Ukraine, which was finally done in 
2008 when the Law "On Joint Stock Companies" replaced the Law "On Business 
Associations". 
 
The risks and limitations in the Ukrainian stock market made many Ukrainian blue-
chip and high growth companies go for IPOs at the foreign trading floors instead of 
PFTS, which restricted the growth in trading volumes in PFTS. Ukrainian stock 
market had limited capital resources. If a company was interested in attracting a few 
hundred million dollars, it faced with inability of the domestic investment market to 
satisfy such demand. Also, offerings and placements in the Ukrainian stock market 
were not viewed as secure enough. In 2000s Ukrainian companies faced with 
problems of corporate raiding when interested parties acquired a shareholding with 
an aim of putting pressure on existing owners and management and taking over 
                                                
5 Vyachaslav Mironenko, 26 June 2006, Investgazeta, #25. 
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control over the company with hostile aims such as getting rid of a competitor or 
own empire building rather than increasing company’s efficiency. In addition to 
this, there was no confidence in that the information disclosed to the stock exchange 
during an IPO would not become available to third parties harming the business 
through that.  
 
High dependence of the Ukrainian stock market on the capital of foreign investors 
presented another risk, a risk of high fluctuations in the prices of Ukrainian stocks 
in response to the changes of situation in the world financial markets. For example, 
when on 10 May 2006 the U.S. federal funds rate was raised to its highest level since 
2001, 5.0%, there was a considerable outflow of funds from the Ukrainian stock 
market, which changed the rising trend of the Index PFTS to falling and resulted in 
a drop of Index PFTS by 19.5% during the next month. 
 
The period of 2008 
 
While the profitability of the Ukrainian stock market was one of the best in the 
world in 2007, in 2008 the market experienced some of the largest losses. From 15 
January 2008, the market’s peak, till 6 March 2009, the market’s trough, index PFTS 
lost 83.5% and came back to the value it had at the time of the Orange Revolution. 
Market capitalization decreased by almost five times, from USD 110 bln. to USD 
22.5 bln.  
The fall of the Ukrainian stock market was mainly a result of the large foreign 
capital outflows from Ukraine after the beginning of the world liquidity crisis. With 
the worsening of the situation in the global financial markets, international funds 
started to actively withdraw capital from Ukraine following the global trend of 
redirecting investments into more secure assets. Large outflow of foreign capital 
had a catastrophic effect on the highly depended on foreign capital stock market of 
Ukraine.  
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Despite the considerable decrease in liquidity in PFTS in 2008, the volume of trading 
grew during the year by 24% as a result of active sales of Ukrainian stocks by 
investors.  
 
The situation in the Ukrainian stock market worsened with a steep downward trend 
in the Ukrainian economy. External markets of debt capital virtually closed and 
Ukrainian companies and financial institutions faced difficulties with borrowing 
cheap financial resources. Later this developed into a considerable drop of liquidity 
of the Ukrainian financial sector. In addition to this, drop in the world commodity 
prices, especially steel prices, created a considerable negative impact on the 
Ukrainian economy. Steel is one of the main exports in Ukraine and steel producing 
companies and iron ore extracting companies are among the companies with the 
highest capitalization on PFTS. Drop of the world steel prices resulted in the large 
drop of Ukrainian industrial output in 2008 (30%) and further negative impact on 
the value of the assets in the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
To increase transparency of trading, in May 2008 PFTS introduced some important 
changes to the reporting of trades. Before, some of the trades executed by PFTS 
brokers with PFTS-listed stocks were not reported to PFTS. Trades which were 
performed directly between a PFTS broker (a member of PFTS) and an outside 
investor (non-member of PFTS) (also called “the third party trades”) were not 
obligatory to be reported to the exchange. Brokers could have voluntarily reported 
these trades to PFTS at a specially allotted time (before the opening of the trading 
session (before 11 a.m.) during the next two trading days after the trade execution). 
As a result, a portion of the third party trades was out of sight of the stock market 
observers/participants. On 26 May 2008, PFTS obliged the brokers to report the 
details of all their third party trades. The reporting had to be done through the 
trading terminal of PFTS no later than the next working day after the trade 
execution and the data on the third party trades started being published on PFTS 
web-site in a special section called “Reporting”. As a result, information about all 
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trades performed by PFTS brokers with PFTS listed securities became available to 
the market. 
 
The period of 2009-2010 
 
2009-2010 brought gradual recovery to the stock market. From the beginning of 
March 2009 till the end of August 2010, index PFTS grew by 303% and reached 
792.8. 
 
2009 opened a new page in the development of the Ukrainian stock market. In 
March 2009 a new stock exchange started its operation, the Ukrainian Exchange 
(UX). Ukrainian Exchange was started by a group of large Ukrainian brokers, which 
traded in PFTS, and the Russian Trading System (RTS). UX introduced to the market 
the long-awaited order-driven trading technology, which increased the speed, 
efficiency, and information transparency of trading and opened access to trading to 
general public. As a result, a large portion of PFTS volume in liquid stocks moved to 
UX.  In August 2009, just five months after the opening of the UX, the volume of 
equity trading on UX exceeded that on PFTS. In June 2010, UX accounted for 70,507 
equity trades of the total volume of $183 mln., which was more than four times 
higher than the equity trading volume on PFTS ($44 mln.). Apart from the order 
driven market UX also operated dealership market where low liquidity stocks were 
traded. 
 
The Internet trading opportunity allowed increasing the number of investors 
considerably. While in April 2009 there were 10 individual investors trading in UX, 
in October of the same year their number increased to more than 1,5006. The 
increased number of individual investors did not create a considerable impact on 
the total volume of trading but was an important step towards attracting more 
                                                
6 “Stock Market: The New Blood”. 2009, Investgazeta #41. 
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attention to investing in the stock market equity among Ukrainian public, which can 
be an important step on the way of raising the stock market liquidity.  
 
The weakened position of PFTS resulted in the takeover of the exchange by a large 
Russian stock exchange, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICE) in 
autumn 2009. Bids for PFTS (though unsuccessful) were also done in previous years. 
In response to the innovation introduced by RTS in UX, MICE started an order-
driven trading technology on PFTS. Despite the changes in PFTS, UX kept the 
leading positions in the market.  
 
We expect that the presence of two large competing stock exchanges in the 
Ukrainian stock market should accelerate the speed of development of the market in 
the years to come. 
 
 
2.3. Overview of the Ukrainian Stock Market 
 
Ukrainian Stock Market in the Context of European Emerging Stock Markets  
 
Standard & Poors' classifies the Ukrainian securities market as a frontier market. 
Frontier markets are a subgroup of emerging markets and are investable but have 
lower market capitalization or liquidity than the more developed emerging markets. 
More than 20 countries are classified as frontier in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. The European Frontier markets group includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
 
The market capitalization of Ukrainian stock market is the largest among European 
frontier markets (USD 111.8 bln.) and larger than of some emerging markets, e.g. 
Hungary and Czech Republic (Table 2.1). The advantage of the Ukrainian stock 
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market is that a substantial number of traded companies are fairly large by 
international standards, a feature that many Eastern European countries lack. 
Market capitalization as percentage of GDP is 78.3 and is higher than in other 
frontier markets and many other emerging markets, e.g. Hungary, Poland, and 
Czech Republic.  
 
























Developed markets      
United States 19,425,855 147.6 35,510,463 182.8 5,133 
United Kingdom 3,794,310 159.6 4,697,356 123.8 2,913 
       
Emerging markets         
Russia 1,503,011 107.1 960,424 63.9 328 
Poland 207,322 44.0 91,429 44.1 328 
Czech Republic 73,420 34.0 44,272 60.3 131 
Hungary  47,651 37.1 48,890 102.6 41 
           
Frontier Markets      
Ukraine* 111,756 78.3 1,996 1.8 335 
Romania 44,925 27.0 8,626 19.2 2,098 
Bulgaria 21,793 32.8 7,431 34.1 369 
Slovak Republic 6,971 10.1 35 0.5 153 
      
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2008, PFTS stock exchange. 
*The numbers for Ukraine refer to the PFTS stock exchange. (PFTS stock exchange accounts 
for 74% of the organized equity trading in Ukraine). 
 
In 2007 the number of listed stocks was 335, which is less than in Romania (2,098) 
and Bulgaria (369) but more than in Poland (328) and Czech Republic (131). 
A specific feature of the Ukrainian stock market is low free float of listed companies 
and low trading activity. As a result, trading volume in Ukraine is relatively modest 
as compared to other countries in the Emerging Markets and Frontier Markets 
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groups. For example, in 2007 value of shares traded in Ukraine was USD 1,996 mln., 
or 1.8%, of the market capitalization. The corresponding number for Bulgaria was 
34.1%, for Poland, 44.1%. 
 
Ukraine is a part of such global indexes as MSCI Frontier Markets and S&P Frontier 
BMI (former S&P/IFC Global for Frontier Group). Separate country index MSCI 
Ukraine is regularly produced by Morgan Stanley, while S&P Ukraine is regularly 
produced by Standard & Poor's. Index PFTS is the main domestic stock market 
index. It includes only blue-chip companies and has been computed daily since 
1997. 
 
Ukraine is open to foreign investors. Restrictions on foreign investments exist only 
in the publishing and broadcasting sectors, and foreigners are not allowed to 
participate in the manufacturing of weapons. 
 
 
Organized Equity Markets of Ukraine and PFTS Stock Exchange 
 
Ukrainian equity market has been actively growing in the past decade. There are 8 
registered stock exchanges in Ukraine. 
Among 8 registered stock exchanges, PFTS Stock Exchange is the largest and 
accounts for over 90% of trading in the organized securities market and 74.1% in the 
organized equity market in Ukraine. The remaining seven exchanges have low 
activity and perform limited operations acting mainly as facilitators in the State 
Property Fund privatization process (USAID, 2006 [1]). 
 
Market capitalization of PFTS has been actively growing and increased from USD 
4.8 bln. (10% of GDP) in 2003 to USD 111.8 bln. (78% of GDP) in 2007 (Table 2.2).  
The market is dominated by large companies. Top-ten companies by market 
capitalization take 44.7% of total market capitalization of PFTS, while top-ten 
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companies by value traded account for 42.5% of total value traded of PFTS. The 
number of listed companies varied between 191 and 335 between 2003 and 2007. 
 
Table 2.2. PFTS stock exchange market indicators. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Stock market capitalization, 
USD million 
4,803 11,780 29,100 44,119 111,756 
Stock market capitalization 
as % of GDP 
10.0% 20.0% 35.0% 40.3% 78.3% 
Capitalization of top-10 
companies by market 
capitalization (% of total) 
68.0% 85.3% 55.9% 50.2% 44.7% 
Value traded, USD million 93.8 206.8 643.9 1,168.3 1,996.0 
Value traded of top-10 
companies by value traded 
(% of total) 
- 80.0% 45.8% 40.1% 42.5% 
Number of listed companies 267 191 262 296 335 
Source: State Commission for Securities and Stock Market, PFTS Stock Exchange 
 
Ukrainian stock market is dominated by industrial enterprises but is fairly 
diversified by industry. Metallurgy and metal mining companies take 40% of the 
total market capitalization of PFTS, which is not surprising as iron and steel are the 
main exports of Ukraine. Power engineering and supply companies take 14% of 
PFTS market capitalization, banking - 12%, mechanical engineering - 8%, oil and gas 
- 6%, telecommunications - 4%, and pipes - 3%.  
 
Even though there are many industrial companies with large market capitalization 
in PFTS, free floats of many of the companies are extremely low. There is no official 
data on free floats of public companies but according to an estimate of one of the 
World Bank studies, average free float for listed companies in Ukraine was around 4 
percent in 2005 (World Bank, 2006). The same estimate of 4% was suggested in a 
USAID study of the Ukrainian stock market, with a comment that the majority of 
newly issued shares of the companies are often distributed among existing 
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shareholders (USAID, 2006 [1]). Estimates of free floats of listed companies are 
suggested by a privately-run Fund Market Project (www.fundmarket.ua), whose 
aim is to gather all publicly available information about Ukrainian public companies 
and publish in on their own web-site. The estimates are averages of the free float 
estimates of major Ukrainian investment companies. The 2009 estimates for the 
largest companies are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.5. For the top-ten capitalized 
companies the estimates vary between 0.5% and 9.6% and are in line with the 
estimate of average free float in Ukraine of 4% suggested by the World Bank and 
USAID studies mentioned above. Though for the first tier companies the estimates 
are somewhat higher, from 4.2% to 33.8%. 
 
Some details on the top-ten companies by market capitalization are presented in 
Table 2.3. Market capitalization of the companies varies between USD 2,174 mln. to 
USD 12,114 mln., which takes from 1.9% to 10.8% of total market capitalization. 
Trading activity of the companies is not high though. Annual value traded of the 
companies varies from USD 4.8 mln. to USD 145.8 mln. Such a low value is not 
surprising if consider the free float of the companies, which is extremely small, from 
0.5% to 9.6% of company market capitalization. 
 
All the securities listed on PFTS are divided into three listing levels ("tiers") based 
on their liquidity and a number of other characteristics. A detailed list of 
requirements is presented in Table 2.4. Third tier stocks are admitted to the PFTS 
stock market based on the agreement with the authorized body of the stock 
exchange. 
A stock is delisted if it was not traded during 60 consecutive calendar days. 
First tier companies are not necessarily the largest companies but the most liquid 
ones. Some of the large Ukrainian companies are not among the most liquid due to 





















































BAVL finance 4,555 4.1% 61.72 3.1% 831 4.0% 
6 Ukrnafta UNAF petrochemical 4,271 3.8% 92.19 4.6% 2,281 8.0% 






PGZK metal mining 2,982 2.7% 66.00 3.3% 888 7.7% 






NITR pipes 2,174 1.9% 28.69 1.4% 1,065 6.1% 
 Total   49,982 44.7% 547.67 27.4% 11,884  
 Source: PFTS Stock Exchange; *information about free floats is from Fund Market 
(http://fundmarket.ua) as of 2009. 
 
In the end of 2007 the first tier contained 10 stocks and accounted for about 18% of 
the market capitalization, while second and third tiers contained 29 and 296 stocks 




Table 2.4. PFTS stock listing requirements for 1st and 2nd Tiers. 
  1st Tier 2nd Tier 
Minimum value of the issuer's net assets, USD 
million 
19.0 9.5 
Minimum last financial year revenue, USD million 19.0 9.5 
Minimum term of business activity of the issuer 3 years 1 year 
Absence of losses 
2 out of 3 last 
years 
Last year 
Minimum number of shareholders 500 100 
Minimum capitalization, USD million 19.0 9.5 
Minimum number of trades for each of the last 6 
months 
10 10 
Minimum average monthly value traded for the 
last 6 months, USD million 
0.19 0.05 
Maximum spread size, % 15 50 
Source: PFTS Stock exchange, 2008. 
 
Some details on the first tier companies are presented in Table 2.5. First tier list 
includes only three of the top-ten capitalized companies. Another seven do not meet 
the requirements for the first tier listing. The list of the first tier companies is 
dominated by regional power engineering and distribution companies. Total value 
traded of the first tier companies is higher (USD 723 mln.) than total value traded of 
the top-ten companies by market capitalization (USD 548 mln.), which tells about 
higher liquidity of the first tier companies. This is not surprising taking into account 




































1 Ukrnafta UNAF Petrochemical 4,271 3.8% 92.19 4.6% 2,281 8.0% 
2 Ukrtelekom UTEL Telecom 3,984 3.6% 29.75 1.5% 1,502 7.1% 
3 Ukrsotsbank USCB Finance 2,821 2.5% 145.80 7.3% 1,288 4.2% 
4 Centerenergo CEEN 
Power 
Engineering 
1,990 1.8% 83.26 4.2% 1,959 21.7% 
5 Dniproenergo DNEN 
Power 
Engineering 
1,979 1.8% 78.22 3.9% 985 8.7% 
6 Zakhidenergo ZAEN 
Power 
Engineering 
1,492 1.3% 99.52 5.0% 2,487 29.9% 
7 Kyivenergo KIEN 
Power 
Engineering 
918 0.8% 48.45 2.4% 519 9.3% 
8 Donbasenergo DOEN 
Power 
Engineering 
872 0.8% 20.18 1.0% 816 14.2% 
9 Motor Sich MSICH 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
709 0.6% 109.82 5.5% 1,545 33.8% 
10 Stirol STIR Chemical 663 0.6% 16.03 0.8% 763 9.6% 
 Total   19,698 17.6% 723.22 36.2% 14,145   
Source: PFTS Stock Exchange; *information about free floats is from Fund Market 
(http://fundmarket.ua) as of 2009. 
 
 
Institutions in the Ukrainian Stock Market 
 
Institutional equity holdings dominate in the Ukrainian market. The main investors 
into Ukrainian equity (equity of both open and closed joint stock companies7) are 
domestic companies, they account for 82.5% of the total equity holdings (Table 2.6). 
Domestic individuals account for 10.7% of the total equity holdings. Foreign 
investors play a minor role in the Ukrainian equity market. Their equity holdings 
account for only 6.7% of the total equity holdings.  
 
                                                
7 For details on distinction between open and closed joint stock companies, see Section 2.2, 
Subsection "History of the Ukrainian Stock Market Development". 
 32 
Table 2.6. Structure of equity investors in Ukraine, 2007. 
The table present details on the ownership distribution by the type of investor in both open 
and closed joint stock companies of Ukraine. 
Stock holdings of companies, USD bln. 32.4 89.1% 
       Stock held by domestic companies, USD bln. 30.0 82.5% 
       Stock held by foreign companies, USD bln. 2.4 6.6% 
Stock holdings of individuals, USD bln. 4.0 10.9% 
       Stock held by domestic individuals, USD bln. 3.9 10.7% 
       Stock held by foreign individuals, USD bln. 0.05 0.1% 
Total 36.4 100.0% 
Source: State Commission for Securities and Stock Market. 
 
Large blocks of equity in the largest industrial enterprises of Ukraine are mainly 
held by Ukrainian business groups. Business groups are conglomerates in a form of 
financial industrial group or a group of vertically integrated companies. Among the 
largest business groups are System Capital Management (chemicals, 
telecommunications, energy, metallurgy, machine building, brewery, media, and 
other), ISD (metallurgy, machine building,  telecommunications, agriculture, media, 
and other),  Privat group (finance, oil&gas, metallurgy, food industry, media, and 
other), Interpipe (pipes, energy, finance, media, and other), and Finance and Credit 
Group (finance, machine building, energy, and other). The groups are largely 
controlled by Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Table 2.7 presents the ownership structure of the top-20 Ukrainian companies by 
market capitalization in 2007. The companies take 60.7% of the total market 
capitalization of PFTS. The largest portion of equity in the companies belongs to the 
business groups, 69.3%. It is followed by state ownership, 12.4%. 4.1% of equity in 
the companies belongs to offshore companies. Offshore companies are often Cypriot 
companies started by Ukrainian nationals with an aim to avoid transparency or 
decrease tax burden. The rest 14.2% of ownership in the companies is either not 
disclosed or belongs to minority shareholders. 
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Table 2.7. The structure of the disclosed ownership of the top-20 Ukrainian 
companies by market capitalization.  
Data on the ownership structure is taken from www.fundmarket.ua as of beginning of 2010. 
www.fundmarket.ua is a privately managed web-portal that presents all publicly available 
data for Ukrainian public companies. Since discussion in the chapter focuses mostly on 2007, 
the companies in the list below are chosen based on their market capitalization in 2007. 













% of Total 
1 ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih KSTL 12,114 0.4% 94.4%  94.8% 
2 Azovstal AZST 6,579  97.3%  97.3% 
3 
North Ore Mining and 
Processing Plant 
SGOK 5,817  99.5%  99.5% 
4 
Ilyich Iron and Steel 
Works 
MMKI 4,686  90.4%  90.4% 
5 Raiffeisen Bank Aval BAVL 4,555  95.6%  95.6% 
6 Ukrnafta UNAF 4,271 50.0% 42.0%  92.0% 
7 Ukrtelecom UTEL 3,984 92.8%   92.8% 
8 
South Ore Mining and 
Processing Plant  
PGZK 2,982  44.0% 52.7% 96.7% 





NITR 2,174  91.5%  91.5% 
11 Nadra Bank NADR 2,130  92.2%  92.2% 
12 
Central Ore Mining and 
Processing Plant 
CGOK 2,003   60.0% 60.0% 
13 Centerenergo CEEN 1,990 78.3%   78.3% 
14 Dniproenergo DNEN 1,979 50.0% 44.3%  94.3% 
15 
Krasnoarmiyska Zahidna 
#1 Coal Mine 
SHCHZ 1,941  55.1%  55.1% 
16 Poltavsky Iron Ore PGOK 1,852    0.0% 
17 
Dniprovsky Iron and Steel 
Integrated Works 
DMKD 1,666  99.0%  99.0% 
18 Zakhidenergo ZAEN 1,492    - 
19 Sun Interbrew Ukraine  SUNI 1,467  98.3%  98.3% 
20 
Marganets Ore Mining 
and Processing Plant 
MGZC 1,321    - 
 Total Mcap  67,824 8,434 45,006 2,774 85.8% 
 % of total Mcap  12.4% 69.3% 4.1%  
Source: www.fundmarket.ua 
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Equity holdings of the business groups often change as the groups buy and sell 
equity depending on their business needs and the changing market conditions. So, 
some new portions of equity can enter or leave free float. Also, if an investor is 
interested in a large equity holding of a particular company whose free float is 
small, there is a possibility to negotiate the acquisition of the block with the current 
owners of the company. According to an analyst of Parex Asset Management, an 
investment company in Ukraine, interviewed by the author, such approach to 
equity acquisition is often practiced in the Ukrainian investment companies. Such 
approach is also often practiced when a foreign fund is interested in buying a block 
of Ukrainian equity in a thinly traded stock. 
 
Professional investment industry in Ukraine is quite underdeveloped. Banks and 
insurance companies are the main institutional players in the Ukrainian stock 
market. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, in the end of 2007, USD 5.7 bln. 
of banks' assets were invested in securities. Out of them USD 704 mln., were kept in 
equity in the banks' trading portfolios (Table 2.8). Unfortunately, there is no data 
available on the value of the banks' assets held in the stock market equity (held as 
investment rather than for trading purposes). 
 
Insurance industry is the largest amongst non-banking financial institutions in 
Ukraine as measured by assets. The total assets of insurance companies were worth 
USD 6.3 bln. in 2007; 37% of the assets (USD 2.3 bln.) were invested in equity (Table 
2.8). 
 
Collective investment funds and non-state pension funds are not yet a prominent 
feature in the Ukrainian investment landscape. Net assets of collective investment 
funds ("non-venture funds" in Ukrainian legislation; the funds available for non-
corporate investors) reached USD 653 mln. in 2007. 40% of the assets (USD 261 mln.) 
were invested in equity (Table 2.8). 
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Out of them, 
assets invested 







equity, % of 
total assets 
Banks 143 110,800 5,680 704* 0.64%
Insurance Companies 446 6,300 2,520 2,331 37%
Investment funds 
(institutions of collective 
investments, non-venture)  
184 659 462 264 40%
Pension funds 85 63 33 16 25%
Total 858 117,822 8,695 3,315
Sources: State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services Markets in Ukraine; State 
Commission for Securities and Stock Market; Ukrainian Association of investment Business; 
National Bank of Ukraine. 
*Value of stocks in the trading portfolio of banks. 
 
Non-state pension funds have emerged only in 2003 and remain small. The number 
of registered non-state pension funds in 2007 was 96, out of which only 54 were 
active. The net assets of non-state pension funds account for USD 55 mln., out of 
which 25% (USD 14 mln.) is invested in the stock market equity (Table 2.8). 
 
Free float of Ukrainian listed companies is concentrated mainly in the hands of 
institutional players. If assume that the free float of the Ukrainian stock market is 
4% (as estimated in the World Bank (2006)), the value of the free float is USD 4.5 bln. 
then. Total institutional equity holdings account for USD 3,315 mln. (Table 2.8) and 
do not include equity held in the equity portfolios of banks (as investment rather 
than for trading purposes). If assume that the value of the banks' equity portfolios 
held for investment purposes equals the value of the banks' trading portfolios, then 
total institutional equity holdings will account for USD 4,115 mln., which is 90% of 
the total Ukrainian free float. 
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2.4. Legislation and Enforcement in the Area of Stock Market and Corporate 
Governance; Information Disclosure and Ownership Concentration in Public 
Companies 
 
Effective legislation and enforcement of laws is vital for effective functioning of a 
stock market. Legislation creates the "rules of the game" and ensures fair treatment 
and security of operations of the stock market participants. Significant drawbacks in 
the stock market or corporate governance legislation and enforcement can result in 
refusal of companies to raise funds in the stock market, refusal of investors to buy 
stock market equity, or refusal of market intermediaries to facilitate the stock 
market operations, which can result in market failure.  
 
Stock Market Legislation in Ukraine 
 
In general, Ukrainian securities market legislation is in good compliance with 
international practice. The Law "On Securities and Stock Market" (2006) represents a 
major improvement over the prior Law "On Securities and Stock Exchanges" (1991), 
especially regarding internationally compliant disclosure requirements for listed 
companies, issues of transparency of ownership, and the new rules for insider 
information and insider trading (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009). The Law 
"On National Depositary System and Particularities of Electronic Circulation of 
Securities in Ukraine" (1998) establishes the principles of depositary system 
operation. The Law "On Joint Investment Institutions" (2001) provides a framework 
for the establishment of mutual funds and investment funds.  
A good compliance of Ukrainian securities market legislation with international 
principles was supported by the conclusion of a survey carried out by European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2008 [1]). The survey measured 
the extent to which national securities market legislation in force 1 June 2007 in 29 
transition countries complied with the objectives and principles of securities 
regulation of the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO). 
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More than 200 questions, reflecting key issues of the regulations, were organized 
into the following 10 sections: (i) the powers of the market regulator, (ii) self-
regulatory organizations, (iii) issuer and disclosure obligations, (iv) collective 
investment schemes, (v) market intermediaries, (vi) secondary markets, (vii) 
clearance and settlement, (viii) accounting and auditing standards for financial 
disclosure, (ix) money laundering, (x) regulation of various financial instruments. 
The questions were sent to local practitioners in the transition region. Based on the  
 
Table 2.9. Quality of securities market legislation in transition countries. 
Compliance of national securities market legislation in force 1 June 2007 with the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (EBRD, 2008 [1]). The study is based on a survey that consists of 200 questions 
reflecting key issues of the regulations. The questions were answered by local practitioners 












(No countries) (14 countries) (8 countries) (4 countries) (3 countries) 
 Bulgaria Armenia Albania Belarus 
 Croatia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Azerbaijan Tajikistan 
 Czech Republic Macedonia Georgia Turkmenistan 
 Estonia Kazakhstan Uzbekistan  
 Hungary Kyrgyz Republic   
 Latvia Mongolia   
 Lithuania Montenegro   
 Moldova Russia   
 Poland    
 Romania    
 Serbia    
 Slovak Republic    
 Slovenia    
  Ukraine       
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
results of the survey, each country was placed into a grouping that indicated its 
level of adherence to international standards for securities markets legislation. No 
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countries in the survey were considered to be in "very high compliance", a result 
that would mean the international principles were fully transposed into the national 
legislation. Fourteen countries, including Ukraine, were rated as being in "high 
compliance", meaning that laws are relatively sound in most areas highlighted by 
the principles. The results of the survey are presented in Table 2.9. 
 
Corporate Governance Legislation and Enforcement in Ukraine 
 
Investor protection is an important element of effective functioning of a stock 
market. When minority shareholders finance companies, they face a risk that may 
not receive the returns on their investments because the controlling shareholders or 
managers expropriate them. Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against 
expropriation by the insiders.  
The legal approach to corporate governance suggests that the legal system (both 
laws and their enforcement) is the key mechanism in the protection of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al. (2000)). To a large extent, potential shareholders choose 
to finance companies because their rights are protected by the law. These laws, and 
the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and courts, are vital elements of 
effective functioning of a financial system (La Porta et al. (1997), (1998)).  
An example of importance of regulation for functioning of a stock market comes 
from Poland and the Czech Republic, two transition economies whose judiciaries in 
the early 1990s were generally viewed as ineffective. At that time the Polish 
government introduced a strict securities law that provided shareholder protection. 
As the system of courts did not work  effectively in the country, the law provided 
for a creation of a powerful Securities and Exchange Commission with significant 
enforcement powers that did not require reliance on courts. As a result, the Polish 
stock market started developing actively with both new and already listed 
companies raising equity in the market. By contrast, in the Czech Republic, neither 
strict securities law, nor a powerful market regulator were introduced. Probably as a 
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result, the Czech stock market has seen massive expropriation of minority 
shareholders from both companies and mutual funds. In contrast to the Polish 
market, the Czech market stagnated, with many companies being delisted and 
virtually no funds raised by companies through the stock market (Coffee (1999), 
Pistor (1999), Glaeser et al. (2001)). 
 
Among sound legislation in the areas of regulation of the operation of the stock 
market, depositary system, and investment institutions, legislation in the area of 
corporate governance until recently was very weak in Ukraine. The enforcement of 
laws has been weak too due to ineffective operation of courts and low power of the 
stock market regulator. This had a considerable negative influence on the 
development of the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
Until October 2008, corporate governance in Ukraine was regulated by the Law "On 
Business Associations" adopted in 1991. The law regulated the activities of five 
different types of companies, including joint-stock companies. According to an 
EBRD corporate governance study for Ukraine (EBRD, 2008 [2]), the law was weak 
in the areas of financial transparency, ownership structure disclosure, and minority 
shareholders protection. The study pointed that among the priority actions 
identified for Ukraine by international experts, the most commonly mentioned was 
the need for a new law on joint-stock companies, which would establish clear rules 
regarding director liability, transparency, disclosure, and the protection of minority 
shareholder rights. Self-regulating organizations in Ukraine were reported, for the 
most part, passive in promoting high corporate governance standards. 
 
The results of a broad EBRD study of corporate governance in Eurasia in 2007 
(EBRD, 2007) have shown that disclosure and transparency requirements in Ukraine 
are low, as well as the level of protection of shareholders' rights; equal treatment of 
shareholders is not guaranteed. The study investigated the law on the books and 
benchmarked each country's legislation to the OECD Principles of Corporate 
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Governance. 100% score corresponded to complete adherence of a country's 
legislation to the OECD principles. The total of 134 questions subdivided into six 
sections were considered. The general level of corporate governance in Ukraine was 
scored at 43%. Graphical results for each of the six sections of the study are 
presented in Figure 2.1. The disclosure and transparency requirements were found 
low, 40% score, as well as the provision of protection of the rights of shareholders, 
41% score. The legislation was found weak in providing equitable treatment of 
shareholders, 48% score.  
 
Figure 2.2. Corporate governance framework in Ukraine: assessment of the law on 
the books. 
The extremity of each axis represents an ideal score: the fuller the ‘web’, the better the 
corporate governance framework. 
Each of the criteria of the Ukrainian corporate government legislation was benchmarked 




Another example of weak corporate governance legislation in Ukraine is a low level 
of prospectus disclosure requirements. According to an EBRD study of securities 
market legislation in transition countries (EBRD, 2008 [1]), prospectus disclosure 
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practices in the CIS countries, including Ukraine, are generally of a lower standard 
than in Central and Southern European transition countries and prospectuses often 
omit risk-sensitive information. In particular, the study stated that doubts may be 
cast on the reliability of prospectuses in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan 
due to the mild sanctions for providing inaccurate or misleading information. 
 
Over the past decade there were numerous attempts to pass a new law on joint-
stock companies, but, according to an EBRD study (EBRD, 2008 [2]), these attempts 
were frustrated by forces in parliament that were concerned about how 
transparency and fair rules would negatively affect their personal businesses. A new 
Law "On Joint Stock Companies" was finally adopted and came into force in 
October 2008. The law was drafted in consultation with international experts, it is in 
line with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Principles 
and is largely compliant with European Union corporate governance directives. The 
adoption of the law is viewed as a significant step towards the establishment of a 
comprehensive corporate governance framework.  
 
Weak legislation in the area of corporate governance is weakened even more by the 
problems with legal enforcement. Private enforcement is weakened by the 
drawbacks in corporate legislation and corrupt court system, public enforcement is 
slackened by low competence and experience of the prosecutor and lack of power of 
the market regulator. An EBRD study of securities market legislation in transition 
countries (EBRD, 2008 [1]) performed a separate study of the effectiveness of private 
and public enforcement mechanisms in 29 transitional countries, including Ukraine. 
Private enforcement was considered as three possible lawsuits: (i) against the issuer, 
who sold the shares, (ii) against the underwriter, who concluded the contract with 
investors, and (iii) against the auditor, who made a mistake in opining on the 
consolidated financial statements. Public enforcement mechanism foresaw two 
actions: administrative action by the market regulator and criminal action by the 
prosecutors, provided that administrative or criminal provisions have been 
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breached. The study concluded that available civil actions are perceived to be 
complex in Ukraine and capacity and competence of courts in corporate cases need 
to be improved. The prosecution authorities were found to have little experience in 
securities cases. Insider trading was considered a serious risk but investigation and 
prosecution practices were found limited.  
The study also concluded that, in addition to the weaknesses in the legislative 
framework, Ukraine had an ineffective court system, which created problems in 
enforcing the country's few existing corporate governance rules. The low level of 
corporate governance expertise among judges, together with less-than-perfect 
legislation, led to contradictory decisions and a significant number of appeals. 
 
Another EBRD study investigated how the law works in practice in a broad range of 
Eurasian countries, including Ukraine (EBRD, 2007). The study assessed practical 
effectiveness of each country's legislation based on the following case study: "A 
minority shareholder discovers that substantial assets of the company have been 
sold to another company belonging to the management at a discount. What to do?" 
The survey was based on a questionnaire and involved working with leading 
corporate governance lawyers in the region. Ukraine's general result of 38% out of 
100% evidenced weak protection of minority shareholder's rights. More detailed 
results of the study for Ukraine are presented in Figure 2.2. In particular, the study 
have found that competence and experience of courts were quite high, 75% score (as 
opposed to the study discussed above), while competence and experience of 
prosecutor were found much lower, 31% score (in line with the EBRD (2008 [1])). 
The courts and the market regulator were found not to give equal treatment to all 
shareholders, impartiality of courts and impartiality of market regulator got the 





Figure 2.3. Corporate governance framework in Ukraine: Assessment of how the 
law works in practice. 
The extremity of each axis represents an ideal score: the fuller the ‘web’, the better the 
corporate governance framework. 
The survey assessed practical effectiveness of Ukrainian legislation based on the case study: 
"A minority shareholder discovers that substantial assets of the company have been sold to 
another company belonging to the management at a discount. What to do?" (EBRD, 2007). 
The survey was based on a questionnaire and involved working with leading corporate 




According to an International Finance Corporation study on commercial dispute 
resolution (International Finance Corporation, 2007), Ukrainian businesses were 
generally not satisfied with judicial proceedings and reported that, in their most 
recent disputes in court, the court decision was only completely adhered to in only 
45% of cases, partially adhered to in 18% of cases, and not adhered to at all in 37% of 
cases. When asked what factors were important to businesses when selecting a 
dispute resolution method, 58% of respondents stated that the most important 
factor was obtaining an outcome that could be enforced.  
 
Corruption is seen as one of the important reasons of the weak system of legal 
enforcement in Ukraine. Ukraine worsened in Transparency International's Year 
 44 
2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The country moved down to 134th place in 
2008 on the list of 180 countries, from 105th place in 2007. In 2008, Transparency 
International rated Ukraine at 2.5 points on the CPI's 10-point scale, a decline from 
the 2007 rating of 2.7 points. 
 
The regulator for the securities market in Ukraine, the State Commission for 
Securities and Stock Market (SCSSM), was found weak in enforcement of securities 
market regulations. According to a World Bank study (World Bank, 2006), SCSSM 
suffers from weak enforcement powers, and is confronted with a lack of budgetary 
and political independence. FTSE Quality of Markets Criteria (Europe Frontier) 
(FTSE, 2009)8 supports the conclusion. The study suggests an appraisal of frontier 
stock markets in Europe in a form of a matrix based on a number of criteria. For 
each criterion a stock market can receive one of the three grades: Pass, Restricted, or 
Not Met. For the "Formal stock market regulatory authorities actively monitor 
market" criterion of the Market and Regulatory Environment block, Ukraine got 
"Not Met" grade.  
 
Weak corporate governance legislation and enforcement results in a high level of 
corporate disputes in Ukraine. This discourages companies from going public and 
urges investors to be cautious when investing into Ukrainian stocks. According to 
the 2006 State Commission for Securities and Stock Market annual report, the level 
of corporate disputes in Ukraine in 2006 remained high compared to the previous 
year. Inadequate corporate legislation and weak enforcement were listed among the 
key reasons for the lack of improvements. SSMSC referred to a significant number 
of violations in the market, primarily violations of shareholders' rights during 
additional share issuances (share dilution resulting from issuing additional shares at 
below fair market value), asset stripping (the sale or transfer of company assets by 
                                                
8 Assessment criteria are grouped into five blocks: (i) Market and Regulatory Environment, (ii) 
Custody and Settlement, (iii) Dealing Landscape, (iv) Derivatives, and (v) Size of market. 
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management to a related party for below fair market value), and a low level of 
information disclosure. 
 
To summarise, legal enforcement in Ukraine is weak. The system of courts in 
Ukraine has competence and experience in corporate cases though it is not effective 
due to the weak corporate governance legislation and high level of corruption. 
Public enforcement is weak due to the low competence and experience of 
prosecutors, while the stock market regulator has lack of power due to the limited 
budgetary and political independence. This creates obstacles to the development of 
the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
Informational Transparency of Ukrainian Public Companies 
 
Standard & Poor's and Financial Initiatives Agency performed a study of 
informational transparency of Ukrainian public companies (S&P/FIA, 2007). The 
study follows methodology developed by Standard & Poor's for assessing 
information transparency of a stock market and computes a transparency index that 
measures how full and timely the information important for investors is disclosed. 
The dataset includes 36 Ukrainian companies that are traded on PFTS stock 
exchange and have the highest market capitalization and volume of trading. The 
companies comprise about 77% of total market capitalization and 70% of total 
volume of trading on PFTS. 
The study evaluates public companies based on 105 criteria divided into three 
blocks: i) ownership structure and shareholders' rights (34 criteria), ii) financial and 
operational information (46 criteria), and iii) composition and procedures of the 
Board of Directors and company management (25 criteria). For analysis, the study 
screens three sources of information: i) company annual reports, ii) web-sites, and 
iii) reports to the State Commission for Securities and Stock Market (SCSSM), 
reports to the PFTS stock exchange, and, in addition, prospectuses for additional 
stock offerings, which are publicly available. According to the weighting system, the 
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fact of public availability of certain information (not depending on the source) gives 
80% of the maximum points for a criterion. Additional 20% are added if the 
information is also available in two other sources (10% for each source). This 
approach is justified by the fact that replication of the same information in different 
sources increases the availability of the information for investor. The index of 
transparency for each company is found as average of the maximum available 
points for each criterion. 
 
The average index for the Ukrainian market as a whole was found very low, 23.9% 
with the highest value of the index for Raiffaisen Bank Aval, 48.8%, and the lowest 
value of the index for Dnieprospetsstal, 10.3%. The ownership structure and 
shareholders' rights block had the highest information transparency, 27.1%, it was 
followed by the financial and operational information block, 24.4%, and the 
composition and procedures of the Board of Directors and company management 
block, 18.6%. The authors suggest that the main reason of such a low level of 
disclosure is not only in low regulatory disclosure requirements but rather in a lack 
of motivation of the stock issuers for the disclosure. The importance of the stock 
market as a source of capital is not high in Ukraine, due to the low liquidity and 
high availability of bank capital. At the same time, the authors note that Ukrainian 
companies that go for an IPO in the international stock markets have considerably 
higher transparency. 
 
Among the industries, the most transparent is financial industry, 39.7% (Table 2.10). 
This is because banks, in addition to the reporting to SCSSM, have also to report to 
the National Bank of Ukraine. The National Bank of Ukraine has high requirements 
for the transparency of ownership structure of banks and performs a strict control 
over the financial and operational information disclosure of banks. The rest of the 
industries have considerably lower transparency. Power engineering industry has 
transparency score of 23.8%. The companies in the industry surpass a number of 
other industries by transparency because many of them have a high share of state 
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ownership. These companies are often in the centre of public attention and therefore 
the government applies efforts to increase their transparency. The companies from 
mechanical engineering industry, metallurgy, and fuel industry are less transparent 
(21.4%, 19.7%, and 19.1% respectively). 
 
Table 2.10. Information disclosure of Ukrainian stocks by industry. 
The Table presents the results of S&P/FIA study of informational transparency of Ukrainian 
public companies in 2007 (S&P/FIA, 2008). The dataset includes 36 Ukrainian companies that 
are traded on PFTS stock exchange and have the highest market capitalization and volume 
of trading. The companies comprise about 77% of total market capitalization and 70% of 
total value traded of PFTS. 
 


















Banks (5) 39.7 42.3 42.1 31.6 
Power engineering (7) 23.8 28.3 23.7 18.3 
Mechanical 
engineering (4) 
21.4 26.2 20.1 18.2 
Metallurgy (15) 19.7 23.4 19.5 15.2 
Fuel industry (2) 19.1 21.7 19.4 15.4 
Total 23.9 27.1 24.4 18.6 
 
Companies with relatively high level of disclosure take quite low percentage of the 
market capitalization (Figure 2.3). Companies with the disclosure index of 40% or 
more take only 7.4% of the market capitalization. Companies with the disclosure 
index of 30%-40% take 10.7% of the market capitalization, while companies with the 
disclosure index of 20-30% take 45.7% of the market capitalization. The least 






Figure 2.4. Structure of the market capitalization of Ukrainian companies by their 
transparency index. 
The Diagram presents the results of S&P/FIA (2008) study of informational transparency of 
Ukrainian public companies in 2007.  The dataset includes 36 Ukrainian companies that are 
traded on PFTS stock exchange and have the highest market capitalization and volume of 
trading. The companies comprise about 77% of total market capitalization and 70% of total 





















Ownership Concentration in Ukrainian Public Companies 
 
S&P/FIA (2008) also studies concentration of the ownership of the companies in the 
sample. It considers each share holding as independent and not as a part of a 
consolidated block unless a share agreement between the owners exists. The results 
of the study show a high level of ownership concentration in the Ukrainian stock 
market. Only 5 companies out of the 36 studied had dispersed stock ownership 
(Table 2.11). These companies take only 4.1% of the total market capitalization. 31 
companies have at list one shareholder who owns more than 25% share stake in the 
company. Out of the 31 companies, 25 companies are controlled companies (with 
the ownership by the largest shareholder of more than 50%). The share of 
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concentrated stock holdings (>25%) was 75.1% of the total market capitalization of 
the companies in the sample, and the share of controlling interest (>50%) was 62.6% 
of the total market capitalization of the companies in the sample.  
 
Table 2.11. Ownership concentration in Ukrainian companies. 
The table presents the results of S&P/FIA (2008) study of informational transparency of 
Ukrainian public companies in 2007.  The dataset includes 36 Ukrainian companies that are 
traded on PFTS stock exchange and have the highest market capitalization and volume of 
trading. The companies comprise about 77% of total market capitalization and 70% of total 





Share of the 
companies in 
the total Mcap, 
% 
Share of the 
concentrated 
holdings in the total 
MCap, % 
Companies with dispersed 
ownership structure (the largest 
holding less than or equal to 25%) 
5 4.1% - 
Companies with at least one large 
shareholder (>25%) 
31 95.9% 75.1% 
out of them controlled 
companies (the largest 
holding more than 50%) 
25 81.1% 62.6% 
Total 36 100%  
 
The majority of companies with concentrated stock holdings are non state owned. 
22 out of 31 companies with the largest stake of 25% of share capital or more, are 
non state owned (Table 2.12). Non-state stakes of more than 25% of share capital 
take 58.7% of the total market capitalization of the companies in the sample. In 
particular, the controlling non-state stakes (>50%) take 49.6% of the total market 
capitalization of the companies in the sample.  
Out of 31 companies with concentrated stock holdings (>25%), 9 are state owned. 
The majority of them (7) are state controlled (>50%). 
 
As shown in the Section "Institutions in the Ukrainian Equity Market", non-state 
ownership in Ukraine mainly refers to the ownership of large business groups. 
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Table 2.12. The types of ownership in the companies with high ownership 
concentration.  
The table presents the results of S&P/FIA (2008) study of informational transparency of 
Ukrainian public companies in 2007.  The dataset includes 36 Ukrainian companies that are 
traded on PFTS stock exchange and have the highest market capitalization and volume of 
trading. The companies comprise about 77% of total market capitalization and 70% of total 





Share of the 
companies in the 
total Mcap, % 
Share of the 
concentrated 
holdings in the 
total MCap, % 
Companies with the largest holding of more than 25% 
State 9 23.0% 16.4% 
Non-state 22 72.9% 58.7% 
Total 31 95.9% 75.1% 
Out of them, companies with the largest holding of more than 50% 
State 7 16.0% 13.0% 
Non-state 18 65.1% 49.6% 
Total 25 81.1% 62.6% 
 
 
2.4. Process of Trading on PFTS 
 
PFTS is a dealership-type market. Independent brokers post their firm quotes 
together with desired quantities in an electronic trading system. The electronic 
trading system, PFTS NEXT, allows brokers to trade the PFTS-listed securities, inter-
regionally from their offices. The trades are done in an on-line mode through a 
private network. The information posted by the brokers such as the name of the 
stock, bid and ask prices and bid and ask quantities, is visible on the screen to all 
authorized subscribers to the trading system. Trades are performed online by one 
broker accepting a bid/offer of another broker within the specified quantity. Brokers 
can act as agents (executing an order of an investor) or as principals, trading for 
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their own accounts. Normally there is no separately set commission to a broker. 
When a broker acts as an agent, he suggests to investor a price, which includes 
remuneration to the broker from the deal. 
An electronic order-driven trading platform was started in PFTS in 2009. It operates 
in parallel with the dealership-type market (similar to the London Stock Exchange). 
Before, PFTS was unsuccessfully trying to introduce order-driven trading in 2002 
and 2007. Success of the new attempt of launching of an order-driven trading 
system in PFTS cannot be assessed as yet. 
 
PFTS provides timely and complete disclosure of information about the trades 
executed in its electronic system. Composite information about trading volume, best 
closing bid and offer prices, closing trade price for each stock is provided daily in 
the PFTS web portal (www.pfts.com). PFTS also publishes a daily risingetin, the 
PFTS Inform, which provides information on PFTS trading activity, the 
Association’s activities, decisions of the PFTS Board and committees, etc. Real time 
information with the details of trades executed on PFTS, both intraday and 
historical, is available through PFTS Online (http://terminal.pfts.com). PFTS Online 
service is available to the subscribed users only, though anyone can subscribe to it. 
Along with own information disclosure, PFTS works in cooperation with numerous 
distributors of financial information. Ukrainian (Interfax Ukraine, Ukrainian News, 
UNIAN, LigaBusinessInform, Ukrinform, etc.) and international (Bloomberg, 
Thomson Reuters, Interactive Data (Europe), SIX Telekurs Ltd., etc.) providers of 
financial services distribute PFTS data in real time mode through over 1,000 
terminals all over the world. 
 
According to the FTSE Quality of Markets Criteria (Europe Frontier) assessment 
(FTSE, 2009), PFTS got "Pass" for the "Efficient trading mechanism" criterion, and 
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"Pass" for "Transparency – market depth information / visibility and timely trade 
reporting process" criterion.9 
 
There are no market makers in the Ukrainian stock market. In the past a system of 
market makers was introduced on PFTS but due to low liquidity of the market it did 
not last long and was cancelled.  
Short selling is not permitted in Ukraine. 
 
The brokerage industry is highly competitive in Ukraine. In 2008, 246 investment 
companies and banks from 22 cities of Ukraine performed operations with securities 
on PFTS (PFTS, 2008). SCSSM reported that there were 348 licensed brokers in 
Ukraine in 2008 (SCSSM, 2008). According to the FTSE Quality of Markets Criteria 
(Europe Frontier) appraisal (FTSE, 2009)10, PFTS got "Pass" for the "Brokerage – 
Sufficient competition to ensure high quality broker services" criterion of the 
Dealing Landscape block. 
 
According to the information from an interview of the author of the thesis with Oleg 
Pikarskiy, Head of Brokerage Department of a Ukrainian investment company 
Kinto, a low percentage of trades is executed without preceding telephone contact 
between the counterparty brokers. According to Oleg Pikarskiy, usually, by posing 
the quotes, brokers signal their interest in a certain stock but the posted price and 
quantity are only indicative. Through a phone call, the party, which initiates a trade, 
can negotiate a better price for the trade. Only trades with the stocks that have a 
very narrow spread are likely to be executed at the quoted prices without a 
preceding telephone call. In the majority of other cases, trade prices are negotiated. 
                                                
9 The assessment criteria are grouped into five blocks: (i) Market and Regulatory 
Environment, (ii) Custody and Settlement, (iii) Dealing Landscape, (iv) Derivatives, and (v) 
Size of market. For each criterion a stock market can receive one of the three grades: Pass, 
Restricted, or Not Met. 
10 The assessment criteria are grouped into five blocks: (i) Market and Regulatory 
Environment, (ii) Custody and Settlement, (iii) Dealing Landscape, (iv) Derivatives, and (v) 
Size of market. For each criterion a stock market can receive one of the three grades: Pass, 
Restricted, or Not Met. 
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After the parties agree about the terms of the trade by phone, one of the parties 
reports about the trade to the PFTS electronic system. The counterparty has to 
confirm the report during 10 minutes after receiving the report (PFTS Trading Rules 
2006). After the report is confirmed, information about the trade such as the name of 
the stock, price, quantity, and time of the trade appears in the electronic system 
PFTS and becomes visible to other market participants. 
The trading session in PFTS lasts from 11 a.m. till 5 p.m. 
 
Until recently, clearing and settlement services for domestic corporate and private 
securities were mainly conducted by user- and exchange-owned depositary 
Interregional Securities Union (MFS), which interfaced with PFTS. There was also 
another depositary, the National depositary of Ukraine, which performed a small 
percentage of settlement operations. In 2008 the two depositaries merged into All 
Ukraine Securities Depositary (AUSD).  
The MFS offered delivery-versus-payment (DVP) settlement services but in the 
great majority of cases market participants settled securities on a free-of-payment 
basis (securities and money do not have to be pre-deposited). There were fewer than 
20 DVP transactions a year (USAID, 2006 [2]). The total value of securities (shares, 
corporate and municipal bonds) accounted by the MFS reached USD 51 bln. in 2008 
(MFS, 2008). MFS enjoyed an excellent reputation among key market participants 
for its honesty, competency and transparency of operations (USAID, 2006 [2]).  
The software of MFS was found effective and operated in compliance with 
internationally recognized standards. According to a study of Ukraine’s Securities 
Depository System (USAID, 2006 [2]), MFS met six of the nine standards 
recommended by the Group of Thirty (G30) in conjunction with the International 
Securities Services Association for clearance and settlement systems in the global 
securities markets (see details in Table 2.13). Because Ukrainian legislation was not 




Table 2.13. Compliance of MFS with the Nine Standards for Clearance and 
Settlement set by the Group of Thirty (G30) in conjunction with the International 
Securities Services Association. 




with the standard 
1 T+1 trade confirmation and affirmation Yes 
2 
Confirmations extended to clients, 
especially large institutions  
Yes 
3 Multilateral netting No* 
4 Central stock depository No* 
5 Delivery vs. payment Yes 
6 Irrevocable payment Yes 
7 T+3 settlement Yes 
8 Stock borrowing and lending procedures No* 
9 Coding Standards Yes 
* Lack of internationally compliant Ukrainian legislation prohibits compliance. 
 
According to the FTSE Quality of Markets Criteria (Europe Frontier) assessment 
(FTSE, 2009), PFTS got "Pass" for the "Settlement - Rare incidence of Not Meted 
trades" criterion of the Custody and Settlement block of criteria.11 
 
The PFTS stock market regulations do not require that the transactions with PFTS-
listed securities performed by a PFTS broker with a third party (further referred to 
as "third party trades") be reported to PFTS at the time of trade execution. An 
example of a third party trade can be an order of an investor  executed by a PFTS 
broker from the broker's own stock of securities and without a need to deal with 
other PFTS brokers for executing the order. The third party trades can be voluntarily 
(since June 2008 – obligatory) reported to PFTS on the next two (since June 2008 – 
one) days after the trade execution before the opening of the trading session 
(between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m.). Brokers have a motivation to report their third party 
                                                
11 Assessment criteria are grouped into five blocks: (i) Market and Regulatory Environment, (ii) 
Custody and Settlement, (iii) Dealing Landscape, (iv) Derivatives, and (v) Size of market. For each 
criterion a stock market can receive one of the thre grades: Pass, Restricted, or Not Met. 
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trades. In the end of each month PFTS publishes volumes of trading by each PFTS 
member and creates ratings of top-brokers by volume. These ratings are viewed by 
the brokers as important for promoting their services in the market. 
From June 2008 till the end of 2008  2,739 third party trades were reported with the 
total volume of USD 475 mln., which is 19% of total PFTS equity value traded in 
2008. 
 
Not only third party trades are reported before the opening of the trading session 
but also the trades of non-standard parameters. Non-standard parameters trades are 
the trades whose volume is less than the size of the minimum lot set by PFTS for 
each security or whose execution price is less than the best bid or higher than the 
best offer at the time of reporting of the trade. Non-standard parameters trades have 
to be reported between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. during next two trading days after the 
trade execution. (PFTS Trading Rules 2006).  
 
There are other trades with PFTS-listed securities that are executed off-exchange 
and are not reported to the exchange. Since Ukrainian legislation does not require 
that all trades with the exchange-listed securities to be executed on a stock 
exchange, the proportion between the off-exchange trades and the trades executed 
on an exchange is hard to estimate. 
 
The volume of trades reported before the opening of the trading session is extremely 
large. For example, in 2005-2006, 44% of the total volume of trading on PFTS was 
reported before the opening of the trading session12. This suggests that a large 
portion of third party trades was actually reported, despite it was not obligatory, 
since non-standard parameters trades are not likely to take a large portion of the 
total volume of trading.  
 
                                                
12 Own calculations based on PFTS trading data, 2005-2006. 
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From the information presented above we can conclude that about half of the 




2.5. Insights of the Ukrainian investment market practitioners on the Ukrainian 
stock market operation 
 
In the initial stage of working at the thesis, the author wanted to better understand 
the operation of the Ukrainian stock market. Since the literature about the Ukrainian 
stock market is quite scarce, and it was even more scarce in the mid-2006, the author 
decided to conduct interviews with the practitioners of the Ukrainian investment 
market. The interviews gave the author a better understanding of the Ukrainian 
stock market in general, as well as provided with some special interesting insights 
about the market. The aim of this section of the chapter is to present the 
practitioners' views on some of the questions, which were studied by the 
international organizations and are discussed above, as well as to present some 
interesting facts about Ukrainian investment market, which were not covered in the 
literature. This is expected to provide a better context for the reader and to help to 
better understand the empirical findings of the thesis. 
 
Six professionals from five well-known investment companies in Ukraine were 
questioned in summer 2006. One of the respondents was an acquaintance of the 
author, he answered the questionnaire and helped in organizing of another three 
interviews. Two interviews were organized by the author herself by looking up for 
investment companies in the business directory and contacting them directly by e-
mail and telephone. 
Five of the respondents were questioned in person during a specially organized 
meeting, while one answered the questions in writing and sent them back to the 
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author by e-mail. The details on the respondents and the names of the companies 
can be found in Table 2.14. 
 
Table 2.14. Details about the respondents who answered the questionnaire. 
Name of the 
Respondent 




































Analyst Male 21-30 
Specialist 
Degree* 
* Specialist Degree is a 5-year university degree specific for post-Soviet countries. 
 
All the companies are based in Kiev, the major financial centre of Ukraine. Most of 
the companies have their own managed equity funds and brokerage divisions. The 
companies are among the most active stock traders on PFTS. In the PFTS rating of 
the most active equity traders in 2006, Concord Capital was 7th (2nd among non-bank 
traders) out of 130, Millenium Capital was 11th (4th), Kinto – 20th (9th), and Foyil – 21th 
(10st). Parex Asset Management did not have their own brokerage division. 
 
The interviews were conducted in the form of semi-structured interviews. They had 
prearranged questions but were flexible, which allowed freedom to modify 
questions and pursue topics in more detail depending upon the interviewee’s 
responses. Also the use of semi-structured interviews allowed to get personal 
insights of the respondents on subjects not directly addressed by the interviwer. 
Additionally, the face-to-face format of the majority of interviews allowed any 
answers that lack clearness to be clarified immediately in order to remove any 
confusion. The interviews lasted between 60 and 100 min. They were recorded and 
notes also were taken. 
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Since the interviews were conducted in the initial stage of work at the thesis, many 
of the questions included in the questionnaire became not relevant for the final 
version of the thesis. Only the relevant questions are discussed. The questions refer 
to the problems of the Ukrainian stock market operation and the asset management 
industry in Ukraine. The full questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
The views of the investment practitioners on the problems of the Ukrainian stock 
market supported our findings from analysing reports of the international 
organizations. Most of the respondents stated that weak company legislation and 
corrupt judiciary system are among very important problems of the Ukrainian stock 
market operation and development. 
One of the respondents said: 
“Many companies do not hurry to enter the stock market. Aggressive business 
environment is one of the reasons of that. Because of the weak legislation, 
banditry, and high level of corruption there are schemes that allow grabbing 
the control over a company. That is why the majority shareholders tend to buy 
out the company stocks from the minority shareholders and leave only around 
5% to float.” 
 
Another important problem stated was a lack of transparency. One of the 
respondents said: 
 “Owners are often afraid to be transparent, they do not want to show their 
true revenues and profits in order to decrease their tax burden. Also, few 
companies are ready to reveal their ownership structure. One of the reasons is 
a weak system of the property rights protection in Ukraine, the owners feel 
more secure if they do not make the information public." 
 
A few respondents mentioned a problem of low credibility of companies' 
accounting reports. One of the respondents said: 
“The process of company valuation is complicated by the lack of credence to 
the reported companies’ accounts. The numbers for sales and income are 
understated with the goal to decrease the tax burden. In order to value a 
company correctly, the investment analysts make adjustments based on other 
available information about the company. 
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Since the Ukrainian stock market activity is low, many companies do not see it 
as an important source of additional capital. Thus, they give preference to 
hiding the true numbers and decreasing their tax burden rather than aiming at 
increase of their stock price.  
…Even though many stock issuers are audited by one of the big-four auditing 
companies according to the GAAP standards, only few publish their GAAP 
accounts.” 
 
One of the respondents gave clarifications on how companies' accounts can be 
distorted having mentioned that large percentage of operations in big industrial-
financial groups are performed with linked entities. For example, one of the 
companies controlled by an industrial-financial group can buy some products from 
another company controlled by the same group and later sell the products back 
without actual delivery of the products. Nothing will change in actual operations of 
the two companies, though this manipulation will allow to report extra expenses, 
which, in turn, will allow to decrease tax burden. 
 
“[Even if the reported numbers itself are correct], there is another problem that 
in a big industrial-financial group a high percentage of operations is 
performed with linked entities, which allows manipulation and reporting the 
numbers that do not represent the facts. For example, in the beginning of 2006 
Standard & Poors' was giving a rating to one of the most efficient industrial-
financial groups in Ukraine, in connection with an issue of Eurobonds. The 
press release stated that 70% of the company operations were performed with 
linked entities, which called the transparency of the company’s operations into 
question.” 
 
The problem of low credibility to the companies’ accounting reports complicates the 
company valuation process and requires from the investment analysts finding 
additional information and making adjustments for a fair valuation. 
The problem is one of the reasons why the PFTS does not perform calculations of 
the multiples (P/E, P/B, and other) for the listed companies. The ratios based on 
adjusted information are calculated by the investment companies themselves. 
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As discussed in the previous sections of the chapter, professional investment 
industry is very underdeveloped in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian 
Association of Investment Business, there were only 8 open-end, 28 interval, and 67 
closed-end funds (non-venture) in 2006 in Ukraine13. The assets under management 
of the funds in the end of 2006 were USD 12.3 mln., USD 7.5 mln., and USD 252.2 
mln. respectively.  
 
The main reasons of the low activity in the Ukrainian professional investment 
markets are seen in the low level of property rights protection of minority 
shareholders and low liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market. 
Victor Botte, a Fund Manager of Kinto, gave interesting insights on the fund 
management industry of Ukraine that add to the understanding of its low 
development as yet. 
 
According to Victor Botte, it is easier to attract general public into the open-end 
funds than to the interval and closed-end funds due to the possibility of 
withdrawing from the fund at any time. This possibility is important to Ukrainians 
in the conditions of political instability in Ukraine and taking into account still low 
trust to investment industry after their negative experiences in 1990s when many 
newly-organized investment trusts went bankrupt or disappeared with the collected 
money. At the same time, the diversification requirements set by the Law of Ukraine 
"About Institutions of Mutual Investment" (2001) made it very difficult to achieve 
such returns that would be attractive for investors. The law intended to protect 
investors, though in the market conditions in Ukraine in the 2000s, the law became 
an obstacle to the development of professional investment industry. The 
diversification requirements are presented in Table 2.15. 
                                                
13 Open-end funds are the funds whose securities can be bought or sold by investors at any time. 
Interval funds are the funds whose securities can be bought by investors at any time but sold only 
during the specified in the prospectus periods (intervals). Closed-end funds are the funds whose 
securities can be bought from the fund at the opening of the fund. During the time of operation of the
fund the securities of the fund can be traded in the stock market. In the end of the fund operation, the 
fund is obliged to buy back its securities from theinvestors. (Ukrainian Association of Investment 
Business).  
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Table 2.15. Diversification requirements set by the Law of Ukraine "About 
Institutions of Mutual Investment" (2001). 
The table shows maximum proportions of each asset class that can be held in an open-end or 
an interval fund. 
 
 2001 
After alterations in 
2009 
Stocks of Ukrainian issuers no more than 40% no restriction 
Stocks of foreign issuers no more than 20% no restriction 
Corporate bonds no more than 20% no restriction 
Municipal bonds no more than 10% no more than 40% 
Government bonds no more than 25% no more than 50% 
Money market instruments no more than 30% 
no more than 50% 
(together with bank 
metals) 
Real estate no more than 5% no more than 10% 
Bank Metals Not allowed - 
Other securities no more than 5% no more than 20% 
 
As explained by Victor Botte, bank deposits were the main competitors to the other 
investment choices in Ukraine. The deposit rates were very high (15-17%) and they 
had a guaranteed provision of up to UAH 15,000 (equivalent of about USD 3,000). 
Investors expected that higher risk of investment into a mutual fund should have 
been compensated by a return, which would be higher than the bank deposit rate. 
This is where the diversification requirements created limitations: 
 
“We need to guarantee our investors a significantly higher level of profitability 
than the bank deposit rate and be able to cover the portfolio management 
costs. Only stocks can give returns higher than bank deposits. The return on 
the most risky corporate bonds is 16-18%, less risky give 12-14%. Municipal 
bonds provide 10-11%, government bonds – 7-8%, their yield is lower than 
inflation14. 
When you compose a portfolio, due to the diversification requirements you 
can invest only up to 40% in stocks, 20% - in corporate bonds, 30% - in bank 
deposits, and the residuary 10% are losing in advance. Taking all these into 
                                                
14 The inflation in Ukraine in 2006 was 11.6%. 
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account, you must be sure that the returns from investment in stocks will 
cover all the expenses.” 
 
To the question of the author whether any capital can be invested in foreign stocks, 
Victor Botte added that the existing difficulties created by the foreign exchange 
regulations make investment funds refuse this option: 
 
 “There is a norm that up to 20% can be invested in the stocks of foreign 
issuers. But this is problematic at the moment because of the difficulties 
created by the foreign exchange regulations. In order to carry out operations 
with foreign currency, a company should have a license from the Central 
Bank; this creates many restrictions and makes investment companies refuse 
buying foreign stocks.” 
 
Kinto was one of the pioneers in the fund management industry in Ukraine and 
became one of the leaders of the market. It is interesting that the company, despite 
all the difficulties and restrictions related to the mutual fund investment in Ukraine, 
did manage to earn above-deposit-rate returns for its investors. At the time of the 
interview (August 2006), Kinto had an open-end fund "Classical" (USD 2.4 mln. of 
assets under management in 2006, opened in July 2004) and an interval fund 
"Prosperity" (USD 1.7 mln. of assets under management in 2006, opened in 
September 2003). According to the end of 2006 results, fund "Classical" brought 
average annual return of 54.3%, while return in 2006 was 27.5%. Fund "Prosperity" 
brought average annual return of 73.1%, while return in 2006 was 46.0% 
(www.kinto.com). Index PFTS has brought a higher return in 2006 (41.3%) than the 
fund "Classical" and approximately the same return as the fund "Prosperity" 
though. 
 
Due to a quite difficult task of being able to provide a rate of return on a diversified 
fund that would be attractive to general public, very few open-end and interval 
funds were created in Ukraine. In 2009, Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of 
Ukraine) considerably weakened the diversification requirements, which is 
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expected to contribute into the development of mutual investment industry. The 
new requirements are presented in Table 2.15. 
 
Due to weaker diversification restrictions, the number of closed-end funds in 
Ukraine is significantly higher compared to the open-end funds. But it is found 
harder to attract individual investors into these funds. 
At the same time, there are still some diversification restrictions even for the closed-
end funds.  Ukrainian legislation does not allow holding less than 70% in securities 
in a closed-end fund: 
 
“Russian legislation allows holding a part of the fund assets in cash, whereas 
Ukrainian does not. In crisis times we would have been able to sell stocks and 
hold cash for a while but we cannot do that; our legislation does not allow 
holding less than 70% in securities even in a closed-end fund. That is why we 
try to buy fundamentally undervalued stocks and do active management.” 
 
Due to less diversification requirements, a closed-end fund of Kinto "Synergy-2" 
(USD 10.8 mln. of assets under management in 2006) outperformed index PFTS in 
2006 and has brought considerably higher returns than the open-end and the 
interval funds. Average annual return of "Synergy-2" was 61.6% since its opening in 
May 2005, and 65.2% according to the results of 2006 (www.kinto.com). 
 
To summarize, in conditions of low liquidity and low level of property rights 
protection of minority shareholders, the development of Ukrainian professional 
investment industry was even more restrained by highly restricting portfolio 







2.6. Relation of the Specific Features of the Ukrainian Stock Market to the Models 
Selected and the Results Obtained in the Thesis 
 
Summary of the Specific Features of the Ukrainian Stock Market 
 
• Ukrainian stock market is a dealership market where brokers post bid and 
ask quotes at which they are willing to trade. The market does not have 
market makers. Instead, multiple dealers facilitate the trades. 
• Institutional investors prevail among the traders in the stock market; 
presence of private investors is very limited. 
• Foreign institutions prevail among the traders in the stock market. Domestic 
industry of investment and pension funds is under developed and the funds 
play a minor role in the stock market trading. Among the domestic 
institutions, insurance companies and banks are the most active traders. 
• Dominance of institutional investors in the market results in much larger, on 
average, trade sizes in the Ukrainian stock market compared to the trade 
sizes in the developed markets. 
• Various market data is available in the Ukrainian stock market. The data is 
carefully gathered by the stock exchange PFTS and has a good quality. 
• Free floats for blue chip companies are very low (about 4%). Large stakes in 
the Ukrainian public companies belong primarily to the financial industrial 
groups and the state.  
• Ukrainian stock market has low liquidity. 
• Informational transparency of Ukrainian public companies is low. 
• Level of property rights protection was low till adoption of the new Law 
“On Joint Stock Companies” in 2008. System of legal enforcement is weak in 
Ukraine. This highly increases risks of investing into Ukrainian stocks. 
• The level of corporate government of the Ukrainian public companies is low. 
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• Due to the low liquidity and low informational transparency of the 
Ukrainian stock market, majority of trades are negotiated over the phone 
before being performed through the electronic trading system. 
• Due to the low free float, large trades are often negotiated directly with the 
block holders. 
• Voluntary reporting of the third party trades (till May 2008) resulted in non-
reporting of a part of the trades; because of this a part of the market 
information was lost for market participants/observers. 
 
Relation of the Specific Features of the Ukrainian Stock Market to the Models 
Selected and the Results Obtained 
 
The Ukrainian stock market is a dealership market where brokers post bid and ask 
quotes at which they are willing to trade. The presence of data on the quotations 
allowed us to use the benchmark method for estimation of the effective bid-ask 
spread in Chapter 4. An important benefit of the benchmark method is that it is 
simple, while allows finding reliable results. Another benefit of the benchmark 
method is that it allows estimating effective bid-ask spreads separately for trades of 
different sizes and directions (purchases or sales). Alternative methods, which are 
based on econometric models, such as Roll (1984), Glosten and Harris (1988), and 
Huang and Stoll (1997), either do not allow to estimate effective spread relative to 
the trade size and trade direction or require higher frequency of the data, which is 
not available for Ukraine due to the low liquidity of the market. 
 
A specific feature of the Ukrainian stock market of prevalence of institutional 
investors among the traders in the stock market and mere presence of private 
investors had an important influence on the results in Chapter 4. The specific feature 
was reflected in much larger size of trades, on average, in the Ukrainian stock 
market compared to developed stock markets, in terms of both the number of stocks 
per trade and the trade value. Grouping of all Ukrainian trades into small, medium, 
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and large based on the normal market size of the trade for each stock, resulted in 
that small Ukrainian trades could be compared to the medium-sized trades in 
developed markets, while medium Ukrainian trades – to large trades in developed 
markets, and large Ukrainian trades – to extra large trades in developed markets. 
When this specific feature was taken into account, the findings for the ratio of the 
effective bid-ask spreads for different trade sizes in Ukraine came in line with the 
findings in other literature. 
 
A distinctive feature of the Ukrainian stock market is availability of various market 
data, which is carefully gathered by the stock exchange and has good quality. The 
data includes quoted bid-ask spreads and detailed stock-by-stock intra-day trading 
data. This allowed us to be able to estimate almost any liquidity measure developed 
in the literature. In Chapter 5 we chose to tests the efficacy of some of the most 
popular in the literature liquidity measures, such as quoted bid-ask spread, 
turnover, Amihud’s measure, the proportion of zero daily returns, the proportion of 
no-trading days, and the volatility of return, for the Ukrainian data. Moreover, the 
availability of data on no-trading days allowed us to test the efficacy of the 
proportion of no-trading days liquidity measure, a new measure suggested in 
Bekaert et al. (2006) but not applied in the original study due to unavailability of the 
data needed. The measure proved to be one of the most efficient liquidity measures 
for the Ukrainian stock market. 
Due to the unique feature of the Ukrainian stock market of low free floats for blue 
chip companies and higher free floats for second and third tier companies, turnover 
liquidity measure was found not to perform well for Ukrainian stocks. 
Low liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market resulted in good applicability of the 
percentage of zero daily returns liquidity measure. This measure did not perform 
well at high liquidity markets (Bekaert et al. (2006)) because for highly liquid stocks 
zero-return days did not necessarily associate with no-trading and new orders for 
these stocks could be accommodated without any influence on price. On the other 
hand, this measure was found to perform well for emerging markets, including our 
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findings for the Ukrainian stock market, since in low liquidity markets, arrival of 
any new trading volume is often seen as a sign of arrival of new information about a 
stock and often results in the price change. 
 
As mentioned above, the Ukrainian stock market is a dealership market, where 
brokers post bid and ask quotes at which they are willing to trade and they revise 
the quotes based on their beliefs about the true market price and their desired level 
of the inventory holdings. Spread decomposition models of Stoll (1989), Glosten and 
Harris (1988), and Huang and Stoll (1997) were developed for markets with a 
similar market structure – the dealership market of Nasdaq and the hybrid market 
of NYSE (as well as many other spread decomposition models). This gives the 
grounds for applicability of the models for the Ukrainian stock market too, which is 
done in Chapter 6. (More details on the reasons of why the models were chosen for 
the research in the thesis are given in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, “Spread Decomposition 
Models Applied in the Thesis”). 
Ukrainian stock market is a multiple dealer market as opposed to NYSE where a 
few market makers have to facilitate trades in a stock. This specific feature of the 
Ukrainian stock market implies that Ukrainian brokers experience much less 
inventory pressure than the market makers in NYSE that are obliged to trade and to 
provide liquidity to the market. Ukrainian brokers have freedom to hold their 
inventory close to their desired level, which implies that inventory holding costs of 
Ukrainian brokers should be close to zero. This assumption allows us to find an 
important for our study result: to separate the asymmetric information cost 
component from the sum of the asymmetric information cost and inventory holding 
cost components provided by the estimation of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model. 
High information asymmetry, a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian stock market, 
was found not to be reliably captured by the spread decomposition models. The 
estimate of the asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread of 14-17% 
seems to be too low for a market with so high information asymmetry as Ukraine. 
The result is probably due to the over simplicity of the assumptions about the price 
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development in the spread decomposition models applied. The models assume that 
the direction of previous trade is the only source of private information that brokers 
have. In the real world, brokers usually have other sources of private information 
such as, for example, personal contacts with company management, contacts with 
other parties who are close to company management, contacts in the companies’ 
banks, etc. In Ukraine, where corporate governance rules and professional ethics are 
still often ignored, usage of these and other sources of private information is quite 
possible. Inflow of private information through such sources is not observed, and 
therefore spread decomposition models cannot capture it. The asymmetric 
information cost component of 14-17% seems to reflect only that part of private 
information, which is learned from the order flow. The findings of the spread 
decomposition models of low information asymmetry in Ukraine together with the 
specific feature of the Ukrainian stock market of the high information asymmetry, 
led us to a conclusion that the spread decomposition models applied in the study 





The chapter has acquainted the reader with the Ukrainian stock market. It presented 
a brief history of the stock market development, described the market in the context 
of other Eastern European stock markets, and presented descriptive statistics of the 
largest stock exchange in Ukraine, PFTS. 
 
Market capitalization of PFTS is quite high, USD 111.8 bln., number of listed 
companies accounts for 335. Though trading activity in PFTS is low with small free 
float being one of the most important reasons of it. The market is quite concentrated 
(market capitalization of the top-ten companies accounts for 45% of the total market 
capitalization) though fairly diversified by industry. 
 
 69 
The large stakes in the Ukrainian public companies belong primarily to the financial 
industrial groups and the state. The investors into the free float are mainly 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies, while investment companies 
and private pension funds are not yet a prominent feature in the Ukrainian 
investment industry. 
 
Securities market legislation is in a good compliance with international practice. 
Though company legislation until recently (October 2008) was weak. This caused 
considerable problems with corporate governance and property rights protection of 
minority shareholders. In addition to weak company legislation, Ukrainian 
securities market suffers from weak legal enforcement, both private and public.  
 
Information transparency of Ukrainian public companies is low. Index of 
informational transparency estimated by Standard & Poors' and Financial Initiatives 
Agency for Ukraine was only 23.9% out of the highest possible score of 100%. 
 
Ukrainian public companies have highly concentrated ownership structure. Out of 
36 companies with the highest market capitalization and trading volume only 5 had 
dispersed ownership, while 6 were partially controlled (largest holding >25% but 
less than 50%), and 25 were controlled companies (largest holding >50%) (Table 
2.11) 
 
The main Ukrainian stock exchange PFTS is a dealership-type market. Multiple 
brokers post their quotes in an electronic trading system, which is viewed by market 
observers as highly transparent and effective. The depositary system is found 
compliant with the majority of international standards for clearance and settlement. 
 
Though there is a significant problem with data reporting on PFTS as the trades 
performed by PFTS brokers with third party traders (not PFTS brokers) are not 
reported at the time of there execution but only on the next trading day before the 
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opening of the trading session. These trades take a considerable part of the market 
and account for about 44% of PFTS total trading volume. As a result, a sizable part 
of executed trades are reported without the information about the actual time of 
their execution, which makes this part of the data lost for many kinds of the market 
microstructure studies. 
 
Interviews conducted with the stock market practitioners supported the conclusions 
of other studies that some of the main problems of the Ukrainian stock market are 
weak company legislation, corrupt judiciary system, and low level of transparency 
of public companies. The interviews also revealed that in conditions of low liquidity 
and low level of property rights protection of minority shareholders, the 
development of Ukrainian professional investment industry was even more 
restrained by highly restricting portfolio diversification requirements for mutual 









3.1. General Description of the Data 
 
The dataset was obtained from PFTS Online, the official source of PFTS data. The 
dataset contains transaction prices and price quotations for all PFTS-listed securities, 
both real-time and historical.  
In particular, the dataset identifies the following: 
 
• the intraday best bid and ask quotes and quantities for each stock  
• best closing bid and ask quotes and quantities for each stock 
• Information about each trade, in particular, PFTS Code, which is stock 
identifier, trade price, trade quantity, date, and time of trade. 
 
The author had access to PFTS Online from mid-November till mid-December 2006. 
PFTS Online contains data starting 1997, though until 2005 trading activity in the 
market was very low. Total volume of trading in PFTS in 2004 was only USD 206.8 
mln., compared to USD 643.9 mln. in 2005 and USD 1,168.3 mln. in 2006. The 
number of actively traded companies until 2005 was very low too. Top-ten 
companies by trading volume took 80% of the total PFTS trading volume in 2004. 
This number decreased to 45.8% in 2005 and to 40.1% in 2006. Therefore, for our 
study we chose the data period from January 2005 to November 2006.  
 
Many of the listed stocks in PFTS are very small (by market capitalization) and have 
low trading frequency. Therefore, out of all the listed stocks, which accounted for 
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more than 260, we chose those stocks that had market capitalization of more than 
USD 10 mln. and at least a few trades per year during 2005-2006. This left us with 59 
stocks.  
 
The trading session in PFTS lasts from 11 a.m. till 5 p.m. From 9 a.m. till 11 a.m. 
trades with the non-members of PFTS and the trades of non-standard parameters 
are reported. These trades were normally executed during two previous days before 
the day on which they were reported. Since many parts of our study require to 
know the time of execution of a trade, the trades reported before 11 a.m. are 
excluded from the dataset. Exclusion of the trades has lead to the decrease of the 
number of observed trades in our dataset by 34.2%. To be more accurate, our study 
of liquidity (Chapter 5) requires data on all executed trades, therefore the trades 
reported before 11 a.m. are kept in the dataset for this chapter. Description of this 
dataset can be found in Chapter 5.  
The datasets described below are employed in all other chapters: the study of the 
cost of trading (Chapter 4), the decomposition of the bid-ask spread (Chapter 6), and 
the study of portfolio returns net of the cost of trading (Chapter 7). 
 
 
3.2. Correction for Outliers  
 
Due to low trading frequency, volatility of stock returns in the Ukrainian stock 
market is quite high. For some stocks in certain periods it was recorded excessively 
high. For example, USCB price was very volatile in January 2006. Standard 
deviation of USCB daily return was 26.2% during this time, whereas during the 
other months of 2005-2006 it was 9.4%, on average. The outlying prices can present 
bias in the mean estimates of the effective bid-ask spread and in the estimated 
coefficients of the spread decomposition models. In order to find unbiased estimates 
of coefficients in our study, we correct our data for outliers. Mean return is taken as 
a basis for excluding the outliers because it allows to clean the data from the 
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abnormal values of trade prices, which is needed for our study. The following rule 
is employed: for each stock we exclude all the trades whose return lies outside two 
standard deviations from the mean return for the stock. This rule also allows to 
clean our data from typing errors. Application of the rule has led to exclusion of 
5.4% of all trades and left us with 11,297 trades executed with 59 stocks in 2005-2006.  
Also all the quotes were checked for the ask price to be greater than the bid price. 
No cases of the bid price to be greater than the ask price were identified. 
 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
During 2005-2006 the Ukrainian stock market did not experience any considerable 
shocks and had been gradually growing. Figure 3.1 shows the behaviour of the 
main Ukrainian stock market index, index PFTS, during this time. 
 






































































Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for our dataset. The descriptive statistics are 
computed based on the data corrected for outliers. Trading in PFTS is done in  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics of the stocks in the dataset, 2005-2006. 
Mean price is weighted by the number of trades for each stock. 
Data is corrected for outliers. Companies are sorted by PFTS Code. 
 





















1 Alchevsk Coke ALKZ 
Mining & 
Coke 
72.30 0.34 33 0.28 8,648 
2 
Alchevsk Iron & 
Steel 
ALMK Metallurgy 2,534.38 0.24 145 35.43 244,653 
3 Avdiyivka Coke AVDK 
Mining & 
Coke 
644.40 3.33 254 11.65 45,842 
4 Azot Cherkasy AZOT Chemical 181.14 1.84 46 4.46 97,839 




BAVL Finance 1,184.68 0.08 538 47.24 87,760 
7 Centerenergo CEEN 
Power 
Engineering 
308.45 0.84 370 15.34 41,470 
8 Donetskgirmash DGRM 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
18.57 0.41 65 1.45 22,460 
9 Donetsk Coke DKOK 
Mining & 
Coke 




DMPZ Metallurgy 24.36 0.04 20 0.18 9,187 
11 Kominmet DMZK Metallurgy 10.18 0.10 18 0.29 16,113 
12 DniproAzot DNAZ Chemical 156.78 0.00 74 11.67 158,141 
13 Dniproenergo DNEN 
Power 
Engineering 
292.73 74.48 215 15.48 72,009 
14 Dniprooblenergo DNON 
Power 
Engineering 
225.93 37.58 118 4.71 39,746 
15 DniproSpetsStal DNSS Metallurgy 178.59 166.09 136 7.01 51,687 
16 Donbasenergo DOEN 
Power 
Engineering 















DTRZ Tube Rolling 60.12 56.92 320 11.01 34,423 
20 Forum FORM Finance 257.37 6.96 18 0.75 41,439 
21 Galnaftogaz GLNG 
Petrochemic
al 








300.59 0.34 91 3.49 38,310 
23 Svitlo Shakhtarya HMBZ 
Mechanical 
Engineering 







37.52 0.28 28 2.24 79,219 
25 Khartsyzk Tube HRTR Tube Rolling 202.36 0.37 8 0.11 13,946 
26 Kyivenergo KIEN 
Power 
Engineering 
169.16 1.56 179 7.37 41,088 
27 AvtoKrAZ KRAZ 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
104.13 0.10 26 0.73 28,473 
28 Krymenergo KREN 
Power 
Engineering 




KSTL Metallurgy 2,966.60 0.77 113 2.59 22,974 
30 Luganskteplovoz LTPL 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
79.57 0.36 530 18.07 34,094 
31 Megabank MEGA Finance 64.44 1.85 15 14.84 1,017,927 
32 
Ilyich Iron and 
Steel Works 
MMKI Metallurgy 1,954.81 0.58 461 7.46 16,191 
33 Motor Sich MSICH 
Mechanical 
Engineering 















y Tube Rolling 
Plant 











1,155.21 10.00 262 22.19 84,589 
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316.31 0.15 158 5.31 33,534 











64.24 0.19 46 1.29 27,677 
43 Sumy Frunze SMASH 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
249.51 3.51 403 14.23 35,337 







35.95 31.31 47 4.15 87,653 
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46 Turboatom TATM 
Mechanical 
Engineering 







10.20 0.17 8 0.25 30,652 
48 Ukrnafta UNAF 
Petrochemic
al 
2,455.80 45.11 624 56.73 90,918 
49 Ukrsotsbank USCB Finance 1,406.68 0.38 316 18.25 57,750 
50 Ukrtelecom UTEL 
Telecommu
nications 







39.10 1.71 11 1.00 91,674 
52 Yasinivsky Coke YASK 
Mining & 
Coke 
46.37 0.34 193 11.44 59,217 
53 ZaporizhCoke ZACO 
Mining & 
Coke 
162.08 1.36 148 3.17 21,334 
54 Zakhidenergo ZAEN 
Power 
Engineering 






















81.14 0.66 43 1.91 44,727 
59 Zaporizhstal ZPST Metallurgy 135.95 1.16 585 15.26 26,103 
  Total     26,610.43   11,297 529 46,798 
This dataset is applied in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, Subsections "Quoted and effective bid-ask spread", 
and "Determinants of the bid-ask spread", and in Chapter 7. 
 
Ukrainian currency, hryvnya, and all the estimations in the thesis are done in 
Ukrainian currency too. Though for the reader's convenience, all the monetary 
values in the descriptive statistics are stated in U.S. dollars. The exchange rate 
applied is 5.09 UAH/USD, which was an average official exchange rate during 2005-
200615. 
The companies in the dataset are of different sizes. The market capitalization of the 
companies varies from USD 10.2 mln. for DMZK to USD 3,261 mln. for UTEL. 
Altogether, the 59 companies account for USD 26.6 bln. in market capitalization, 
which is 72.7% of the total market capitalization of PFTS.  
                                                
15 National Bank of Ukraine data, www.bank.gov.ua 
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Average stock prices vary considerably across companies, from USD 0.005 for 
DNAZ to USD 514 for RODV. The reason for this is considerable differences in 
stocks' par values. The number of trades for each stock varies from 5 for RODV to 
851 for UTEL.  
Some of the companies have very low volume of trading, as, for example, HRTR, 
USD 0.11 mln., while others were traded much more heavily, as UNAF, USD 56.7 
mln. Altogether, trading volume of 59 companies during 2005-2006 was USD 529 
mln. and accounted for 58.3% of the total PFTS trading volume during the period. 
Average volume per trade varied considerably across the stocks. Due to the 
prevalence of institutional trading in the Ukrainian stock market, average volume 
per trade in PFTS is quite large. Average volume per trade during 2005-2006 ranged 
from USD 8,648 for ALKZ to USD 1,017,927 for MEGA. 
 
The number of trading days in 2005-2006 accounted for 471. The number of closing 
bid-ask quotes varies from 133 for SHKD and YAMZ to 471 for many other stocks. 
For some stocks the number of closing quotes is less than the number of trading 
days during the period of observation because the stocks came into listing in PFTS 
later than in January 2005. 
 
 
3.4. Details on the Smaller Dataset of 15 Most Liquid Stocks 
 
Some parts of the analysis in the thesis, such as study of the cost of trading for 
different trade sizes and trade directions and study of determinants of the bid-ask 
spread (Chapter 4), and application of the spread decomposition models (Chapter 
6), require high frequency transaction data.  
Out of 59 stocks, described above, we chose 15 most liquid – stocks with high 
market capitalization and high number of trades. The descriptive statistics for them 
are presented in Table 3.2.  The stocks take 38% of the total PFTS market 
capitalization and 33% of the total PFTS trading volume. Market capitalization 
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among the chosen 15 stocks ranges from USD 60 mln. for DTRZ to USD 3,261 for 
UTEL. The number of transactions for the stocks ranges from 262 for PGOK to 851 
for UTEL. Average volume per trade is USD 43,866 and ranges from USD 16,191 for 
MMKI to USD 90,918 for UNAF. 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for 15 most liquid stocks, 2005-2006. 
Mean price is weighted by the number of trades for each stock. Companies are sorted by 
PFTS Code. 
 






















1 Azovstal AZST Metallurgy 1,709.23 0.54 485 10.99 22,632 
2 Raiffeisen Bank Aval BAVL Finance 1,184.68 0.08 538 47.24 87,760 
3 Dniproenergo DNEN 
Power 
Engineering 
292.73 74.48 236 16.99 72,009 
4 Dnipropetrovsk Pipe DTRZ Tube Rolling 60.12 56.92 320 11.01 34,423 
5 Luganskteplovoz LTPL 
Mechanical 
Engineering 











Tube Rolling Plant 
NITR Tube Rolling 438.11 8.15 389 19.86 51,071 
8 Poltavsky Iron Ore PGOK Mining & Coke 1,155.21 10 262 22.19 84,589 
9 Sumy Frunze SMASH 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
249.51 3.51 403 14.23 35,337 
10 Stirol STIR Chemical 534.38 19.74 273 10.2 37,328 
11 Ukrnafta UNAF Petrochemical 2,455.80 45.11 624 56.73 90,918 
12 Ukrsotsbank USCB Finance 1,406.68 0.38 347 20.04 57,750 
13 Ukrtelecom UTEL 
Telecommunica
tions 
3,261.30 0.17 851 17.41 20,467 
14 Zakhidenergo ZAEN 
Power 
Engineering 
371.32 29.09 363 14.41 39,737 
15 Zaporizhstal ZPST Metallurgy 135.95 1.16 585 15.26 26,103 
 Total   13,477.60   6,634 309.99 46,728 
This dataset is applied in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, Subsections: "Relation of the Cost of Trading to the 
Trade Size", "Difference in the Cost of Trading for Sales and Purchases", and "Determinants of the 




3.5. Assigning of the Trade Direction 
 
The trade direction (purchase or sale) is not identified in the PFTS data, though 
these data are necessary for estimating effective bid-ask spreads (Chapter 4) and for 
applying trade-indicator spread decomposition models (Chapter 6).  
Two approaches are used in literature to infer the direction of a trade: (i) 
comparison of the trade price to adjacent trades (techniques commonly known as 
"tick tests") or (ii) comparison of the trade price to the midquote of the prevailing 
bid/ask quote (known as Lee and Ready (1991) procedure).  
The tick test is a technique which infers the direction of a trade by comparing its 
price to the price of the preceding trade. The test classifies each trade into four 
categories: an uptick, a downtick, a zero-uptick, and a zero-downtick. A trade is an 
uptick (downtick) if the price is higher (lower) than the price of the previous trade. 
When the price is the same as the previous trade (a zero tick), if the last price change 
was an uptick, then the trade is a zero-uptick. Similarly, if the last price change was 
a downtick, then the trade is a zero-downtick. A trade is classified as a buy if it is  an 
uptick or a zero-uptick; a trade is classified as a sale if it is a downtick or a zero-
downtick. The tick test was the primary method of identification of trade direction 
in earlier literature when quote data was not available (for example, Dann et al. 
(1977), Holthausen et al. (1987)). The analysis of efficiency of tick test has proven 
high ability of this method in identifying trade direction(Lee and Ready (1991)).. 
74% of transactions in the Australian Stock Exchange were found to be correctly 
classified (Aitken and Frino (1996)). The primary limitation of the tick test is its 
relative imprecision if it has been a long time since the last trade, which is a 
particular concern for the stocks with low trading frequency (there are many stocks 
with low trading frequency in the Ukrainian stock market). 
 
Later, when quoted bid-ask spread data became available, a new method of 
identifying buy and sale trades was suggested, which is usually referred to in 
literature as the Lee and Ready (1991) procedure. The method assigns "sale" 
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direction to the trades that took place at a price lower than the midpoint of the 
prevailing bid/ask quotes and "buy" direction to the trades that took place at a price 
higher than the midpoint of the prevailing bid/ask quotes. This method is often 
given preference in recent literature. Ellis et al. (1999) found that 81.4% of Nasdaq 
trades were correctly identified by Lee/Ready method. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) 
used a unique dataset (TORQ), which allowed to trace the true trade direction for 
many trades. The study found that for about 40% of the executed trades the 
direction of trade could not be unambiguously identified as either purchase or sale. 
The major source of the ambiguity was in the stopped trades and market crosses16. 
Though, in those cases where trades could have been unambiguously classified, 
Lee/Ready method had a 93% overall agreement rate with TORQ classifications.  
 
In our study, Lee/Ready methodology is used for identifying the trade direction in 
the Ukrainian stock market: 
 
Tradei,t ≡ SELL      if Pi,t < MQi,t 
Tradei,t  ≡ BUY       if Pi,t  > MQi,t 
 
Where Pi,t is the price of the trade for a stock i at time t and MQi,t is the midquote for 
a stock i at time just before time t. The midquote is calculated as an average between 
the best bid and the best ask quotation issued at a time just preceding the trade. 
If a trade took place at the midquote, we cannot identify whether it was a purchase 
or a sale and therefore exclude it from the estimation. 5.9% of observations (after 
correction for outliers) were excluded due to this reason. 
 
                                                
16 A NYSE specialist may stop a market order, guaranteeing by this execution at the stop 
price (the prevailing quote) while attempting to execute the order at a better price. The 
subsequent execution of a stopped market order is difficult to classify unambiguously as 
either a buy or a sell. Market cross is a market order matched against another market order. 
Market crosses are also difficult to classify unambiguously since both sides of the trade can 
be deemed to have initiated the transaction. 
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A laborious process of matching trades with preceding quotes for 2005-2006 data 
was carefully done in Ryzhkov (2007). Yuriy Ryzhkov has kindly provided the 
author with the matched data. 
Each trade was matched with the closest in time bid/ask quote preceding the trade. 
For some stocks on some days the best quote issued by a broker did not change for a 
few hours. In these cases long time will be documented between a trade and the 
issuance of preceding quote.  
For 0.2% of all trades the closest previous quote was the closing quote on the 
previous day; majority of these trades were executed in the first forty minutes after 
opening of the trading session. For the trades and quotes executed/issued on the 
same day, average time between the trade and the issue of the closest quote 
preceding the trade was 1 hour and 7 minutes. Minimum time was 0 minutes, while 
maximum time was 5 hours and 59 minutes. Standard deviation of the average time 
was 1 hour and 36 minutes. 
59% of all trades were matched with preceding quote with a difference in time of 30 
min. or less.  
 
 
3.6. Division of Stocks Into Groups Based On Trade Size 
 
Certain parts of the cost of trading study (Chapter 4) and the study of 
decomposition of the bid-ask spread (Chapter 6) require division of trades into 
groups by trade size. 
Two different measures of trade size are often applied in the market microstructure 
literature. The U.K. studies tend to divide trades into size groups based on the 
relative trade size. As a basis, the normal market size is taken. According to the 
London Stock Exchange definition, the normal market size (NMS) for a given stock 
is 2.5% (or 1/40th) of the average daily trading volume over the prior twelve months 
(Hansch et al., 1999). The size of each trade is related to the normal market size of a 
trade for a stock (Hansch et al. (1999), Bernhardt et al. (2005), Naik and Yadav 
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(2003)). The U.S. studies usually divide trades into size groups based on the absolute 
trade size. This can be either the number of stocks per trade (Lee (1993), Huang and 
Stoll (1996)) or dollar value of a trade (Stoll, 2000). 
 
The number of stocks per trade seems to be an inappropriate measure of trade size 
in the Ukrainian stock market. The median trade size over 2005-2006 varies from 200 
stocks per trade for DNEN to 665,850 stocks per trade for BAVL (Table 3.3). Such a 
big difference in the size of the median trade is driven by considerable differences in 
stock prices. For example, average stock price for DNEN was USD 74.5, while for 
BAVL it was much smaller, USD 0.08. This suggests that a trade with the same 
number of stocks can be small for one company though large for another company 
and this approach to defining trade size does not seem to be appropriate for 
Ukraine. 
The definition of the trade size based on the value traded was applied in Ryzhkov 
(2007). It will be discussed below. 
 
We have chosen to define trade sizes based on the relative size of trades. PFTS does 
not define the normal market size. Median trade size (number of shares traded) is 
seen as an appropriate measure of the normal market size for a stock. Relative trade 
size for each trade is calculated as a ratio of the size for this trade (number of shares 
traded) to the normal trade size for the stock. Trades executed in 2005 are related to 
the median trade size for each stock during 2005. Trades executed in 2006 are 
related to the median trade size for each stock during 2006.   
Average value of the relative trade size varied from 3 to 5 NMS for the majority of 
the stocks. Therefore we set the following rule of division of the stocks into size 
groups: small trades are the trades of less than 2 NMS, medium trades are the trades 
of 2 NMS or more but less than 6 NMS, and large trades are the trades of 6 NMS or 
more. The same division into groups relative to the normal market size was used in 
Hansch et al. (1999). 
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In Ryzhkov (2007) the stocks were divided into size groups based on the volume of 
each trade in monetary terms. The division was based on the Ukrainian brokers' 
view that a large trade in PFTS is one of at least UAH 1 mln. (about USD 200,000). 
Ryzhkov (2007) considered small trades as those of less than UAH 0.1 mln, medium 
as those of UAH 0.1 mln - UAH 1 mln, and large as those of more than UAH 1 mln. 
The approach assigned small size to 63% of all trades, medium size – to 26% of all 
trades, and large size – to 11% of all trades. Our division based on the relative trade 
size has given a similar breakdown: small, medium-sized, and large trades took 
69.7%, 19.4%, and 11% of all trades respectively. 
 
Table 3.3. Median trade size and the number of small, medium, and large trades 


























AZST 19,000 10,233 408 107 34 549 
BAVL 665,850 52,566 287 75 78 440 
DNEN 200 14,897 150 45 29 223 
DTRZ 500 28,462 217 81 26 325 
LTPL 41,190 14,961 428 108 57 593 
MZVM 1,000 9,299 323 101 43 468 
NITR 3,000 24,446 278 94 57 429 
PGOK 3,000 30,009 206 50 43 298 
SMASH 3,000 10,540 318 87 45 450 
STIR 500 9,868 194 61 43 297 
UNAF 800 36,091 485 81 103 670 
USCB 25,000 9,511 162 54 42 257 
UTEL 70,000 12,187 605 176 50 831 
ZAEN 500 14,544 274 55 43 372 
ZPST 10,000 11,564 460 160 62 681 
Total   19,279* 4,794 1,333 755 6,882 
% of Total   69.70% 19.40% 11.00% 100.00% 
* Average volume of median trades 
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The distribution of the number of trades by trade size for each stock is presented in 
Table 3.3. The volume traded for each trade size is presented in Table 3.4. As 
expected, small trades are the most numerous in number, 4,794, though take the 
smallest share by volume, 13.9%. Medium trades accounted for 1,333 in number and 
took 16.6% of total volume. Large trades were the least numerous in number, 755, 
though took the largest share by volume, 69.5%. 
 
Table 3.4. Total volume traded during 2005-2006 for small, medium, and large 
trades. 
Company 












AZST 2,599,233 3,386,880 5,001,555 10,987,668 
BAVL 2,631,101 3,632,316 40,979,978 47,243,395 
DNEN 1,735,975 2,179,733 13,078,398 16,994,106 
DTRZ 2,432,809 3,205,129 5,367,626 11,005,564 
LTPL 2,502,004 2,856,766 12,715,408 18,074,178 
MZVM 2,209,224 2,964,042 10,180,838 15,354,103 
NITR 2,496,630 4,428,330 12,938,741 19,863,700 
PGOK 3,056,485 3,667,782 15,465,813 22,190,080 
SMASH 2,516,712 3,015,895 8,694,097 14,226,704 
STIR 1,068,018 1,546,904 7,585,356 10,200,279 
UNAF 6,773,476 5,174,183 44,780,205 56,727,865 
USCB 1,683,565 3,099,299 15,256,429 20,039,293 
UTEL 5,308,011 5,130,337 6,973,705 17,412,054 
ZAEN 2,360,682 2,069,938 9,975,037 14,405,656 
ZPST 3,732,591 5,125,349 6,406,687 15,264,627 
Total 43,106,516 51,482,882 215,399,874 309,989,273 






3.7. Limitations of the Data 
 
PFTS data has some limitations. First, it does not reflect all the trades executed with 
PFTS-listed securities. Ukrainian legislation does not require that all trades executed 
with an exchange-listed security to be reported to the stock exchange. As a result, 
some trades with PFTS-listed securities can be performed over the counter with no 
reporting to PFTS. There is official data on the total volume of over the counter 
trades executed with all stocks (both listed and not listed) though no separate data 
on the volume of these trades with the exchange-listed stocks. Based on our 
knowledge of the Ukrainian stock market, we tend to conclude that majority of 
trades with the stocks in the free float are executed with the intermediation of PFTS 
brokers, while large blocks of stocks held by business groups can be bought or sold 
off-exchange, through direct negotiation between the interested parties. 
 
Second, some of the trades executed by PFTS brokers with PFTS-listed stocks were 
not reported to PFTS. Trades, which were performed directly between a PFTS 
broker (a member of PFTS) and an outside investor (non-member of PFTS) (further 
referred to as third party trades) were not obligatory (until May 2008) to be reported 
to PFTS. Brokers could have voluntarily reported these trades to PFTS at a specially 
allotted time (before the opening of the trading session (before 11 a.m.) during the 
next two trading days after the trade execution). As a result a portion of the third 
party trades, which stayed unreported, are lost for our study. Though we expect 
that percentage of such trades is not high. Despite reporting of the third party trades 
was not obligatory, brokers had a motivation to report the trades. Higher trading 
volume increases the position of a broker in the rating of PFTS brokers, which is 
published by PFTS monthly and is based on the volume traded by each broker. This 
is the only rating of brokers issued in Ukraine and a higher position in the rating is 
viewed as an important constituent of a broker's reputation. Taking into account 
that the reported third party trades take quite a large portion of the total trades 
(44.2% of the total PFTS volume and 34.8% of the total PFTS number of trades), we 
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tend to conclude that majority of the third party trades are actually reported to 
PFTS. This means that the dataset for our liquidity study (Chapter 4, the dataset 
includes both third party trades and the trading session trades) reflects actual PFTS 
trading volume quite accurately.  
 
Another important limitation of the data is that reported data on the third party 
trades do not contain actual time of trade execution but only the time of trade 
reporting. Our study in Chapters 4 and 6 requires data on the actual time of trade 
execution.  Therefore all the trades reported before 11 a.m. are lost for the study, 
which considerably decreases our dataset.  
 
As we do not include the reported third party trades in our study in Chapters 4 and 
6, in order to conclude whether our estimates found for the trades performed during 
the trading session can be attributed to the Ukrainian stock market as a whole, it is 
important to compare the properties of the third party trades with the properties of 
the trades performed during the trading session. Table 3.5 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the two sets of trades. 
 
Sales dominate among the third party trades. The share of sales is 70%, while share 
of purchases is 30%. The shares for the trading session trades are 57% and 43% 
respectively. Dominance of sales among the third party trades is not surprising. 
(Trade direction is determined from the point of view of an investor. If investor sells 
stocks to a broker, a trade is a sale; if an investor buys stocks from a broker, a trade 
is a purchase). A broker can buy for his own inventory the stocks that an investor 
wants to sell, though if an investor wants to buy stocks and the broker does not 
have the stocks in his inventory, he cannot sell the stocks to investor without trading 
with other brokers. If a broker needs to trade with another broker to execute a trade, 
the trade will not be a third party trade anymore but will need to be a trading 




In terms of trade size, third party sales have a very similar structure to the trading 
session sales. For example, small, medium, and large third party sales took 63.8%, 
22.1%, and 14.1% respectively of the total number of the third party sales, while 
small, medium, and large trading session sales took 68.0%, 21.5%, and 10.5% 
respectively of the total number of the trading session sales. The proportions based 
on the volume traded are also similar for the third party sales and the trading 
session sales. This suggests that the third party sales and the trading session sales 
are similarly distributed in terms of trade size and trade volume and, therefore, the 
estimation results found based on the trading session sales can be extrapolated on 
all the sales in PFTS. 
 
In terms of trade size, the structure of the third party purchases is quite different 
from the structure of the trading session purchases. Proportion of small third party 
purchases is much less than the proportion of small trading session purchases. The 
opposite is true for large trades. Large trades take 25% of the total number of the 
third party purchases, while large trades take only 11% of the total number of the 
trading session purchases. In terms of volume traded, the ratios are 85% and 69% 
respectively. Moreover, average volume of a large third party purchase is USD 0.41 
mln., while  average volume of a large trading session purchase is smaller, USD 0.29 
mln. The finding is surprising as we did not expect that proportion of large trades 
among the third party purchases will be higher than for the trading session trades. 
We expected that the third party trades should be executed from the brokers'  own 
inventory, and since inventory of a broker is quite limited, small trades should 
dominate among the third party purchases. The result points at that the third party 
trades are not necessarily executed from the brokers' own inventory. Though the 
trades are executed not through transacting with the other brokers. Probably, 
having received a large buy order, a broker can contact the owners of the large 
blocks of shares directly and execute the order with them directly, without a need to 
transact with other PFTS brokers. 
 88 
So, if the distribution of sales in terms of trade size is similar for the third party 
trades and the trading session trades, the respective distribution of purchases is 
quite different. Third party purchases have less of small trades and more of large 
trades in their structure compared to the structure of the trading session trades. 
Large trades are done through negotiation, and trade prices for block trades can 
differ considerably (in either direction) from the prices for trades of normal size. 
Since large third party purchases are, on average, larger than large trading session 
purchases and their proportion in the structure of the third party trades is higher 
than in the structure of the trading session trades, the estimation results found for 
the large trading session purchases should not necessarily hold for the large 
purchases in PFTS as a whole. 
 
Since the third party trades were not required to be reported to PFTS, we expected 
that the number of reported large purchases will be quite low, since these trades are 
viewed as the those that have the highest information content. Though a large 
number and volume of the reported third party trades suggests that brokers do not 
tend to hide the trades. One of the reasons of it can be a delay allowed for reporting 
the trades. At the time when the trades are reported (one or two trading days after 
the day of the trade execution), the value of information may have decreased. 
 
To summarize, a portion of trades with PFTS-listed stocks can be executed over-the-
counter, without reporting to PFTS. There is no data available on the number and 
volume of the trades. The trades executed with a PFTS broker and a third party are 
not reported to PFTS at the time of trade execution but can be voluntarily reported 
during the next two trading days after the opening of the trading session. Taking 
into account that: (i) brokers have a motivation to report the trades, (ii) the 
proportion of the reported third party trades is quite high (44% of the total PFTS 
trading volume), and (iii) the proportion of reported large purchases is quite high 
(large purchases are considered the most informative trades, their reporting may be 
not in the interest of brokers), we tend to conclude that majority of the third party 
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trades are reported to PFTS. The distribution of sales is very similar for the third 
party trades and for the trading session trades, so the estimation results found for 
the trading session sales can be quite confidently extended on all PFTS sales. 
Though among the third party purchases, the proportion of large trades is higher 
than that among the trading session purchases. Moreover, third party large 
purchases are, on average, larger, than the trading session large purchases. So, the 
estimation results for the large trading session purchases have to be extended on all 
PFTS large purchases with caution. 
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Table 3.5. Distribution of trades reported before the opening of the trading (from 9 a.m. till 11 a.m.) and during the trading session 
(from 11 a.m. till 5 p.m.)  
Sales Purchases 
    
Small Medium Large Total 
Sales as 
% of all 
trades 
Small Medium Large Total 
Purchases 




% of all 
reported 
trades 
Number of trades 1,666 576 369 2,611 70.0% 557 281 279 1,116 30.0% 3,727 34.8% 
 % 63.8% 22.1% 14.1% 100.0%   49.9% 25.1% 25.0% 100.0%       
Volume traded, USD mln. 12.57 22.94 90.66 126.17 48.7% 6.01 13.49 113.58 133.08 51.3% 259.24 44.2% 
Reported 
from 9 
a.m. till 11 
a.m.  % 10.0% 18.2% 71.9% 100.0%   4.5% 10.1% 85.3% 100.0%       
                            
Number of trades 2,710 858 417 3,985 57.0% 2,184 489 334 3,007 43.0% 6,992 65.2% 
 % 68.0% 21.5% 10.5% 100.0%   72.6% 16.3% 11.1% 100.0%       
Volume traded, USD mln. 25.19 32.34 131.89 189.43 58.0% 20.73 21.28 95.29 137.31 42.0% 326.73 55.8% 
Reported 
from 11 
a.m. till 5 
p.m.  % 13.3% 17.1% 69.6% 100.0%   15.1% 15.5% 69.4% 100.0%       
                            
Number of trades                     10,719 100% 
                          
















Usually the decision to buy or sell a particular asset is based on the expectations 
about the future performance of this asset. But buying a stock with high expected 
returns might result in considerably worse performance than expected if trading 
costs for this stock are high. In the same way, a stock with lower expected gross 
returns may perform better than its rival stocks if the cost of trading for this stock is 
lower. This makes trading costs an important factor to consider when a portfolio is 
constructed or portfolio rebalancing decisions are made. This is especially important 
for active institutional investors who frequently transact in stocks.  
 
Empirical literature has shown that the cost of trading a stock depends not only on 
individual features of a stock but also on the characteristics of a trade such as trade 
size and trade direction. The cost of transacting small and large quantities of the 
same stock can differ substantially. In the order-driven markets (like NYSE, 
Euronext Paris, Tokyo Stock Exchange) it is found that it is more expensive to 
execute a large order, while small orders are done at a lower cost (Lee (1993), Harris 
and Hasbrouck (1996), and Bernhardt and Hughson (2002)). On the contrary, in the 
dealership markets (like Nasdaq and London Stock Exchange) large orders are 
found less expensive to execute than small orders (Reiss and Werner (1996), Huang 
and Stoll (1996), and Hansch et. al (1999)).  It is important for traders to predict the 
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cost of trading for the quantity they intend to trade in order to keep their strategy 
profitable. In this chapter, we study the cost of trading separately for small, 
medium-sized, and large orders in the stock market of Ukraine. Such an important 
for the stock market participants study has not been done for Ukraine before. 
Literature has shown that the cost of trading is not symmetrical for institutional buy 
and sell orders. Buy orders were found more expensive in rising markets 
(Holthausen et al. (1987), Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Keim and Madhavan (1998), 
and Chiyachantana et al. (2004)), while in falling markets, sell orders were found 
more expensive (Chiyachantana et al. (2004) and Bikker et al. (2007)). Most previous 
studies in the area of the cost of trading were conducted using data primarily from 
rising market conditions. In this chapter, we investigate the cost of trading 
separately for rising and falling market conditions and add more evidence to the 
literature to confirm the asymmetry documented in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
Also, we add to knowledge by estimating how the cost of buy and sell orders differs 
in falling and rising markets in the Ukrainian stock market, which has not been 
done before.  
 
The cost of trading differs across the stocks. What factors are the determinants of the 
width of the bid-ask spread for a stock? The importance of various stock 
characteristics, in particular stock risk and liquidity, in determining the width of the 
bid-ask spread is studied in the last section of the chapter. In conducting the study 
we follow the framework of Stoll (2000). Understanding the determinants of the bid-
ask spread can be helpful in predicting the cost of trading for the stocks and 
designing stock selection procedures and trading strategies that lower transaction 
costs and, as a result, maximize net returns on an equity portfolio. 
 
A study of the cost of trading is important not only for investors and traders but 
also for exchanges, brokers, and regulators. The cost of trading is an important 
determinant of the quality of a stock market. Brokers regularly conduct the cost of 
trading studies to document their performance. Regulators often try to promote 
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policies that lower transaction costs. Therefore, the study is expected to be of value 
for the PFTS stock exchange and for the Ukrainian stock market regulator, the State 
Commission for Securities and Stock Market. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature, 
Section 3 presents the methodology and data, Section 4 discusses results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
4.2. Review of Literature 
 
Analysts usually distinguish two components of the cost of trading: explicit and 
implicit costs. Explicit costs are direct costs of trading and include broker 
commissions and taxes. Implicit costs are not directly paid by traders but indirectly 
increase the cost of equity trading. They include bid-ask spread, price impact costs, 
delay costs, and opportunity costs.  
In the NYSE, brokers that  act as agents and are intermediaries between traders and 
market makers earn commission. Market makers act as principals. They work for 
their own account and earn the difference between bid and ask prices.  
In the Ukrainian stock market, as opposed to the NYSE, brokers act as both agents 
and principals. When a broker needs to trade with other brokers in order to execute 
an order of his client, he acts as an agent. In this case he earns commission. Though 
commission in the Ukrainian stock market is not directly stated. A broker suggests a 
price to his client that already includes commission and the client has either accept 
the price, or negotiate it, or switch to another broker. When a broker executes a 
client's order or an order from another broker from his own inventory, the broker 





Quoted Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Suppliers of liquidity, such as market makers, stand ready to trade at prices they 
quote. The demanders of liquidity are active traders who place market orders to 
trade immediately. Immediate sales are usually done at the bid price, and 
immediate purchases – at the ask price. The spread between the bid and the ask is 
one of the measures of the cost of trading.  
Bid-ask spread arises because stock market intermediaries have to cover the costs of 
doing their business. Microstructure literature has shown that the quoted spread 
reflects a number of costs: i) order processing costs (Demsetz (1968), Stoll (1985)), ii) 
inventory holding costs (Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll 
(1981)), and iii) asymmetric information costs (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Copeland and Galai (1983)); also bid-ask spread can reflect monopoly or cartel 
power of the liquidity suppliers.  
 
The order processing cost is the oldest cost identified in literature. Early writers, as 
Demsetz (1968), viewed the bid-ask spread as a payment for services provided by 
suppliers of liquidity.  The supply of liquidity, like any other business activity, 
requires real economic resources – labour and capital – to execute trades and theses 
resources must be paid for. In other words, the order processing cost refers to 
different kinds of costs related to order execution such as office rent, salaries to the 
employees, costs of finding counterparts for a trade, etc. 
 
Some authors argue that market makers use spread to compensate for the risk they 
take due to holding some unwanted inventory positions. Because of their role of 
liquidity suppliers, market makers have to constantly post quotes and must be 
ready to play as counterparts for each trade; as a result, they falling an inventory 
risk due to positions away from their desired target inventory level. These positions 
can lead to losses of market makers in case of adverse price movement. The 
 95 
relationship between the spread and inventory costs has been studied, among 
others, by Stoll (1978), Ho & Stoll (1981) and Amihud & Mendelson (1980). 
 
The existence of the information asymmetry cost grounds on the idea that a market 
maker always loses to informed traders, but recovers his losses with gains he earns 
from transactions with uninformed traders. With the presence of asymmetric 
information, a supplier of liquidity faces the danger that a bid or ask will be 
accepted by someone with superior information. Informed traders buy at the ask if 
they have information justifying a higher price, and they sell at the bid if they have 
information justifying a lower price. When the information becomes known, 
informed traders gain at the expense of the suppliers of immediacy. The equilibrium 
spread is expected to cover such losses. As Bagehot (1971) first noted, if suppliers of 
immediacy are to avoid losses, uninformed traders must pay a spread sufficient to 
compensate suppliers of immediacy for the losses to informed traders. The 
relationship between information asymmetry and the bid-ask spread has been the 
subject of numerous studies (Copeland & Galai (1983), Glosten & Milgrom (1985), 
Easley & O’Hara (1987), and others). 
 
Market power has long been recognized as a potential source of the bid-ask spread. 
Dealers with market power will increase the spread relative to their costs. The cost 
of trading in this setting is the real resources extracted as monopoly rents to 
accomplish trades (Stoll, 2000).  
 
Values of the estimates of the quoted spread vary widely across the stocks of 
various liquidity as well as across different stock exchanges of the world. For 
example, in NYSE, relative quoted bid-ask spread (spread as a percentage of the 
midquote) varies from 0.5% for the most liquid (largest market capitalization) stocks 
to 4-6% for the most illiquid (smallest market capitalization) stocks (Loeb (1983), 
Keim (1989), and Huang and Stoll (1996)). The relative quoted spreads for liquid 
stocks (25 highest market capitalization stocks on each exchange) across a wide 
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selection of developed and emerging stock markets were estimated in Jain (2003), 
the results are presented in Table 4.1. As the table show, the cost of trading is 
smaller in developed markets and larger in emerging markets. Out of 51 exchanges 
studied in Jain (2003), quoted bid-ask spread was the highest in the Ukrainian stock 
market (15.3%).  
 
Table 4.1. Estimates of relative quoted bid-ask spread for liquid stocks for a 




Eastern Europe East Asia Latin America 
US, NYSE 0.20% Poland 1.15% China 0.20% Argentina 1.74% 
US, Nasdaq 0.41% Czech Republic 3.66% Taiwan 0.35% Mexico 1.76% 
France 0.40% Hungary 4.55% Hong Kong 0.59% Colombia 3.08% 
U.K. 0.88% Russia 5.38% Philippines 1.97% Peru 4.35% 
Germany 0.91% Ukraine 15.30% Indonesia 6.01% Brazil 7.34% 
 
 
Effective Bid-Ask Spread 
 
For several reasons quoted bid-ask spread is not an accurate estimate of the true cost 
of equity transacting. First, quoted bid-ask spread may overstate the true spread 
because trades are often executed inside the quoted spread. Second, both the bid 
and ask prices have a systematic tendency to rise (fall) following a purchase (sale), 
so the true round-trip trading costs are less than the quoted spread suggests. Third, 
large block transactions are often prearranged and need not occur at the quoted bid 
or ask prices. 
Effective spread equals quoted spread when all purchases occur at the bid and all 
sales occur at the ask. When trades take place within the spread (if price 
improvement is suggested to traders), the effective spread paid by traders is smaller 
than quoted spread. In the same way, when larger orders are executed at the prices 
outside the quoted bid-ask spread, effective spread is larger than quoted spread. 
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Effective spread is the estimate of the cost of trading, which is most commonly 
used by practitioners. Retail traders primarily compare their execution prices 
against the bid and offer prices that prevailed when the orders were submitted 
(Harris, 2003). 
Figure 4.1 shows the relation between quoted spread, effective spread, and price 
improvement. 
 
There is a number of methods of estimating effective bid-ask spread. The 
benchmark method suggests estimating effective bid-ask spread as a doubled 
deviation of the trade price from the prevailing mid-quote at the time of trade, 
which is the benchmark (Naik and Yadav (2003) and Stoll (2000)). The limitation of 
this method is that it requires bid and ask quotes data, which are not always 
available.   
The covariance method of estimating effective bid-ask spread suggested by Roll 
(1984) infers implied bid-ask spread (a concept in Roll (1984) similar to effective 
spread) directly from a time series of trade prices. The idea behind the Roll model is 
that market prices are not independent because the recorded transactions occur at 
either bid or ask price. This implies that one would find negative serial dependence 
in observed prices when a specialist is involved in transactions. Roll (1984) has 
shown that the covariance between successive price changes equals one-half of the 
squared implied spread with a negative sign, which implies that implied spread 
equals cov2 − , where cov is the serial covariance of successive price changes. Roll 
interpreted the implied spread as a measure of the spread at which transactions 
actually occur. Using daily data for NYSE and American Exchange stocks for the 
period 1963 to 1982 Roll found that implied spread equals 0.30% or about 8.9 cents 
on a $30 stock.  
Stoll (1989) and Huang and Stoll (1995)) criticize Roll's measure of spread for not 
taking into account permanent price changes following a trade, which is correct 
only in the absence of asymmetric information and inventory costs in the market. 
Huang and Stoll (1996) find that for more recent data on the NYSE (1991), the Roll 
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implied half-spread is 3.4 cents, which is less than the effective half-spread 
calculated using the benchmark method. This reflects the fact that quotes on the 
NYSE do permanently change in response to trades, consistent with the presence of 
asymmetric information. 
 
Figure 4.1. Quoted spread, effective spread, the cost of trading, and price 




The models of Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson, Roomans (1997) 
suggest a simple and effective method of estimating effective bid-ask spread from 
the time series of trade prices. The basic idea of the approach is to regress the price 
change from the successive transactions on the change in the trade direction 
variable (which equals one if trade was a purchase and minus one if trade was a 
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sale). The models also allow to estimate the components of the bid-ask spread. This 
approach is explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Empirical findings in literature show that effective spread is usually less than 
quoted spread. Lee (1993) found that for 500 NYSE common stocks during 1988-
1989 effective spread was by as much as 50% smaller than quoted spread. Huang 
and Stoll (1997) estimated that effective spread for a sample of 20 stocks in the Major 
Market Index in 1992 ranged from a low of 9.9 cents per share for IBM to a high of 
13.5 cents per share for Procter and Gamble. The quoted spreads for the companies 
were 15.9 cents and 19.6 cents respectively. Stoll (2000) estimated that on 
NYSE/AMEX in December 1997-February 1998 the overall effective spread was 
11.16 cents per share, while quoted spread was 15.74 cents per share. In Nasdaq, the 
spreads were 21.40 cents per share and 25.14 cents per share respectively. 
On the London stock exchange, effective spread for the FTSE-100 stocks in August 
1994 was 0.54% while quoted spread was 1.25% (Hansch et al. (1999)). On Euronext 
Paris, effective spread for 55 largest stocks during the first six months of 2001 was 




There are other frictions that increase the cost of equity trading. Many researchers 
have documented that large equity trades move stock prices in the direction of the 
trade. This incurs additional cost of trading for the buyers/sellers of large block of 
stocks. The cost is usually called the price impact cost, or the market impact cost. 
The price impact is the deviation of the transaction price from the “unperturbed 
price” that would have prevailed in the market if the trade had not occurred. The 
approach to measuring price impact is similar to the benchmark method for 
measuring effective bid-ask spread, where the benchmark price is a measure of 
unperturbed price. Therefore, price impact for large, or institutional, trades is often 
considered as the cost of trading for these trades.  
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Investors can incur very substantial price impact costs when they trade large 
amounts of thinly traded stocks or relatively large blocks of heavily traded stocks, 
irrespective of whether the trades are liquidity or information motivated. 
Price impact cost is difficult to measure because the unperturbed price is not 
observable. Many different measures of the unperturbed price exist in literature, 
among them three main groups can be distinguished: pre-trade, post-trade, and 
mixed benchmarks. A pre-trade benchmarks used in literature are i) a stock price 
observable a few seconds before a block trade (Smith et al. (2001)), ii) a price at the 
moment when the block order was passed to the broker (Bikker (2007)), iii) a 
previous day closing price, or closing price 1 week or 3 weeks before the block trade 
(Keim & Madhavan (1996)). Post-trade benchmarks such as the day of the trade 
closing price and the post trade day's closing price were applied in Beebower and 
Priest (1980). A mixed benchmark such as weighted average of the pre-trade and 
post-trade prices was used for estimating price impact in Berkowitz et al (1988). 
Empirical findings document various values of the price impact cost. Bikker (2007) 
found that a big Dutch pension fund during the first three months of 2002 incurred 
the price impact costs of 0.2% for purchases and 0.3% for sales. Keim & Madhavan 
(1996) report that the price impact of the block trades of an American passive 
investment management firm during 1985-1992, estimated based on 1 day, 6 days 
and 22 days pre-trade benchmarks were 1.60%, 2.82%, and 4.66% respectively for 
purchases, and -1.50%, -4.32%, and -7.40% respectively for sales. 
Estimation of the price impact costs is out of the scope of this chapter. We focus at 
studying effective spread rather than the price impact of large trades. Therefore the 
extensive price impact literature is not discussed in further detail. Though we find it 
important to present the basic information about the price impact measurement 
because this measure of the cost of trading is used in some of the literature, which 




Delay Costs and Opportunity Costs 
 
Delay costs reflect the risk of adverse price movements that can occur when trading 
is postponed.  
The estimates of this cost can rarely be found in literature due to the difficulties with 
obtaining the necessary data, namely the date of the decision to trade. 
 
Opportunity costs represent the cost associated with missed trading opportunity. 
Many trades are motivated by information and the information has value that 
decays over time. Unexecuted orders lay on the trader the cost of unused 
information. An order may be left unexecuted because the trader cannot locate the 
shares to complete the order or the price has moved out of the range of prices the 
portfolio manager is willing to pay. For example, Treynor (1981) suggested to 
measure the cost of trading as a difference in performance between a portfolio based 
on the actually made trades and a hypothetical portfolio whose returns are 
computed based on the assumption that trades were executed at prices observed at 
the time when the decision to trade was made. 
Unfortunately, similar to the case with estimating the delay cost, researchers rarely 
have sufficiently detailed data to measure the opportunity cost. 
 
Other Measures of the Cost of Trading  
 
Lesmond et. al (1999) suggested a new approach to measuring the cost of trading. 
The model developed in the paper is based on the adverse selection framework of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) and suggests that the marginal 
informed investor does not transact until his anticipated profit from the trade 
exceeds his cost. The transaction cost represents a limit that must be exceeded before 
the security's return will reflect new information. A zero return is observed every 
time the anticipated return does not cover the transaction cost.  
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The menu of the cost of trading measures is supplemented with realized spread and 
perfect foresight spread (Huang and Stoll (1996)), adverse selection spread (Naik 
and Yadav (2003)), traded spread (Stoll (2000)) and other measures. These measures 
try to capture special aspects of the process of trading or estimate the cost of trading 
from the view of a broker rather than a trader.  
 
Effects of Trade Size 
 
Theoretical literature has predicted and empirical literature has shown that there 
exists a relationship between the cost of trading and the trade size.  
For NYSE, Keim and Madhavan (1996) documented that the percentage costs for the 
largest trades are much higher than for smaller trades (1.16% and 0.32% 
correspondently). A similar pattern was found in Huang and Stoll (1996), large 
trades were executed with the effective spread of 8.5 cents per share, while small 
trades with the effective spread of 7.7 cents per share. Lee (1993) found that large 
trades were executed at on average 3 cents per share higher price than small trades. 
The fact that large orders receive worse prices in NYSE was also documented in 
Bernhardt and Hughson (2002), Glosten and Harris (1988), Easley, Kiefer, and 
O'Hara (1997), Lee (1993), and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996). 
 
Traditional explanation for the proportional relationship between trade size and the 
cost of trading is that large trades impose large inventory exposure on the market 
maker and therefore require additional compensation, which is accomplished by the 
trade clearing at a worse price. A difficulty with such explanation is that a market 
maker rarely takes the other side of such trades, indeed he might not participate in 
the trade at all, as many large trades bypass the specialist completely and are done 
through syndication (O'Hara (1998), p. 70). 
Development of information-based models in 1980s gave a new insight on the 
possible reason of higher cost of trading for larger trades. Large traders have trouble 
finding liquidity because large liquidity suppliers suspect that block traders have 
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superior information (Seppi (1990), Barclay and Warner (1993), and Hansch et al. 
(1999)). There are two main reasons behind this suspicion. First, large traders can 
afford to invest more in research and therefore have higher chances to know more 
about a stock. Second, it is probable that the reason behind trading a large block of 
shares is a desire to maximize profit from information that the trader has. Therefore, 
in order to protect themselves from losses, brokers demand price concessions when 
trading with block traders.  
Block liquidity suppliers demand these price concessions for the same reason that 
market makers include an asymmetric information component in their bid-ask 
spread. Block liquidity suppliers suspect that, in particular, large anonymous 
traders are well informed (informed traders prefer to be anonymous in order not to 
get a reputation of informed traders and therefore not to be suggested higher, 
information-corrected prices in future) (Harris (2003), p. 326). 
 
It is interesting that relationship between trade size and the cost of trading that is 
opposite to the one found for NYSE, was documented for the dealership type 
markets like London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Nasdaq. For the London Stock 
Exchange, Reiss and Werner (1996) found that larger trades receive better prices 
(only for unusually large orders the cost of trading starts to grow with the trade 
size). Hansch et. al (1999) found that in the LSE price improvement is smaller for 
small trades (0.073%), larger for medium-sized trades (0.083%) and the largest for 
large trades (0.089%).  
On Nasdaq, Huang and Stoll (1996) found that small trades were executed with 
effective half-spread of 19.9 cents per share, while large trades, with effective half-
spread of 13.5 cents per share.  
The empirical findings in literature suggest that in the markets with open limit 
order book structure (like NYSE and Euronext Paris) the cost of trading grows in the 
trade size, while in the markets with dealership structure (like London Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq) the cost of trading falls in the trade size.  
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According to conventional wisdom, in dealership markets, large trades are also 
expected to be more information motivated than small trades. But the asymmetric 
information theory fails to explain the relationship between the cost of trading and 
the trade size in dealership markets. There should exist some sources of concession 
for larger trades that are able to overweigh the asymmetric information 
considerations for these trades in dealership markets. The differences in dealer 
behaviour are found to be the reason of better price for larger trades in dealership 
markets (Christie and Schultz (1994), Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994), Bernhardt 
et. al (2005), and Rhodes-Kropf (2005)). 
 
Bernhardt et. al (2005) studies closely larger trades in LSE and argues that structural 
features of dealership markets provide an explanation of the smaller cost of trading 
for larger trades. The key structural feature is the timing of competition for an order. 
In an open limit order book market, like NYSE or Paris Bourse, price competition is 
simultaneous. All market participants willing to fill their orders bid simultaneously. 
The liquidity provider with the best quoted price fills the order. In contrast, in a 
traditional dealer market, even though the information on dealers' quotes is open, 
brokers themselves choose a dealer with whom to trade and then negotiate the final 
price with him17. During the negotiation stage there are no other dealers to spur the 
competition. If broker is unhappy with the price, he can either accept the price but 
change dealers in the future, or can find another dealer and start the negotiation 
process again. This process is time consuming and can result in information leakage, 
which can reduce the profit from trading a stock. There is also no guarantee that the 
new dealer will offer a better price. The lack of temporal competition is supported 
by the fact that brokers typically do not even first contact the dealer with the best 
quote.  
Even though an individual order is not exposed to competition, Bernhardt et al. 
(2005) argue that there still exists intertemporal competition and that this 
                                                
17 In a traditional dealer market trading is organised in the following way: a trader submits an order to 
a broker and a broker executes it through a dealer; broker is an agent, who does not trade for his own
account and executes orders for his clients, whereas d ler trades for his own account. 
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competition generates the negative relationship between the trade size and the cost 
of trading. The broker's equilibrium strategy is to switch dealers if, for a given order 
size, he does not get sufficient price improvement. The dealer's problem is to weigh 
two revenue opportunities and choose the one, which will maximize his revenue. 
First opportunity is to suggest no price improvement to the broker and receive a 
higher one-time profit, and the second opportunity is to suggest enough price 
improvement to the broker and keep getting revenue from trading with the broker 
in the future.  
 
Bernhardt et. al (2005) tests the predictions of their model using a sample of 25 FTSE 
100 stocks in 1991. The study is possible because the data set allows to identify 
brokers and dealers both over time and across stocks, and hence to track trades by a 
particular broker across dealers. The results show that price improvement offered 
on each trade i) rises with the value of the relationship, and ii) holding the 
relationship fixed, falls with the current order size.  
The results indicate that London dealers screen broker identities and that it is not 
order size per se but rather the enduring relationship that determines the price 
improvement offered. With that, if relationship is kept fixed, the relation between 
the cost of trading and the order size is the same as in the open limit order market 
structure. Altogether, this evidence indicates that enduring trading relationships are 
primary to understanding pricing and trading in a traditional dealership market. 
 
A similar explanation of price improvement in dealership market is suggested in 
Rhodes-Kropf (2005). The model of Rhodes-Kropf (2005) assumes that some 
customers can make counteroffers to the posted quotes. Those customers who can 
negotiate may be larger, own a negotiation technology, have lower discount rates, 
posses greater skill, and so forth, but they do not necessarily have less or more 
information than a customer who cannot negotiate. Therefore dealers bid below 
their true value, leaving the surplus up for negotiation. Since customers have 
negotiation power, brokers cannot avoid suggesting them price improvement. In 
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case of not suggesting a price improvement to a customer with market power, the 
broker will lose this customer. Small customers are unlikely to have market power 
and trade at the quoted prices. Larger customers negotiate price improvement and 
trade at a better than quoted price.  
 
At the same time, in the dealership markets, information contents of trades has the 
same influence on the bid-ask spread as in the open limit order book markets. 
Information motivated trades are expected to be more expensive than uninformed 
trades. Informed traders has to stay anonymous and therefore trade at quoted 
prices. Uninformed traders submit to examination from their broker and receive a 
price improvement (for details on how examination can be done, see Harris (1993), 
pp. 11-22). Seppi (1990) noted that with negotiated improvements the transaction is 
not anonymous. In order to secure their price improvement in the future, repeat 
customers have to stay anonymous when they trade on information or they will not 
be trusted and suggested a price improvement in the future otherwise. Therefore, 
when motivated by information, repeat customers stay anonymous and trade at the 
quotes. Barclay and Warner (1993) and Hansch et al. (1999) also argue that dealers 
examine customers to asses their information. So, informed customers remain 
anonymous and trade at the quotes, while the uninformed submit to examination 
and receive a price improvement. An increase in the fraction of informed customers 
widens bid-ask spread as in a standard asymmetric information model.  
To summarize, in the order driven markets, traders cannot be examined. Trade size 
is viewed as a sign of the information content of a trade. As a result, larger orders 
tend to be executed at worse prices than smaller orders. In the dealership markets, 
traders are examined for the information content of their trade. Uninformed traders 
submit to examination and receive price improvement. Informed traders stay 
anonymous and trade at quoted prices. The value of price improvement that a 
broker agrees to provide depends on how much the broker values relationship with 
the trader. Normally, relationships with the traders with larger orders are 
considered more valuable since they bring more business to their brokers. So, larger 
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trades in the dealership markets receive more price improvement and are executed 
at better prices than smaller trades. 
 
That spreads could vary across trade sizes reveals a difficulty to measuring the cost 
of trading: there is no one market price for trading a stock. Examining only the 
small-trade spread cannot provide a good indication of the cost of trading in a 
market. Therefore, the spreads for various trade sizes have to be studied in order to 
get a fuller picture of the cost of trading in a market. 
 
Difference in the Cost of Trading for Sales and Purchases 
 
Empirical research in finance documents an asymmetry in the cost of trading 
between buyer- and seller-initiated institutional trades with many studies showing 
that institutional purchases are more expensive than institutional sales.  
Researchers have found that block purchases have a larger permanent price impact 
than block sales (Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), and Gemmill 
(1996)). The same result was documented for institutional purchases and sales 
(Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Keim and Madhavan 
(1998) (with an exception for the largest trades)).  
Majority of literature attributes the asymmetry to higher portion of informed 
trading in institutional purchases than in institutional sales. Kraus and Stoll (1972) 
noted that "blocks are sold not bought" pointing at a higher information content of 
purchases, which prompts institutional traders to split their block purchase orders 
into smaller parts in order to reveal less information and cause less adverse stock 
price movement. Similarly, Keim and Madhavan (1996) points that purchases are 
more likely to be based on private information because they create new long 
positions. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argue that institutional investor typically has 
limited alternatives to sell an asset since the number of stocks in his portfolio is 
limited, and therefore the decision to sell does not necessarily convey negative 
information. In contrast, the choice of buying a specific stock out of virtually all the 
 108 
stocks traded in the market, is more likely to convey positive firm-specific 
information.  
 
Saar (2001) develops a theoretical model that goes further in explanation of the 
asymmetry. The model relates the cost of institutional trading to the underlying 
economic environment and demonstrates that a stock’s history of price run-ups and 
run-downs influences the asymmetry. The model predicts that purchases have 
greater price impact than sales following a long period of price run-ups. The 
opposite is true after a series of price run-downs.  
The idea of Saar (2001) is further developed in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). The 
study suggests that the cost of trading is higher for institutional purchases when the 
market condition is rising, while when the market condition is falling, sales are 
more expensive than purchases. Due to their large sizes, institutional trades tend to 
be affected by market conditions and pay a higher premium for liquidity when they 
trade on the same side of the market. In a rising market, buy orders are likely to be 
an evidence of a shift to a higher expected equilibrium price. Therefore, suppliers of 
liquidity are cautious of buy orders and increase the prices in the face of a strong 
buying interest. Though suppliers of liquidity are not so cautious about the 
institutional sell orders in a rising market condition and therefore do not decrease 
the prices as much when they face a selling interest. When the market condition is 
falling, the situation is the opposite.  
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) examine two distinct calendar periods, four quarters of 
1997 and first quarter of 1998 (the rising phase) for 39 countries and first three 
quarters of 2001 (the falling phase) for 36 countries. Price impact in the study is 
defined in a few different settings depending on the benchmark price. The 
benchmarks include previous day closing price, the price prevailing at the time the 
institutions release an order to a trading desk (a benchmark, which is the closest to 
the benchmark in this study), and a volume-weighted average price for a day. The 
empirical results confirm the hypothesis that in the rising (falling) markets the cost 
of trading for purchases (sales) is greater than that for sales (purchases). The finding 
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is robust to the use of all alternative measures of price impact. In the rising market 
condition, the price impact (with benchmark as the price prevailing at the time the 
institutions release an order to a trading desk) of institutional purchases was 0.49%, 
whereas the price impact of institutional sales was 0.31%. In the falling market 
condition they were 0.13% and 0.53% respectively. Institutions pay for consuming 
liquidity when they buy in rising markets and sell in falling markets. On the 
contrary, when trading against the market, institutions effectively provide liquidity 
and, therefore, face lower cost of trading. This is despite the fact that institutional 
decisions are quite evenly split between purchases and sales in both periods 
(Chiyachantana et al. (2004)). 
Indeed, the studies that documented higher cost of trading for purchases than for 
sales (Keim and Madhavan (1998), Chan and Lakonishok (1993), and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995); similar to Chiyachantana et al. (2004), the studies applied either 
pre-trade benchmark, or mixed, or both) used the data from the periods when the 
market condition was rising. 
A study of the cost of trading for a Dutch pension fund during falling market of the 
first quarter of 2002 (Bikker et al. (2007)) found that sales were more expensive than 
purchases (0.3% and 0.2% correspondently), which is consistent with the predictions 
in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). (Bikker et al. (2007) applies a similar to 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) benchmark price, which is the price at the moment, 
when the order was passed to the broker). 
 
Determinants of the bid-ask spread 
 
Empirical findings in literature document that there are considerable differences in 
the bid-ask spreads of the stocks within a stock market as well as across stock 
markets (Loeb (1983), Keim (1989), Huang and Stoll (1996), and Jain (2003)). A 
number of studies investigate the factors that determine the width of the bid-ask 
spread for a stock. Stoll (2000) hypothesize that the bid-ask spread depends on the 
factors related to a stock's liquidity and risk. Liquidity related factors considered in 
 110 
the study are daily dollar trading volume, number of trades per day, and firm size. 
Increase in any of them is expected to increase liquidity of a stock and therefore to 
narrow its bid-ask spread. Risk of a stock is measured in Stoll (2000) by stock return 
variance and stock price (stocks with high return variance and low price tend to be 
riskier). Increase in risk for a stock is expected to widen the stock's bid-ask spread 
because of the higher probability of losses brokers can incur if they hold a risky 
stock in their inventory. 
Stoll (2000) runs a cross-sectional regression of the quoted bid ask spread on five 
determinants for 3890 NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks and finds highly significant 
and consistent results. Every coefficient has its expected sign and is significantly 
different from zero. The explanatory variables are able to explain more than 60% of 
the cross-sectional variance in the bid-ask spreads. Referring to previous literature, 
Stoll (2000) concludes that the relationship has changed little over time and adds: 
"The empirical relation is very strong… Few empirical relations in finance are this 
strong." 
 
Naik and Yadav (2003) study the difference in spreads for the London Stock 
Exchange stocks before and after market reform and run a regression similar to that 
in Stoll (2000). The number of explanatory variables in the regression is restricted to 
three: the volume of trading for a stock, stock price, and stock variance. Naik and 
Yadav (2003) run the regression for 76 stocks over three three-months periods of 
1994, 1996, and 1998 and find that all the coefficients have their expected signs and 
are significantly different from zero; more than 50% of the differences in the bid-ask 
spreads before and after the reform is explained. 
 
The cost of trading in Euronext Paris and London Stock Exchange is studied in 
Gajewski and Gresse (2007). Having found significant differences in the cost of 
trading of the matched stocks in the two exchanges, Gajewski and Gresse (2007) 
study the economic factors and institutional specifics that best explain the 
differences. Similar to Stoll (2000), the study employs determinants of the bid-ask 
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spread such as trading volume, number of trades per day, floating market 
capitalization for a stock, return variance, and stock price. Also, following the 
predictions of Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Kavajecz (1999), imbalances 
between purchases and sales are added.  
Gajewski and Gresse (2007) employ data for 55 pairs of matched stocks over 6 
months of 2001 and find that trading volume, return variance, and order imbalances 
have their expected signs and are significantly different from zero. Whereas, as 
opposed to Stoll (2000), floating market capitalization, stock price, and number of 
trades per day were found insignificantly different from zero. The explanatory 
power of the regression is high with the adjusted R-squared of 58.8%. 
 
In what follows, I am going to examine several aspects of the cost of trading that the 
studies that I have just explained consider. The aspects of the cost of trading will be 
examined for the stocks in the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
 
4.3. Methodology and Data 
 
Our analysis of the cost of trading includes estimation of the quoted bid-ask spread, 
effective bid-ask spread (following the benchmark method), and price 
improvement. 
 








=    (4.1) 
 
Where iTQS  is the relative quoted bid-ask spread, AiT is the best quoted closing ask 
price for a stock i on the day T, and BiT is the best quoted closing bid price for a stock 
i on the day T. 
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Average relative quoted spread for each stock is calculated as average of the daily 
values over the period of observation. 
 
Since the bid-ask quotes data are available for the Ukrainian stock market, we chose 
to apply the benchmark method for estimation of the effective bid-ask spread.  








=     (4.2) 
 
Where saleitES  is the effective half-spread for a sale trade for a stock i at the time t, Pit 
is the trade price for a stock i at the time t, and 2/)BA(MQ ititit +=  is the quote 
midpoint prevailing several minutes/hours before the trade (for more details on 
matching trade prices with the preceding midquotes, see Chapter 3)18. 
 








=    (4.3) 
 
Where  purchaseitES  is the effective half-spread for a buy trade for a stock i at the time 
t, Pit is the trade price for a stock i at the time t, and 2/)BA(MQ ititit +=  is the 
quote midpoint prevailing several minutes/hours before the trade (for more details 
on matching trade prices with the preceding midquotes, see Chapter 3)19. 
 
                                                
18 In our dataset intraday quotes are available only for the stocks with high liquidity. For the stocks 
with medium and low liquidity, for effective spread calculation, best closing quotes are taken instead 
of intraday quotes. 
19 In our dataset intraday quotes are available only for the stocks with high liquidity. For stocks with 
medium and low liquidity, for effective spread calculation, best closing quotes are taken instead of 
intraday quotes. 
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Average effective half-spreads for sales and purchases for each stock are calculated 
as average of the individual estimates over the period of observation. 
Average effective spread is found as the sum of the average effective spread for sale 
trades and average effective spread for buy trades.  
 








=     (4.4) 
 
Where saleitPI  is the price improvement for a sale trade for a stock i at the time t, Pit is 
the trade price for a stock i at the time t, and Bit is the best quoted bid price for a 
stock i prevailing several minutes/hours before the trade (for more details on 
matching trade prices with the preceding midquotes, see Chapter 3). 
 








=     (4.5) 
 
Where purchaseitPI  is the price improvement for a buy trade for a stock i at the time t, 
Pit is the trade price for a stock i at the time t, and Ait is the best quoted ask price for 
a stock i prevailing several minutes/hours before the trade (for more details on 







Definition of the rising, falling, and neutral market conditions 
 
For estimation of the effective bid-ask spread and price improvement in different 
market conditions, the 2005-2006 period is divided into three sub-periods relative to 
whether market condition was rising, falling, or neutral. 
According to the Vanguard Group, while there is no agreed-upon definition of a 
falling market, one generally accepted measure is a price decline of 20% or more 
over at least a two-month period (or decline of 0.33%, on average, per day). 
Ukrainian stock market is far not that active as NYSE. If we follow the Vanguard 
Group rule, the majority of periods would be regarded as a neutral market 
condition. Therefore, we modified the rule and considered market condition as 
falling (rising) if for at least 25 consecutive days there was a clear declining 
(growing) trend with average daily decline (growth) of the index during this period 
of at least 0.15%. 
The main index of the Ukrainian stock market is index PFTS. Based on the values of 
the index and according to the rule described above, during 2005-2006 market was 
in the rising condition for 290 days, in the falling condition for 220 days, and in the 
neutral condition for 127 days. The PFTS index over the period of observation (2005-
2006) is depicted in Graph 3.1 (Chapter 3). Description of each of the periods is 
















Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for rising, falling, and neutral market 




























Rising 2 06/04/05 10/05/05 34 278.1 317.2 14.1% 0.41% 
Rising 4 22/06/05 14/09/05 82 194.0 360.1 85.6% 1.04% 
Rising 7 17/01/06 12/05/06 115 345.8 464.8 34.4% 0.30% 
Rising 10 03/08/06 29/08/06 26 379.1 425.6 12.3% 0.47% 
Rising 12 28/09/06 31/10/06 33 394.0 423.3 7.4% 0.23% 
Total for 
Rising 
   290     
Falling 1 13/01/05 05/04/05 82 346.6 278.1 -19.8% -0.24% 
Falling 3 11/05/05 21/06/05 40 317.2 294.0 -7.3% -0.18% 
Falling 5 15/09/05 24/10/05 39 360.1 330.1 -8.3% -0.21% 
Falling 8 13/05/06 15/06/06 32 464.8 374.3 -19.5% -0.61% 
Falling 11 30/08/06 27/09/06 27 425.6 394.0 -7.4% -0.27% 
Total for 
Falling 
   220     
Neutral 6 25/10/05 16/01/06 81 330.1 345.8 4.8% 0.06% 
Neutral 9 16/06/06 02/08/06 46 374.3 379.1 1.3% 0.03% 
Total for 
Neutral 




4.4. Estimation and Discussion of Results 
 
Quoted and effective bid-ask spread 
 
Table 4.3 reports average quoted and effective bid-ask spreads for a wide sample of 
Ukrainian stocks. The estimations are done based on the dataset for 59 Ukrainian 
stocks over 2005-2006. Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Chapter 3. 
The quoted bid-ask spread varies from 4.9% for UTEL to 129.5% for HRTR. For the 
group of top-15 stocks by quoted spread (the group considered as the group of most 
liquid Ukrainian stocks) quoted bid-ask spread is 8.8%. The cost of trading for liquid  
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Table 4.3. Quoted and effective bid-ask spreads for Ukrainian public companies 
in 2005-2006. 
Quoted bid-ask spread is found by applying Formula (4.1). Effective bid-ask spread is found 
as a sum of formulas (4.2) and (4.3). The estimations are done based on the dataset for 59 
Ukrainian stocks over 2005-2006. 
 
Quoted bid-ask spread Effective bid-ask spread 
 Company 
Value St. err. Obs. Value St. err. Obs. 
1 UTEL 4.88% 0.15% 470 3.16% 0.10% 800 
2 UNAF 5.56% 0.26% 470 2.20% 0.10% 587 
3 ZAEN 7.54% 0.25% 470 3.23% 0.17% 341 
4 NITR 7.66% 0.24% 471 3.79% 0.23% 366 
5 ZPST 8.33% 0.52% 365 3.66% 0.14% 550 
6 MMKI 8.53% 0.31% 470 5.32% 0.23% 433 
7 KSTL 8.63% 0.33% 305 3.86% 0.33% 106 
8 MZVM 8.79% 0.42% 397 5.10% 0.22% 402 
9 DNSS 8.82% 0.33% 284 5.37% 0.41% 128 
10 STIR 9.07% 0.26% 470 5.13% 0.30% 257 
11 AZST 9.19% 0.26% 470 5.01% 0.20% 456 
12 DTRZ 10.40% 0.58% 313 3.89% 0.24% 301 
13 CEEN 10.70% 0.37% 471 4.63% 0.24% 348 
14 MSICH 11.58% 0.41% 471 5.74% 0.39% 248 
15 DOEN 12.22% 0.30% 471 5.50% 0.37% 184 
16 DNON 13.11% 0.54% 471 5.22% 0.46% 111 
17 NVTR 13.59% 0.39% 471 7.47% 0.43% 132 
18 SMASH 14.14% 1.08% 469 6.13% 0.41% 378 
19 DOMZ 14.33% 0.42% 470 9.11% 0.35% 322 
20 KIEN 14.37% 0.34% 471 7.62% 0.34% 169 
21 DNEN 14.50% 0.45% 471 4.66% 0.28% 202 
22 BAVL 14.74% 0.63% 470 4.32% 0.18% 506 
23 LTPL 15.53% 1.01% 471 6.14% 0.36% 498 
24 RODB 17.48% 1.15% 151 8.82% 2.00% 5 
25 ZACO 18.95% 0.98% 396 10.06% 1.17% 140 
26 DGRM 19.21% 0.61% 185 8.35% 0.83% 61 
27 ZFER 20.57% 0.55% 470 11.87% 0.76% 139 
28 GLNG 22.04% 1.02% 416 17.18% 3.77% 17 
29 PGOK 23.22% 1.31% 469 8.42% 0.60% 247 
30 YASK 24.21% 1.35% 469 8.66% 0.63% 182 
31 SHKD 24.29% 1.84% 133 12.19% 1.27% 44 
32 PGZK 25.27% 0.86% 284 12.71% 1.12% 149 
33 ZAON 25.56% 0.67% 222 11.14% 1.91% 21 
34 ZALK 28.70% 1.04% 465 13.79% 0.91% 130 
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35 DKOK 31.00% 1.52% 373 13.09% 0.86% 196 
36 DRMZ 31.43% 0.82% 256 8.88% 0.74% 65 
37 TATM 34.50% 0.91% 470 14.21% 1.67% 73 
38 KRAZ 35.97% 2.04% 222 17.47% 2.62% 24 
39 FORM 36.18% 1.78% 222 13.29% 1.98% 17 
40 AVDK 37.28% 2.05% 470 8.05% 0.52% 239 
41 NFER 39.63% 0.73% 471 18.45% 1.84% 33 
42 YAMZ 40.24% 1.66% 133 11.72% 1.74% 10 
43 HANZ 41.80% 1.05% 457 25.25% 2.02% 86 
44 DNAZ 46.66% 1.80% 448 25.51% 1.69% 69 
45 MEGA 53.28% 2.49% 169 29.58% 6.41% 14 
46 AZOT 57.30% 1.72% 344 16.06% 2.19% 43 
47 ALMK 62.02% 2.82% 428 25.18% 2.62% 136 
48 DMPZ 66.47% 1.62% 201 40.44% 5.46% 19 
49 USCB 67.97% 2.79% 438 14.16% 1.19% 297 
50 SFER 78.69% 1.27% 466 33.42% 2.22% 40 
51 ZHEN 84.29% 2.64% 470 19.27% 2.83% 40 
52 HMBZ 86.45% 2.05% 284 23.36% 1.86% 41 
53 KREN 87.37% 2.67% 470 23.22% 2.16% 85 
54 HMON 104.28% 0.98% 471 53.49% 5.19% 27 
55 SVGZ 104.34% 2.53% 353 48.94% 11.61% 45 
56 DMZK 104.39% 2.12% 381 25.47% 6.30% 17 
57 TOEN 120.83% 1.63% 248 81.68% 10.04% 8 
58 ALKZ 123.95% 2.93% 241 36.34% 5.42% 31 
59 HRTR 129.50% 2.30% 249 55.51% 12.71% 8 
 
stocks in Ukraine exceeds that of all developed and most emerging stock markets. It 
is 44 times higher than in NYSE, 10 times higher than in LSE, more than 2 times 
higher than in the Prague stock exchange, and 1.6 times higher than in RTS (Russia) 
(compared to the estimates from Jain (2003), see Table 4.1). 
Some of the main reasons of such a high cost of trading, as evidenced from the 
study about the Ukrainian stock market presented in Chapter 2, are seen in the low 
trading activity in the Ukrainian stock market, low transparency of public 
companies, and weak company legislation and legal enforcement in Ukraine. 
The results of estimation of the effective bid-ask spread are also reported in Table 
4.3. Effective bid-ask spread varies from 2.2% for UNAF to 81.7% for TOEN.  It is 
important to note that for some stocks the number of observations for estimation of 
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the effective bid-ask spread is very low (as low as, for example, 5 for RODV and 8 
for HRTR and TOEN). Therefore the estimates of effective spread for the stocks with 
a low number of observations may be unreliable.  
Effective bid-ask spread for every stock is smaller than the quoted spread for the 
stock reflecting ability of the brokers to negotiate price improvement over the 
quoted spread. Effective spread takes from 20.8% of the quoted spread (for USCB) 
to 78.0% of the quoted spread (for GLNG). That effective spread is smaller than 
quoted spread is in line with the findings in literature (Lee (1993), Huang and Stoll 
(1997), Hansch et al. (1999), Stoll (2000), Naik and Yadav (2003), and other). 
 
 
Relation of the Cost of Trading to the Trade Size 
 
Due to the low trading frequency in many Ukrainian stocks with lower liquidity, it 
is not possible to study influence of trade size on the cost of trading for all the stocks  
in the dataset since the number of observations for many of them is too low. 
Therefore the study of the question is done only for a group of 15 most liquid 
Ukrainian stocks. The stocks are AZST, BAVL, DNEN, DTRZ, LTPL, MZVM, NITR, 
PGOK, SMASH, STIR, UNAF, USCB, UTEL, ZAEN, and ZPST. Period of 
observation: 2005-2006. Descriptive statistics for these stocks, as well as the 
approach to assigning trade direction (sale or purchase), and the definition of small, 
medium, and large trades are presented in Chapter 3. 
 
Estimation results of the average effective spread relative to the trade size are 
presented in Table 4.4 (the row "Total" for each of the trade sizes). Average effective 
spread for a group of stocks relative to the trade size is found in two steps. First, 
average effective spread for each stock is found over the period of observation for 
each of the trade sizes. Then average across all the stocks within each trade size 
group is found. 
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Table 4.4. Estimation results for the effective bid-ask half-spread. 
The companies included in the sample are 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks, time period 
2005-2006. They are: AZST, BAVL, DNEN, DTRZ, LTPL, MZVM, NITR, PGOK, SMASH, 
STIR, UNAF, USCB, UTEL, ZAEN, and ZPST. 
For sales, effective spread is estimated as a percentage difference between the midquote 
preceding the trade and the trade price. For purchases, effective spread is estimated as a 
percentage difference between the trade price and the midquote preceding the trade. 
All estimates are significant at 1% significance level. 
 
All Trade Sizes 
  Sales Purchases 
Market 




Rising 1596 2.20% 0.08% 1637 1.75% 0.04% 3.95% 
Falling 1097 2.99% 0.11% 732 2.23% 0.07% 5.22% 
Neutral 603 2.18% 0.10% 521 1.71% 0.06% 3.89% 
Total 3296 2.46% 0.06% 2890 1.87% 0.03% 4.33% 
Small Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market 




Rising 1034 2.27% 0.11% 1158 1.84% 0.05% 4.11% 
Falling 783 3.18% 0.15% 513 2.23% 0.08% 5.41% 
Neutral 432 2.43% 0.13% 381 1.76% 0.07% 4.19% 
Total 2249 2.62% 0.08% 2052 1.92% 0.04% 4.54% 
Medium Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market 




Rising 375 1.87% 0.09% 283 1.54% 0.08% 3.41% 
Falling 228 2.48% 0.19% 131 1.95% 0.16% 4.43% 
Neutral 101 1.93% 0.20% 87 1.40% 0.11% 3.33% 
Total 704 2.08% 0.09% 501 1.62% 0.07% 3.70% 
Large Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market 




Rising 187 2.51% 0.24% 196 1.51% 0.11% 4.02% 
Falling 86 2.57% 0.26% 88 2.69% 0.35% 5.26% 
Neutral 70 0.97% 0.11% 53 1.90% 0.28% 2.87% 
Total 343 2.21% 0.15% 337 1.88% 0.12% 4.09% 
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Small trades are the most expensive to execute, they have the highest effective bid-
ask spread of 4.54%, whereas medium-sized trades are the cheapest, with the 
effective bid-ask spread of 3.70%. The cost of trading for large trades is 4.09%. 
 
That small trades are the most expensive to execute is in line with the findings in 
other literature for dealership markets (Reiss and Werner (1996), Hansch et. al 
(1999), and Huang and Stoll (1996)). A broker knows that he will have to agree to a 
price improvement for larger customers (other brokers in case of our data) and 
therefore, in order not to incur negative profits, widens his bid-ask spread beyond 
its true value leaving the surplus up for negotiation. Since small customers do not 
have market power and have to buy and sell at the quoted prices, they pay the 
surplus left for negotiation for the larger customers. Indeed, small trades receive the 
smallest price improvement, 1.84% of the bid quote for sale trades and 1.15% of the 
ask quote for buy trades, relative to 2.21% and 1.78% respectively for medium-sized 
trades and 2.38% and 1.53% respectively for large trades (Table 4.5).  
 
As vast majority of investors in the Ukrainian stock market are institutions, rather 
than individuals (for more details see subsection "Institutions in the Ukrainian Stock 
Market" of Section 2.2, Chapter 2), there are not many of really small trades. 
Average volume of a small trade in PFTS is USD 19,300. Small trades in the 
Ukrainian stock market can often be compared by their volume to the medium-
sized trades in the developed markets.  
 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that medium-sized trades in Ukrainian stocks are executed 
at the lowest cost of 3.70% with a high price improvement of 2.21% for sales and 
1.78% for purchases. As medium-sized trades in the Ukrainian stock market can be 
compared to the large trades in the London stock exchange20, our results are in line 
                                                
20 Average trade sizes in the Ukrainian stock market ar  much larger than in the developed stock 
exchanges since Ukrainian stock market is dominated by trading from institutional clients (equity 
investment by individuals is very underdeveloped in Ukraine, see Chapter 2 for more details). For 
example, in this study a medium-sized trade is betwe n 2 and 6 NMS (normal market size), and large 
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Table 4.5. Estimation results for price improvement. 
The companies included in the sample are 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks, time period 
2005-2006. They are: AZST, BAVL, DNEN, DTRZ, LTPL, MZVM, NITR, PGOK, SMASH, 
STIR, UNAF, USCB, UTEL, ZAEN, and ZPST. 
For sales, price improvement is estimated as a percentage difference between the trade price 
and the best bid quote preceding the trade. For purchases, price improvement is estimated 
as a percentage difference between the trade price and the best ask quote preceding the 
trade.  
All estimates are significant at 1% significance level. 
 
All Trade Sizes 
  Sales Purchases 
Market condition Obs Mean St. Error Obs Mean St. Error 
Rising 1596 1.93% 0.07% 1637 1.19% 0.05% 
Falling 1097 2.31% 0.14% 732 1.66% 0.09% 
Neutral 603 1.49% 0.10% 521 1.14% 0.07% 
Total 3296 1.97% 0.06% 2890 1.30% 0.04% 
Small Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market condition Obs Mean St. Error Obs Mean St. Error 
Rising 1034 1.81% 0.09% 1158 1.02% 0.05% 
Falling 783 2.12% 0.15% 513 1.48% 0.11% 
Neutral 432 1.38% 0.11% 381 1.08% 0.08% 
Total 2249 1.84% 0.07% 2052 1.15% 0.04% 
Medium Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market condition Obs Mean St. Error Obs Mean St. Error 
Rising 375 2.01% 0.13% 283 1.69% 0.13% 
Falling 228 2.61% 0.31% 131 2.19% 0.23% 
Neutral 101 2.03% 0.28% 87 1.46% 0.16% 
Total 704 2.21% 0.13% 501 1.78% 0.10% 
Large Trades 
  Sales Purchases 
Market condition Obs Mean St. Error Obs Mean St. Error 
Rising 187 2.38% 0.28% 196 1.50% 0.13% 
Falling 86 3.18% 0.60% 88 1.87% 0.24% 
Neutral 70 1.38% 0.19% 53 1.08% 0.28% 
Total 343 2.38% 0.22% 337 1.53% 0.11% 
 
                                                                                                                                
trade is 6 NMS or more, whereas for LSE, for example in Bernhard et al. (2005), a medium-sized 
trade is between 0.25 and 1 NMS, and a large trade is 1 NMS or more. Therefore the trades attributed 
to the medium size in the Ukrainian stock market can be compared to the large trades in LSE, and the 
trades attributed to the large size in the Ukrainian stock market can be compared to very large and 
unusually large in LSE.  
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with the findings in Reiss and Werner (1996), which document that large trades (but 
not the unusually large) are the cheapest to execute in the London Stock Exchange. 
 
These trades receive a high price improvement because they are likely to come from 
more valued customers (other brokers in case of our data) who provide business to 
the brokers. If a broker refuses to provide price improvement to these customers, he 
can lose his business with these customers in future. (As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the competition between brokers in PFTS is high, therefore wide opportunities exist 
in PFTS for changing brokers). With that, the trades are not too large to tempt the 
brokers to refuse price improvement. 
 
Large trades in the Ukrainian stock market are more expensive than medium-sized 
trades. As large trades in the Ukrainian stock market can be compared to the very 
large and unusually large trades in LSE, our results are in line with the findings in 
Reiss and Werner (1996) that document that for very large orders the cost of trading 
starts growing with the order size. Bernhard et al. (2005) also shows that while price 
improvement rises with the value of the relationship in LSE, still sufficiently large 
orders get increasingly bad prices. According to Bernhard et al. (2005), reason of this 
is that temptation to refuse to offer price improvement rises with trade size. 
 
 
Difference in the Cost of Trading for Sales and Purchases 
 
The cost of trading for sales is found higher than that for purchases for every market 
condition (rising, falling, and neutral). On average, over the period of observation 
sales cost 2.46% in terms of effective half-spread, while purchases 1.87% (Table 4.4). 
During rising market, the cost of trading for sales and purchases was 2.20% and 
1.75% respectively, in falling market it was 2.99% and 2.23% respectively, and in the 
neutral market brokers could have executed sales at 2.28%, while purchases at 
1.71%. The result is unexpected as many other studies tend to find that purchases 
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are more expensive than sales in the rising market, while the opposite is true in the 
falling market (Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Keim 
and Madhavan (1997), Chiyachantana et al. (2004), and Bikker et al. (2007)).  
 
Despite the cost of trading for sales was found higher than for purchases for every 
market condition (rising, falling, and neutral), relative cost of trading (the cost of 
trading during rising and falling market relative to the cost of trading during 
neutral market) is in line with the pattern predicted in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
In neutral market, sales were executed at 2.28% and purchases at 1.71%. During 
rising market the cost of sales grew by 0.2 percentage points, (or by 9.2% of the 
neutral market cost of sale) to 2.20%, and the cost of purchases grew more, by 0.4 
percentage points, (or by 23.4% of the neutral market cost of purchase) to 1.75%. So, 
relative to the neutral market, purchases during rising market became more 
expensive than sales. During falling market, the cost of sales grew by 0.81 
percentage points, (or by 37.2% of the neutral market cost of sale) to 2.99%, and the 
cost of purchases grew much less, by 0.52 percentage points, (or by 30.4% of the 
neutral market cost of purchase) to 2.23%. So, relative to the neutral market costs, 
sales during falling market became more expensive than sales. The same pattern is 
predicted and documented in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
 
Why actual cost of sales is higher than that of purchases in any market condition is 
not entirely clear. One of the possible explanations of this result can be that traders 
are more patient on the buy side than on the sell side, other things being equal, and 
therefore sales are more expensive because they have to pay for immediacy of the 







Determinants of the bid-ask spread 
 
We study the determinants of the cost of trading in two settings. First, we study the 
determinants of the cost of trading measured as quoted bid-ask spread and then 
measured as effective bid-ask spread. Quoted bid-ask spread measure allows to 
include a wider cross-section of stocks in the investigation (all 59 stocks in our 
dataset) due to availability of reliable estimates of this measure for a wide cross-
section of stocks. Quoted bid-ask spread is reported daily not depending on 
whether any trades were executed for a stock in that day. Therefore a reliable 
estimate of the quoted bid-ask spread can be found for both liquid and illiquid 
stocks in the Ukrainian stock market. But since there are volume of trading related 
variables among the explanatory variables, the frequency of observations will have 
to be limited to annual. There is too low variation in volume variables from day to 
day or from month to month. Annual frequency is found the most appropriate in 
the setting. 
Effective bid-ask spread is a more accurate measure of the cost of trading than 
quoted spread but a reliable estimate of effective bid-ask spread can be found only 
for the stocks with quite high trading frequency. This will limit the cross-section of 
stocks included in the estimation to 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks but will allow 
to use a higher frequency of observations (monthly) due to more variation available 
in the dependant variables.  
 
Stoll (2000) hypothesizes that the bid-ask spread depends on the factors related to a 
stock's liquidity and risk. Liquidity related factors considered in the study are daily 
dollar trading volume, number of trades per day, and firm size. Increase in any of 
them is expected to increase liquidity of a stock and therefore to narrow its bid-ask 
spread. Risk of a stock is measured in Stoll (2000) by stock return variance and stock 
price (stocks with high return variance and low price tend to be riskier). Increase in 
risk for a stock is expected to widen the stock's bid-ask spread because of the higher 
probability of losses brokers can incur if they hold a risky stock in their inventory. 
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Following Stoll (2000) we run following regression of the quoted relative bid-ask 




it2it10it eNlogaicePrlogaMcaplogaaDDVlogaaS ++++++= σ  (4.6) 
 
Where Sit is proportional quoted half-spread for stock i in period t, DDVit is daily 
dollar volume for stock i in period t, 2itσ  is return variance for stock i in period t, 
Mcapit market capitalization for stock i in period t, Priceit is stock price for stock i in 
period t (calculated as average between daily closing bid and ask quote), Nit is 
average number of trades per day for stock i in period t, and eit is the error term.  
Daily dollar volume, price, and number of trades per day are calculated as averages 
of the daily values over a year for 2005-2006 period. Market capitalization is taken in 
the beginning of each year. Return variance is calculated based on daily stock 
returns over a year. 
 
OLS estimation results for equation (4.6) are reported in Table 4.6. Return variance, 
price, and the number of trades per day have an expected sign and are significantly 
different from zero at least at 5% significance level. Bid-ask spread widens in return 
variance and narrows in the stock price and the number of trades per day. Market 
capitalization and daily dollar volume also have an expected sign but are 
insignificantly different from zero. Market capitalization was expected to capture 
the difference in the firms' sizes, which, in turn, is expected to increase the 
probability of locating a counterparty for a trade. Though for some of the Ukrainian 
large firms attractive to investors the free-float is low. Therefore, large market 
capitalization may not always be a measure of probability of locating a 
counterparty. Daily dollar volume is a volume-based proxy for a stock's liquidity. 
As will be shown in Chapter 5, volume-based proxies of liquidity do not perform 
well in the Ukrainian stock market (as well as they do not perform well for many 
other emerging markets (Bekaert et al. (2003) and Lesmond (2005))). Because of this 
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we will substitute daily dollar volume with the number of no-trading days, which, 
as will be shown in Chapter 5, is one of the best liquidity measures for the Ukrainian 
stocks. Market Capitalization variable is excluded from the new regression 
specification since it was found insignificantly different from zero.  
 
Table 4.6. Relation of quoted proportional bid-ask spread to the trading 
characteristics of stocks, initial specification. 
The table presents results of estimating equation (4.6) using OLS method. 
Estimation is performed for 59 Ukrainian stocks based on annual observations during 2005-
2006. 
*** represent statistical significance at 1% level, ** represent statistical significance at 5% 
level, and * represent statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Logarithm of daily dollar volume 
(LogDDV) 
-0.0422 0.0297 -1.42 0.159 
Return variance(
2σ ) 0.5667*** 0.1958 2.89 0.005 
Logarithm of market capitalization 
(LogMcap) 
-0.0217 0.0218 -1.00 0.322 
Logarithm of price (LogPrice) -0.0232** 0.0115 -2.01 0.047 
Logarithm of the number of trades 
per day ( Nlog ) -0.1075*** 0.0356 -3.02 0.003 
Intercept 1.3247 0.5177 2.56 0.012 
 Adj R-squared 0.451  
Observations 97  
 




it2it10it eNlogaicePrlogaaNNTDlogaaS +++++= σ     (4.7) 
 
Where Sit is proportional quoted half-spread for stock i in period t, NNTDit is the 
number of no-trading days for stock i in period t, 2itσ  is return variance for stock i in 
period t, Priceit is stock price for stock i in period t (calculated as average between 
daily closing bid and ask quote), Nit is average number of trades per day for stock i 
in period t, and eit is the error term. 
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The OLS results of estimating equation (4.7) are reported in Table 4.7. All the 
explanatory variables have expected signs and are significantly different from zero 
at least at 10% significance level. As expected, quoted proportional bid-ask spread is 
higher for the stocks with lower liquidity (stocks with higher number of no-trading 
days and lower number of trades per day) and for the stocks with higher risk 
(stocks with higher return volatility and lower price). The result is in line with 
findings in other literature (Stoll (2000), Naik and Yadav (2003), and Gajewski and 
Gresse (2007)). Regression has a high explanatory power with over 45% of the cross-
sectional variance in quoted bid-ask spreads explained. 
 
Table 4.7. Relation of quoted proportional bid-ask spread to the trading 
characteristics of stocks, improved specification. 
The table presents results of estimating equation (4.7) using OLS method. 
Estimation is performed for 59 Ukrainian stocks based on annual observations during 2005-
2006. 
*** represent statistical significance at 1% level, ** represent statistical significance at 5% 
level, and * represent statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t Prob. 
Logarithm of the number of no-
trading days ( NNTDlog ) 0.0017* 0.0009 1.86 0.067 
Return variance(
2σ ) 0.4685** 0.1987 2.36 0.020 
Logarithm of price (LogPrice) -0.0225* 0.0115 -1.96 0.053 
Logarithm of the number of trades per 
day ( Nlog ) -0.1025*** 0.0374 -2.74 0.007 
Intercept 0.0666 0.1659 0.40 0.689 
 Adj R-squared 0.4552   
Observations 97   
 
Equation (4.7) takes into account only the determinants of the bid-ask spread, which 
are related to the order processing and inventory holding costs of the brokers. In 
order to take into account the difference in the informational efficiency of the 
Ukrainian stocks, an additional variable is added to the regression. S&P/FIA (2008) 
compute an index that measures transparency of Ukrainian stocks. The index is 
computed following the methodology developed by Standard & Poor's, and 
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measures how full and timely the information important for investors is disclosed. 
The study evaluates Ukrainian public companies based on 105 criteria divided into 
three blocks: i) ownership structure and shareholders' rights (34 criteria), ii) 
financial and operational information (46 criteria), iii) composition and procedures 
of the Board of Directors and company management (25 criteria). The analysis was 
performed for one year, 2006, for 36 Ukrainian public companies. There is a 
drawback of including the index into regression since it will decrease the number of 




i2i10i eInfoIndexaNlogaicePrlogaaNNTDlogaaS ++++++= σ    (4.8) 
 
Where Si is proportional quoted half-spread for stock i, NNTDi is the number of no-
trading days for stock i, 2iσ  is return variance for stock i, Pricei is stock price for 
stock i  (calculated as average between daily closing bid and ask quote), Ni is 
average number of trades per day for stock i, and ei is the error term. 
 
The OLS results of estimating equation (4.8) are reported in Table 4.8. The 
informational index is found insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, inclusion 
of the index significantly decreased the number of observations and, as a 
consequence, decreased the statistical significance of results. The number of no-
trading days and return variance variables were found insignificantly different from 
zero as opposed to the results in previous specification (Equation (4.7)). If the data 
for the informational index for more years and for a wider selection of stocks 
becomes available, the regression specification with the informational index can 
possibly bring more reliable results and show the importance of asymmetric 
information in determining the width of the bid-ask spread of Ukrainian stocks. 
 
More frequent data is available for liquid Ukrainian stocks. This allows to estimate 
the regression on a higher than annual frequency. Higher frequency will allow to 
capture more variation in variables and increase the power of the regression but the 
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Table 4.8. Relation of quoted proportional bid-ask spread to trading 
characteristics of stocks: estimation with information index. 
The table presents results of estimating equation (4.8) using OLS method. 
Estimation is performed for 36 Ukrainian stocks based on annual observations in 2006. 
*** represent statistical significance at 1% level, ** represent statistical significance at 5% 
level, and * represent statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t Prob. 
Logarithm of the number of no-
trading days ( NNTDlog ) 0.0001 0.0015 0.05 0.964 
Return variance(
2σ ) 0.3955 0.3544 1.12 0.278 
Logarithm of price (LogPrice) -0.0348** 0.0138 -2.53 0.021 
Logarithm of the number of trades 
per day ( Nlog ) -0.1206* 0.0673 -1.79 0.089 
InfoIndex 0.0012 0.0037 0.33 0.744 
Intercept 0.2839 0.2707 1.05 0.307 
 Adj R-squared 0.419  
Observations 25  
 
estimation will include a smaller cross-section of stocks. When estimating regression 
(4.6) and (4.7) we included 59 stocks of various liquidity at annual frequency during 
2005-2006 and had total number of observations of 97. Now we include 15 liquid 
stocks in the estimation at monthly frequency (frequency used in Stoll (2000) and 
Gajewski and Gresse (2007)), during January 2005-November 2006 and have total 
number of observations of 275. 
Averages of daily values are taken over each month during 2005-2006. For the 
midquote and effective spread, the variable with intraday frequency, first, average 
over the day is taken and then average of daily values is taken over a month. Return 
variance is computed at monthly frequency. 
The explanatory variables in the new regression are the same as in the Equation (4.7) 
but the dependant variable is now the effective bid-ask half-spread instead of the 




it2it10it eNlogaicePrlogaaNNTDlogaaES +++++= σ     (4.9) 
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Where ESit is effective half-spread for stock i in period t, NNTDit is the number of 
no-trading days for stock i in period t, 2itσ  is return variance for stock i in period t, 
Priceit is stock price for stock i in period t (calculated as average between daily 
closing bid and ask quote), Nit is average number of trades per day for stock i in 
period t, and eit is the error term. 
 
The OLS results of estimating Equation (4.9) are presented in Table 4.9. The results 
are similar to the results of estimating Equation (4.7) apart from no significance of 
the number of trades per day in the new regression. Number of no-trading days, 
return variance, and price have expected signs and are significantly different from 
zero at least at 5% significance level. So, as expected, effective proportional spread is 
positively related to the measure of stocks illiquidity (number of no-trading days) 
and to the level of risk for a stock (return variance and inverse of stock price).  
 
Table 4.9. Relation of effective proportional bid-ask spread to trading 
characteristics of stocks. 
The table presents results of estimating equation (4.9) using OLS method. 
Estimation is performed for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during January 2005-November 
2006 based on monthly observations. 
*** represent statistical significance at 1% level, ** represent statistical significance at 5% 
level, and * represent statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t Prob. 
Logarithm of the number of no-
trading days ( NNTDlog ) 0.0027*** 0.0004 6.24 0.000 
Return variance(
2σ ) 6.6492*** 0.7316 9.09 0.000 
Logarithm of price (LogPrice) -0.0018** 0.0007 -2.36 0.019 
Logarithm of the number of trades 
per day ( Nlog ) 0.0027 0.0037 0.73 0.464 
Intercept 0.0069 0.0084 0.82 0.412 
 Adj R-squared 0.423  





The chapter examined the cost of trading in the Ukrainian stock market during 
2005-2006. 
 
It was found that relative quoted bid-ask spread for Ukrainian stocks is large 
compared to many other stock markets and varies from 4.9% for the most liquid 
stocks to 129.5% for the least liquid stocks. The relative quoted bid-ask spread is 
lower in all developed and many emerging markets. For comparison, relative 
quoted bid-ask spread for liquid stocks is 0.2% in NYSE, 0.9% in the London Stock 
Exchange, 1.2% in the Warsaw Stock Exchange,  and 4.6% in the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange (Jain (2003)). 
 
A more accurate measure of the cost of trading, effective bid-ask spread, varies 
across the Ukrainian stocks of different liquidity from 2.2% to 81.7%. In line with 
findings in other literature, effective bid-ask spread is less than quoted bid-ask 
spread, which gives evidence that trades in the Ukrainian stock market are often 
executed within the quoted spread. In other words, traders are able to negotiate 
price improvement from brokers relative to the quoted stock prices. The reason of 
suggesting price improvement in the dealership market is an intention of brokers to 
keep long-term relationships with their clients (which are other brokers in case of 
our data) in order to secure future deals with them.  
 
Due to the low trading frequency in many Ukrainian stocks with lower liquidity it is 
not possible to study influence of trade size on the cost of trading for all the stocks 
since the number of observations is too low. Therefore the study of the question is 
done only for a group of 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks. 
For the 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks, average effective bid-ask spread is 4.33%. It 
is the highest for small trades, 4.54%, is lower for the medium-sized trades, 3.70%, 
and starts growing again for large trades, 4.09%. That the cost of trading for small 
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trade sizes is higher than for larger trade sizes was also documented in other 
literature for dealership markets (Reiss and Werner (1996), Hansch et. al (1999), and 
Huang and Stoll (1996)). The reason for it is that small trades are not viewed as 
valuable for brokers and therefore price improvement cannot be negotiated for them 
and they have to be executed near to the quotes. Larger trades are those that bring 
the most valuable business to the brokers and, in order to keep the relationship with 
the clients in the long-term, price improvement is suggested for these trades. The 
finding that the cost of trading for very large orders starts growing in the order size 
is in line with the findings in Reiss and Werner (1996) and Bernhard et al. (2005) for 
the London Stock Exchange. According to Bernhard et al. (2005), reason of this is 
that temptation to refuse to offer price improvement rises with trade size. 
 
For the same reason as for the trade size study, the study of the influence of the 
trade direction on the cost of trading was also performed only for 15 most liquid 
Ukrainian stocks. The average cost of trading for an institutional sale was found 
higher than that for an institutional purchase in any market condition (rising, 
falling, or neutral market) for the reasons that are not entirely understood. Empirical 
findings in other literature tend to show that institutional purchases are more 
expensive than sales in a rising market, while the opposite is true in the falling 
market (Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Keim and Madhavan (1998), Chiyachantana 
(2004) and Bikker et al. (2007)). 
At the same time, relative cost of trading in the Ukrainian stock market during 
falling and rising market compared to the cost of trading in neutral market follows 
the pattern predicted in Chiyachantana et al. (2004): in the falling market the cost of 
trading sales rises more than the cost of trading purchases relative to their values in 
the neutral market, while in the rising market the opposite is true. 
 
A study of the determinants of the cost of trading showed that proportional quoted 
and effective bid-ask spreads depend on the stock liquidity (measured as the 
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number of no-trading days and the number of trades per day21) with higher 
liquidity stocks, as expected, having narrower bid-ask spreads. Also, proportional 
quoted and effective bid-ask spreads depend on the risk of the adverse price change 
for a stock (measured as return volatility and stock price) with more risky stocks 
having wider bid-ask spreads. The result is in line with the findings for other 
exchanges, in particular, NYSE and Nasdaq (Stoll (2000)), London Stock Exchange 
(Naik and Yadav (2003)), and Euronext Paris (Gajewski and Gresse (2007)). Firm 
size (measured as market capitalization) was found not important in determining 
the width of the bid-ask spread, which is probably the result of a specific feature of 
the Ukrainian stock market that for many large companies free float is very low. 
                                                
21 Number of trades per day was found significantly different from zero only for the quoted spread 










The role of liquidity in empirical finance has grown rapidly over the past decade 
and has begun to influence conclusions in asset pricing, corporate finance, and 
market efficiency. 
A substantial body of empirical research has documented that liquidity affects 
prices and expected returns of financial assets in many different markets (Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Loderer and Roth 
(2005)), influences companies’ levels of leverage (Lipson and Mortal (2007)), and 
affects cross-listings and market segmentation (Domowitz et al. (2000) and Miller 
(1999)). 
Liquidity and the cost of trading are closely related (Domowitz, 2000). Low liquidity 
is one of the major reasons of a high cost of trading.  
Liquidity is an important factor to consider for investors and portfolio managers 
when making their investment decisions as low liquidity stocks can be costly and 
can require longer time to transact, which can result in an adverse influence on the 
net portfolio returns. 
 
As an essential characteristic of a stock market and a significant input in many other 
areas of financial research, liquidity needs to be correctly and efficiently measured. 
A menu of reliable liquidity measures will allow researchers flexibility in choosing 
the liquidity measure that is most appropriate for their study and the data available. 
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The assumption that the available liquidity measures are able to capture liquidity of 
stocks is often not tested because of the limitations with the available data. As a 
consequence, there is little consensus on which measures are better and little 
evidence that various liquidity measures applied in the literature actually measure 
what they claim to measure. A few studies investigate the efficacy of various 
liquidity measures for the U.S. stock market (Lesmond at al. (1999), Hasbrouck 
(2006), Goyenko et al. (2009)) and a number of emerging stock markets (Lesmond 
(2005)) but, to our knowledge, none do that for the emerging stock market of 
Ukraine. To study the efficacy of liquidity measures in measuring liquidity in 
emerging markets is especially important since commonly used measures of 
liquidity were designed for developed markets and little is known about their 
applicability for emerging stock markets. A high investment interest enhanced by 
substantial returns in Ukraine highlights the importance of measuring liquidity of 
the Ukrainian stock market. The chapter contributes to literature by investigating 
the efficacy of a number of liquidity measures such as quoted bid-ask spread, 
turnover, Amihud’s measure (Amihud, 2002), the proportion of zero daily returns 
(Lesmond et al., 1999), the proportion of no-trading days, and the volatility of return 
for measuring liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
In this chapter, first, liquidity of individual stocks in the Ukrainian stock market is 
measured. Then, the efficacy of different liquidity measures is studied and a 
selection of reliable liquidity measures is suggested. Finally, to show the place of 
Ukraine among other emerging markets, liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market is 
compared to the liquidity of other emerging markets based on different measures of 
liquidity. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature, 
Section 3 presents the methodology of the liquidity measures computation, the data 
and the methodology of analysis is described in Section 4, Section 5 discusses 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 136 
5.2. Review of Literature 
 
Liquidity is easily recognized but not so easily defined. Black (1971) describes a 
liquid market in the following intuitive way: "The market for a stock is liquid if the 
following conditions hold: (1) there are always bid and ask prices for the investor 
who wants to buy or sell small amounts of stock immediately; (2) the difference 
between the bid and ask prices (the spread) is always small; (3) an investor who is 
buying or selling a large amount of stock, in the absence of special information, can 
expect to do so over a long period of time at a price not very different, on average, 
from the current market price; (4) an investor can buy or sell a large block of stock 
immediately, but at a premium or discount that depends on the size of the block. 
The larger the block, the larger the premium or discount."  
Kyle (1985) notes that ‘‘liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, in part because it 
encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets." These include 
tightness (the cost of turning around a position over a short period of time), depth 
(the size of an order flow required to change prices by a given amount), and 
resiliency (the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative 
shock). 
According to O'Hara (1998) liquid markets are those, which accommodate trading 
with the least effect on price.  
The above definitions can be summarized by the definition of liquidity suggested in 
Bank for International Settlements (1999): "a liquid market is a market where 
participants can rapidly execute large-volume transactions with a small impact on 
prices”. 
 
Empirically, four types of liquidity measures are identified in literature: (i) measures 
related to the cost of trading (such as bid-ask spread and price impact), (ii) measures 
related to the trading activity (such as turnover), (iii) compound liquidity measures, 
and (iv) alternative liquidity measures. 
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The main measures of liquidity related to the cost of trading include quoted bid-ask 
spread, effective bid-ask spread, and price impact (for more details on definition 
and measurement of effective bid-ask spread and price impact, see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2).  As a measure that directly shows the cost of transacting a stock, the 
bid-ask spread is considered by many researchers by far the most demonstrable 
measure of a stock liquidity. Jain (2003) estimates the daily quoted bid-ask spread 
for 51 stock exchanges over a four-months period and finds that the quotes are good 
indicators of the underlying liquidity. Lesmond (2005) applies quoted bid-ask 
spread as a benchmark for studying the efficacy of other liquidity measures. 
Effective bid-ask spread is taken as a benchmark liquidity measure in Goyenko et al. 
(2009). 
 
Among the measures related to trading activity, turnover is the one most commonly 
applied in literature. Turnover can be computed in either of the two ways: as a ratio 
of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding (as, for example, in Lesmond, 
2005) or as volume traded (in monetary form) to the market capitalization (as, for 
example, in World Bank World Development Indicators, 2006). Turnover is an 
ubiquitous liquidity measure. It is used in Rouwenhorst (1999), Bekaert et al. (2006), 
and Levine and Schmukler (2003) to name just a few and has many applications. 
The benefit of the measure is that it is able to capture trading frequency for a stock 
and is simple to construct but its drawback is that it fails to account for the cost per 
trade, which varies considerably across stocks. Turnover and the bid-ask spread are 
inversely related. The efficacy of turnover and other liquidity measures in 
measuring liquidity will be discussed later below.  
 
A number of comprehensive liquidity measures were suggested in recent literature. 
The Amivest Investment Management liquidity measure combines turnover and the  
cost of trading sides of liquidity definition and suggests a measure that relates 
dollar volume of trading to security return. The measure was used, for example, in 
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) and Chen and Park (2006).  
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Amihud (2002) generalizes the liquidity measure to make it more adaptable to 
markets around the world. Amihud's measure relates the daily absolute return to 
the daily dollar trading volume for a stock. This ratio more closely follows the Kyle 
(1985) price impact definition of liquidity, or the response of price to order flow. 
This ratio gives the absolute price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the 
daily price impact of the order flow. The Amivest liquidity measure, however, does 
not have the intuitive interpretation of measuring the average daily association 
between a unit of volume and the price change. Another advantage of the Amihud 
liquidity measure is that it can be calculated for the days when there is no price 
change, which is of particular concern in emerging markets. On the other hand, 
days of zero-returns are closely related to zero volume traded. If a zero volume day 
occurs, the measure cannot be computed due to zero in the denominator in the 
formula for the measure. Amihud's measure is positively related to the bid-ask 
spread as smaller spreads are associated with lower price impact and higher trading 
volumes. 
 
Alternative liquidity measures are not directly related to measuring cost of trading, 
or volume for estimating liquidity. They are often substitutes for the established 
measures of liquidity and are applied in the markets with poor data availability or 
poor quality of data (which is often the case of emerging stock markets). Among the 
alternative measures proportion of zero daily returns, proportion of no-trading 
days, and volatility of return will be discussed. 
Proportion of zero daily returns liquidity measure exploits the effect transaction 
costs may have on daily returns. The maintained hypothesis is that the marginal, 
informed trader will trade only if the value of information exceeds the marginal 
costs of trading Lesmond et al. (1999). If trading costs are sizable, Lesmond et al. 
(1999) argue that zero return days occur more frequently because new information 
must accumulate longer, on average, before informed trades can affect price. The 
model takes its roots in the asymmetric information models of Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and Kyle (1985). The cost of trading is a threshold that must be exceeded 
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before return on a security will reflect new information. A security with high cost of 
trading will have less frequent price movements and more zero returns than a 
security with low cost of trading. Though the proportion of zero daily return 
measure of liquidity has a serious limitation as it does not measure no-trading days 
but zero return days, and zero return can occur on the days with non-zero trading. 
Proportion of no-trading days is seen in Lesmond et al. (1999) and Bekaert et al. 
(2006) as a measure that can better reflect liquidity than the proportion of zero daily 
returns, though the data for estimating the further was not available.  
 
Volatility of return is not directly related to the definition of liquidity but is found 
highly correlated with liquidity measures and therefore is viewed as a liquidity 
proxy (Domowitz et al. (2000), Lesmond (2005)). Less liquid stocks usually have 
higher volatility of return. 
 
There is very limited literature that studies how well different liquidity measures 
can measure liquidity and therefore the question regarding which measures 
perform better still stays open.  
The bid-ask spread is considered in the literature as a reliable liquidity measure for 
any market since it directly measures the level of friction of trading a stock. Though 
the bid-ask spread data is not available for some markets, especially some emerging 
markets. Also, for some researchers it can be more convenient to infer liquidity from 
other data than the bid-ask spreads, even if the bid-ask spread data exist for the 
market under study. Therefore there is a need in studying efficacy of different 
liquidity measures in measuring liquidity. 
A few recent papers contribute to filling the gap in literature (Lesmond (2005), 
Bekaert et al. (2006), and Goyenko et al. (2009)). They study the efficacy of liquidity 
measures using different methods, the main of which is correlation analysis. In the 
correlation analyses of the studies, the bid-ask spread often serves as a benchmark 
liquidity measure, to which all other liquidity measures are correlated.  
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Lesmond (2005) performs a detailed study of the efficacy of a number of liquidity 
measures in measuring liquidity in emerging markets. The study considers such 
liquidity measures as the bid-ask spread, turnover, Amihud's measure, Roll's 
measure, and LOT measure. The dataset includes 31 emerging markets for the 
period of 1987-2000 but covers only about 12% of listed companies in each market. 
The study applies several different techniques. First, correlation analysis is 
performed. Quoted bid-ask spread is taken as a benchmark to which all other 
liquidity measures are correlated. Second, a regression analysis is done. The bid-ask 
spread is regressed on each of the liquidity measures and a number of  control 
variables. Finally, a factor analysis is performed in order to study the commonality 
in liquidity. The measures of liquidity are viewed as proxies for different aspects of 
liquidity. Roll's measure is regarded as a proxy for the effective spread, Amihud's 
measure – for price impact, turnover – for relative trading frequency, LOT measure 
– as a general liquidity cost estimate encompassing some portion of each liquidity 
component. The factor analysis provides some indication of whether a single 
liquidity factor is being captured by any, or all, of these liquidity estimators. 
The correlation analysis in Lesmond (2005) is performed separately for each country 
and for all countries together. The correlation analysis is based on pooled data of 
quarter-firm estimates of liquidity measures.  
The results of the correlation analysis show that turnover measures liquidity weakly 
at best. Turnover was found to be negatively and significantly correlated with the 
bid–ask spread in only 40% of the 23 emerging markets. It had the lowest 
correlation, where significant, among any of the liquidity measures. The correlation 
coefficient for all countries was found very low, only -6.5%. According to Lesmond 
(2005), these results cast doubt on a wide range of studies employing turnover as a 
principal liquidity proxy. Amihud’s measure was found quite good for measuring 
liquidity. The measure was found to be very highly positively correlated with the 
spread regardless of country, with the correlation coefficient for all countries of 
27.5%. Except for five of the 23 markets, Roll’s model was found to be significantly 
associated with the bid–ask spread, with the correlation coefficient for all countries 
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of 29.5%. In terms of the magnitude of the correlation coefficient, the LOT model 
appeared to be stronger related to the bid-ask spread than the other liquidity 
measures, with the correlation coefficient for all countries of 56.1%. 
To determine how well each measure was able to capture the cross-sectional 
differences in each country’s bid-ask spread, Lesmond (2005) performs rank 
correlations between the bid-ask spread and other liquidity measures. Each 
country’s liquidity measure was ranked for each of the four liquidity estimators as 
well as for the bid-ask spread. This procedure allowed to eliminate outlier effects 
that could have been present in the all-country estimates. The results indicated that 
price-based liquidity measures (the LOT and the Roll) outperformed volume-based 
liquidity measures (the Amihud and turnover).  
Slightly different result was found based on regression analysis. The analysis 
showed that the LOT measure and Amihud’s measure dominated Roll’s measure 
and turnover.  
Factor analysis indicated that in almost half of the 31 markets, a single factor 
represented the common variation in all of the liquidity measures examined. This 
single factor appeared most correlated with the LOT estimate and, to a lesser extent, 
Amihud’s measure. However, turnover did not appear to be related to any of the 
common variation in any of the other measures.  
Lesmond (2005) also considers proportion of zero returns liquidity measure. While 
the correlation and regression results for this measure are not presented in their 
study, Lesmond (2005) notes that high degree of association is found between the 
proportion of zero returns and the bid-ask spread, regardless of a country. 
Based on the results of the analyses, Lesmond (2005) conclude that the LOT 
measure, Amihud’s measure, and Roll's measure have power in measuring liquidity 
in emerging equity markets, with the LOT measure found superior over the other 
two measures. The results, though, cast significant doubt on the use of turnover as a 




Bekaert et al. (2006) study how liquidity influences expected asset returns in 
emerging markets. Given the paucity of realized transaction cost data for emerging 
markets, Bekaert et al. (2006) cannot apply the bid-ask spread as a measure of 
liquidity and instead apply proportion of zero daily returns. As this is a fairly new 
liquidity measure in literature, a separate part of the paper is dedicated to studying 
the efficacy of the measure for measuring liquidity. Proportion of zero daily returns 
was suggested and applied in Lesmond et al. (1999). The measure was also applied 
in Lesmond (2005) but its efficacy was not carefully studied.  
For their study, Bekaert et al. (2006) apply daily return data at the firm level from 
the Datastream research files. The dataset covers about 90% of the number of 
domestically listed firms in each country starting from the late 1980s. In order to test 
the efficacy of the proportion of zero daily returns for measuring liquidity, Bekaert 
et al. (2006) perform a correlation analysis of this measure with more established 
measures of liquidity. First, the proportion of zero daily returns is correlated with 
turnover and volatility of return, the other two measures that can be constructed 
based on the data available. Even though there is evidence that turnover does not 
have enough power in measuring liquidity in emerging stock markets (Lesmond, 
2005), it is expected that negative sign of the correlation coefficient between 
turnover and proportion of zero daily returns would give some support to the 
hypothesis of the ability of the proportion of zero daily returns to measure liquidity. 
Bekaert et al. (2006) find that cross-sectional correlation coefficient between the 
average levels of turnover and the average proportion of zero daily returns is –35%. 
The correlation coefficient of the two liquidity measures across time within each 
country had average value of –16%. Both results support the hypothesis of ability of 
proportion of zero daily returns to measure liquidity. Correlation between 
proportion of zero daily returns and volatility has shown that there is no consistent 
pattern in the behaviour of the two measures. 
Second, the proportion of zero daily returns is correlated with a more standard 
liquidity measure, the bid-ask spread. The data on the bid-ask spread is available 
only for a few countries in the dataset and for a shorter time period (from the mid to 
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the late 1990s). Bekaert et al. (2006) find that the proportion of zero daily returns 
measure is highly correlated, 48% on average, with the mean bid-ask spread across 
all countries and time periods for which the bid-ask spreads are available. Lesmond 
(2005) also documented that the proportion of zero daily returns is highly correlated 
with bid-ask spreads for a broader collection of emerging equity markets. For the 
purpose of comparison, Bekaert et al. (2006) also correlate equity market turnover 
with the bid-ask spread and find average correlation coefficient of only –20%. Since 
the correlation coefficient between proportion of zero daily returns and the bid-ask 
spread was found much higher (48%), Bekaert et al. (2006) conclude that the 
proportion of zero daily returns appears to be picking up a component of liquidity 
and transaction costs that turnover does not.  
 
Further, Bekaert et al. (2006) study how proportion of zero daily returns liquidity 
measure performs with the U.S. data. Similar correlations to the described above are 
performed with NYSE and AMEX data for 1962-2001 at annual frequency. The 
study finds that the proportion of zero daily returns is highly correlated with the 
more established liquidity measures. The correlation of the proportion of zero daily 
returns with the Amihud's liquidity measure was found to be 40%, and with the 
bid-ask spread it was found to be 30%. Bekaert et al. (2006) note that the use of 
proportion of zero daily returns in emerging markets is predicated on the 
assumption that zero returns proxy for no-trading days in these relatively illiquid 
markets. For the U.S., proportion of no-trading days can actually be constructed. 
Bekaert et al. (2006) further correlate proportion of zero returns observed on no-
trading days and find that in this setting, correlation of the measure with the 
Amihud liquidity measure is much  higher, 91%. The authors note that the above 
distinction is important as zero returns in emerging markets are more likely to be 
associated with non-trading than in the U.S. where a significant number of trades 
are processed with no associated price movement. 
Having performed the correlation analysis, Bekaert et al. (2006) conclude that the 
proportion of zero daily returns liquidity measure is able to capture liquidity in 
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emerging equity markets and apply this measure in their study of the influence of 
liquidity on expected asset returns. 
 
A recent study of Goyenko et al. (2009) performs a deep analysis of the ability of a 
wide selection of low-frequency liquidity measures for measuring liquidity of the 
U.S. stocks. For researchers that need a liquidity measure for their study, low-
frequency measures are easier to compute and apply than the high frequency 
measures, though the latter are usually presumed to have a higher precision. The 
purpose of the study is to test the hypothesis that low-frequency measures of 
liquidity, measured monthly and annually, can usefully substitute high frequency 
measures and if so, which measures are the best. The study applies data for 400 
randomly selected stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq over 1993-2005. The 
methodology applied in the study is time-series correlations, cross-sectional 
correlations, and prediction errors.  
In the exploration of the best low-frequency measures of liquidity, the low 
frequency liquidity measures are compared to a range of sophisticated benchmarks 
calculated based on high-frequency data. The benchmarks include two spread 
benchmarks: the effective bid-ask spread and the realized bid-ask spread, and two 
price impact benchmarks: lambda and 5-minute price impact.  
The study tested six low-frequency measures of liquidity that are spread proxies: (i) 
the effective tick, developed jointly by Goyenko et al. (2009) and Holden (2007); (ii) 
the Holden measure from Holden (2007); (iii) the Roll measure from Roll (1984); (iv) 
the Gibbs measure from Hasbrouck (2004); (v) the LOT measure, and (vi) the 
proportion of daily zero returns measure from Lesmond et al. (1999). Also, the study 
tested four low frequency measures of liquidity that are price impact proxies: (i) the 
Amihud measure from Amihud (2002); (ii) the extended Amihud measure 
developed in Goyenko et al. (2009); (iii) the Pastor and Stambaugh measure from 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); and (iv) the Amivest liquidity ratio. 
Goyenko et al. (2009) find that both monthly and annual low-frequency measures 
usefully capture high-frequency measures of transactions costs, so the effort of 
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using high frequency measures is not worth the cost. The answer to the question of 
which measure a researcher should use, was found to depend on what exactly the 
researcher wants to measure. To capture spread, without considering computational 
requirements, the Holden measure delivered the best performance overall. 
Considering ease of computation, effective tick was found the best measure to use. 
The proportion of daily zero returns was found inferior to all other measures 
designed to capture effective spread. Bekaert et al. (2006) come to the same 
conclusion regarding  the proportion of daily zero returns when apply the U.S. data 
in a similar setting (without taking into account whether zero return took place on a 
no-trading day or not). To capture price impact, both the Amihud and the extended 
Amihud measures were found to do a good job. The Pastor and Stambaugh and the 
Amivest measures were found to have very little or nothing to do with the price 
impact benchmarks. 
 
Not all liquidity measures respond to the trading pressure in the same way. As the 
study of Chordia et al. (2001) show, volume-based and cost-of-trading-based 
measures of liquidity are found to behave differently in the turbulent times in the 
market. Even though trading activity and trading costs are often assumed (and 
shown) to be related, they capture different aspects of secondary markets and do 
not need to behave similarly. In tranquil times and across securities, higher volume 
is associated with lower transaction costs. In other words, all liquidity proxies move 
in the same direction. But their behaviour changes in periods of financial 
turbulence, when shocks are of different nature. For example, a sudden increase in 
trading activity when investors rush to exit the market, might signal an increased 
trading demand for a given market depth, congesting the market and raising the 
costs of trading. While trading activity variables increase both in rising and falling 
markets, bid-ask spreads respond asymmetrically by increasing significantly in 
down markets and decreasing only marginally in up markets. Therefore it is 
important to perform correlation analysis between the volume-based and the 
trading cost-based liquidity measures during normal market conditions.  
 146 
 
5.3. Methodology of the Liquidity Measures Computation  
 
This section describes the methodology of computation of the liquidity measures 
applied in the chapter. Based on the data available, the list of liquidity measures that 
we are able to estimate includes the quoted bid-ask spread, turnover, Amihud's 
measure, proportion of zero daily returns, proportion of no-trading days, and 
volatility of return. Quoted bid-ask spread is estimated instead of a more accurate 
estimate of transaction cost, which is effective bid-ask spread, because there are not 
enough data for finding reliable estimates of the effective bid-ask spread for a wide 
cross-section of Ukrainian stocks applied in the chapter. 
The dataset includes 56 Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006. More details 
on the data are presented in the next section. 
 
i) Quoted bid-ask spread 
 







−=       (5.1) 
Where AP is the closing ask quote and BP is the closing bid quote. 














=   (5.2) 
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Where DH is the number of trading days in the period H; Volumeit is the number of 
shares traded for the stock i in the day t; SharesOutstandingi is the number of 
outstanding shares for the stock i in the beginning of the period H; 
Higher value of turnover is associated with a higher liquidity of a stock. 
 
iii) Amihud's measure 
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= ; Priceit is the mid-quote of the closing bid-ask quote 
for the stock i in the day t; Volumeit is the number of shares traded for the stock i in 
the day t. 
The measure is then multiplied by 106 as it is done in Amihud (2002) to present the 
results in a comparable format to other studies. 
Amihud's liquidity measure relates price impact (percentage change in price) to the 
volume of stock traded. Lower value of Amihud's measure is associated with higher 
liquidity of a stock. 
If zero volume occurs on a day t, then the Amihud's measure cannot be computed 
for the day t and that day is excluded from the calculations.  
 
iv) Proportion of zero daily returns  
 
The proportion of zero daily returns is calculated as a ratio of days with zero daily 
returns to the total number of trading days over a period for a stock.  
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Daily return for a stock is calculated in the same way as for Amihud's liquidity 
measure. 
Lower number of proportion of zero daily returns for a stock indicates a higher 
liquidity of the stock. 
 
v) Proportion of no-trading days 
 
The proportion of no-trading days is calculated as a ratio of the number of days 
with no trading to the total number of trading days over a period for each stock. 
Lower number of no-trading days for a stock indicates higher liquidity of the stock. 
 
vi) Volatility of return 
 
Volatility of return is a standard deviation of daily return for a stock over a given 
period. Daily return for a stock is calculated in the same way as for Amihud's 
liquidity measure. 
Lower volatility of a stock indicates higher liquidity of the stock. 
 
 
5.4. Data and Methodology of Analysis 
 
The Ukrainian stock market has been actively developing in the past several years 
and the volume of trading and liquidity of the market has been considerably 
growing. For example, the volume of trading in PFTS has grown by 211% in 2005 
and by 81% in 2006. Estimation of liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market over an 
extended period of time can result in very high standard errors of our liquidity 
estimates. Therefore, we have decided to limit the period of observations for our 
liquidity study to the first half of 2006. 
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When choosing a data period for a liquidity study it is important to pay close 
attention to the market conditions. As mentioned above, in the crisis times, the 
volume of trading and the cost of trading change significantly (Yeyati et al. (2007)). 
Turnover is likely to increase during liquidity crunches such as occurred during the 
Tequila Crisis, the Asian Crisis, and the Brazilian Crisis (Summers, 2000), rather 
than decrease to reflect the decline in market liquidity (Froot et al., 2001). 
During the first half of 2006 Ukrainian stock market did not experience any shocks 
or crises. It had a gradual growth during January-April (index PFTS has grown by 
34.8%) and a graduate decline during May-June (index PFTS has decreased by 
19.6%). A mixture of trends will allow us to find an estimate of the stock market 
liquidity attributed to an average market condition. 
 
The main dataset for the thesis described in Chapter 3 excludes all the trades 
reported before the opening of the trading session (before 11 a.m.). Though for 
liquidity study, we find it appropriate to keep the trades in the dataset. Inclusion of 
the trades will allow us to estimate volume-related liquidity measures (turnover, the 
Amihud, and the proportion of no-trading days) more accurately, while it will not 
have any influence on the estimates of the quoted bid-ask spread,  the proportion of 
zero daily returns, and volatility of return measures of liquidity (as these measures 
are estimated based on the closing bid-ask spread data). 
It is important to mention that the trades reported before 11 a.m. were executed one 
or two trading days before the day on which they were reported. The actual day of 
execution of these trades is unknown to the market participants. They learn about 
the trades only after they are reported, which is one or two trading days after the 
execution day. Since the trades will influence the market only after they become 
known to the market, they can be considered as if they were executed on the day of 
their reporting. Of course, the prices for these trades are expected to be close to the 
prices prevalent on the actual day of execution of the trades rather than on the day 
of reporting. But since actual trade prices are not used in the estimations of any of 
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the liquidity measures in the chapter, inclusion of the trades reported before 11 a.m. 
is seen as an appropriate step. 
 
The dataset was not corrected for outliers in terms of trades with abnormally high 
returns (as it was done for the main dataset described in Chapter 3) because actual 
stock prices are not used in the estimation of any of the liquidity measures in this 
chapter. Instead, for estimations of stock returns, midquote of the closing bid-ask 
quote is used. Keeping all the executed trades in our dataset allows us to find more 
accurate estimates for the volume-related measures of the cost of trading. 
 
The main characteristics of the Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006 are 
presented in Table 5.1. The dataset includes 56 stocks. The number of trades varies 
from 1 for YAMZ to 589 for UTEL. None of the stocks were traded on each of the 
trading days, the number of which accounted for 117 in the first half of 2006. The 
number of days traded varies from as low as 1 for YAMZ to 106 for UTEL. The total 
volume of stocks traded varies from 29.2 ths. shares for MSICH (average price USD 
80.7) to 4,840,000 ths. shares for DNAZ (average price USD 0.005). 
 
Similar to Lesmond (2005), Bekaert et al. (2006), and Goyenko et al. (2009), the 
methodology applied for studying the efficacy of the liquidity measures in 











Table 5.1. The main characteristics of Ukrainian stocks. 
 
The table presents the main characteristics of Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006. 
The stocks are sorted by PFTS Code. 
 
Stock details 
















1 Alchevsk Iron & Steel ALMK 8 7 0.16 386.7 450.9 
2 Avdiyivka Coke AVDK 123 60 3.87 1,071.8 370.9 
3 Azot Cherkasy AZOT 12 9 1.90 1,041.8 171.5 
4 Azovstal AZST 330 84 0.46 13,600.0 1,033.9 
5 Aval BAVL 214 76 0.10 556,000.0 1,381.0 
6 Centrenergo CEEN 188 72 0.71 13,100.0 436.0 
7 Donetskgirmash DGRM 69 35 0.43 5,134.8 14.4 
8 Donetsk Coke DKOK 119 52 0.23 12,300.0 27.8 
9 Donetsk Metal Rolling DMPZ 30 23 0.05 8,467.4 15.3 
10 Kominmet DMZK 10 8 0.12 1,838.5 18.0 
11 DniproAzot DNAZ 71 33 0.01 4,840,000.0 135.8 
12 Dniproenergo DNEN 119 56 69.97 219.7 442.6 
13 Dniprooblenergo DNON 53 35 42.79 43.3 307.9 
14 DniproSpetsStal DNSS 133 63 171.36 38.3 189.8 
15 Donbasenergo DOEN 63 40 5.35 327.3 188.5 
16 Donetsk Metal Plant DOMZ 85 42 0.19 5,625.9 37.7 
17 Druzhkivka Machine-Shop DRMZ 66 40 0.32 3,285.0 59.0 
18 Dnipropetrovsk Pipe DTRZ 239 76 55.04 216.5 98.2 
19 Forum FORM 4 4 11.76 139.5 303.8 
20 Galnaftogaz GLNG 15 13 0.01 745,000.0 115.8 
21 Galychyna Refinery HANZ 86 42 0.33 27,900.0 238.4 
22 Svitlo Shakhtarya HMBZ 39 24 0.31 1,943.5 28.8 
23 Khmelnitskoblenergo HMON 8 7 0.40 3,216.5 49.3 
24 Kievenergo KIEN 111 46 1.57 7,594.9 161.0 
25 AvtoKrAZ KRAZ 30 20 0.12 6,941.6 86.1 
26 Krymenergo KREN 50 25 0.23 5,240.3 111.3 
27 Mittal Steel Kryvyy Rig KSTL 66 40 0.74 2,311.1 3,497.0 
28 Luganskteplovoz LTPL 336 91 0.46 43,700.0 85.5 
29 Megabank MEGA 26 12 1.61 16,100.0 44.9 
30 Mariupol Illicha MMKI 222 66 0.59 8,769.2 1,500.2 
31 Motor Sich MSICH 113 61 80.67 29.2 160.7 
32 Maruipol Heavy Machinery MZVM 213 74 12.28 613.0 138.9 
33 Nikopol Ferroalloy NFER 25 20 1.44 475.0 360.6 
34 Nyzhnyodniprovsky Pipe NITR 178 78 11.25 1,078.5 817.8 
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35 Novomoskovsk Pipe NVTR 70 40 6.58 418.1 90.7 
36 Poltavsky Iron Ore PGOK 147 66 12.34 1,943.8 997.4 
37 Pivdenny Iron Ore PGZK 155 57 0.13 100,000.0 175.1 
38 Rodovid Bank RODB 22 7 763.38 37.2 80.2 
39 Stakhanov Ferroalloy SFER 18 16 0.00 6,698.5 53.7 
40 Komsomolets Donbasa SHKD 20 12 0.19 7,143.9 66.0 
41 Imeni Frunze SMASH 167 70 4.18 1,936.0 233.3 
42 Stirol STIR 145 56 22.80 402.3 384.0 
43 Stakhanovsky Wagon SVGZ 140 38 29.93 75.9 34.1 
44 Turboatom TATM 64 29 0.40 8,017.3 130.1 
45 Ukrnafta UNAF 352 96 56.69 951.7 3,215.8 
46 Ukrsotsbank USCB 301 40 0.42 26,200.0 1,294.5 




YAMZ 1 1 2.53 30.0 39.0 
49 Yasinivsky Coke YASK 95 49 0.41 20,300.0 42.1 
50 ZaporizhCoke ZACO 91 48 1.46 2,313.3 130.5 
51 Zakhidenergo ZAEN 194 65 27.46 406.6 551.7 
52 Zaporizhzhya Aluminum ZALK 75 42 0.17 7,930.5 83.2 
53 Zaporizhiaoblenergo ZAON 20 13 0.87 2,722.6 210.5 
54 Zaporizhzhya Ferroalloy ZFER 55 31 0.11 8,395.6 87.0 
55 Zhytomyroblenergo ZHEN 16 13 0.71 2,500.5 92.3 
56 Zaporizhstal ZPST 358 83 0.96 11,500.0 75.7 






This section discusses the results of studying efficacy of liquidity measures for 
measuring liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market. It also suggests a comparison of 
liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market with liquidity of other emerging markets 
based on the estimates of liquidity for emerging markets found in other literature. 
The main methodology of studying the efficacy of liquidity measures is correlation 
analysis, in particular, time-series, cross-sectional, and rank correlations are applied. 
The bid-ask spread is considered by many researchers by far the most demonstrable 
measure of liquidity for any market since it directly measures the level of friction of 
trading a stock. Therefore the bid-ask spread is taken as a benchmark for studying 
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efficacy of other liquidity measures. A similar approach was taken in Lesmond 
(2005) and Goyenko et al. (2009). 
Among two possible benchmarks, which are the quoted bid-ask spread and the 
effective bid-ask spread, we have chosen to apply the quoted bid-ask spread. The 
data on closing bid-ask  spreads is available daily for a wide range of Ukrainian 
stocks, not depending on the frequency of trading for these stocks. Though for 
finding reliable estimates of the effective bid-ask spread, frequent data on the prices 
of executed trades is needed, which is not available for many Ukrainian stocks due 




Before performing the correlation analysis, we first suggest a preliminary analysis of 
the interrelation between various liquidity measures and the quoted bid-ask spread.  
 
The results of estimation of liquidity measures are presented in Table 5.2. For each 
liquidity measure, the table also reports the rank of each stock by liquidity. Rank 1 
shows that a stock is the most liquid among other stocks. Rank 56 shows that a stock 
is the least liquid among other stocks. 
 
By the main measure of liquidity, the quoted bid-ask spread, top ten liquid 
companies were large companies, with market capitalization from USD 86 mln. to 
USD 3,216 mln. These companies had the bid-ask spread of 1.7%-4.0%. Bottom ten 
companies by the quoted bid-ask spread were mostly small and medium-sized 
companies, with market capitalization from USD 15 mln. to USD 66 mln., with an 
exception of two large companies: USCB with market capitalization of USD 1,294 
mln. and ALMK with market capitalization of USD 451 mln. The bid-ask spread for 




Table 5.2. The estimates of the liquidity measures for the Ukrainian stocks. 
 
The table reports the estimates of liquidity measures for Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006. For each liquidity measure, the table also reports 
the rank of each stock by liquidity. Rank 1 refers to the highest liquidity, while rank 56 refers to the lowest liquidity. 
 
Liquidity measures 





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 UTEL 1.66% 1 0.00% 48 0.055 3 10.34% 1 9.40% 1 1.34% 5 
2 UNAF 2.12% 2 0.02% 30 0.031 2 16.38% 4 17.95% 2 0.92% 1 
3 ZAEN 2.58% 3 0.03% 20 0.136 15 21.55% 9 44.44% 14 1.43% 6 
4 NITR 2.62% 4 0.02% 26 0.133 13 27.59% 19 33.33% 6 1.83% 20 
5 MMKI 2.98% 5 0.00% 51 0.18 21 12.93% 3 43.59% 12 1.59% 10 
6 BAVL 3.33% 6 0.03% 16 0.605 44 26.72% 18 35.04% 8 1.82% 18 
7 AZST 3.73% 7 0.00% 49 0.311 31 24.14% 14 28.21% 4 1.96% 22 
8 DNON 3.88% 8 0.01% 43 0.102 12 50.00% 39 70.09% 35 1.54% 9 
9 CEEN 3.97% 9 0.03% 17 0.243 28 25.00% 15 38.46% 10 1.25% 3 
10 LTPL 4.01% 10 0.17% 4 0.08 7 25.86% 16 22.22% 3 2.46% 29 
11 DNSS 4.02% 11 0.03% 18 0.169 19 25.86% 17 46.15% 15 1.75% 17 
12 MZVM 4.11% 12 0.03% 15 0.073 4 32.76% 24 36.75% 9 1.10% 2 
13 PGOK 4.11% 13 0.01% 33 0.201 22 36.21% 27 43.59% 13 1.44% 7 
14 STIR 4.11% 14 0.01% 35 0.556 42 31.03% 22 52.14% 20 2.37% 28 
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15 KSTL 4.24% 15 0.00% 52 0.206 24 43.10% 33 65.81% 29 1.63% 11 
16 DTRZ 4.26% 16 0.18% 3 0.1 11 24.14% 13 35.04% 7 2.18% 25 
17 ZACO 4.68% 17 0.02% 27 0.089 8 43.97% 34 58.97% 23 1.47% 8 
18 SMASH 4.70% 18 0.02% 23 0.284 30 22.41% 10 40.17% 11 2.32% 27 
19 KIEN 4.74% 19 0.06% 9 0.099 10 43.10% 32 60.68% 24 1.25% 4 
20 AVDK 5.25% 20 0.01% 47 0.156 18 29.31% 21 48.72% 17 1.69% 13 
21 YASK 5.31% 21 0.13% 5 0.281 29 32.76% 25 58.12% 22 2.81% 34 
22 DNEN 5.39% 22 0.05% 12 0.154 17 19.83% 7 52.14% 19 1.70% 14 
23 NVTR 5.40% 23 0.03% 19 0.211 25 54.31% 41 65.81% 32 1.82% 19 
24 MSICH 5.41% 24 0.01% 39 0.51 41 27.59% 20 47.86% 16 2.73% 33 
25 ZPST 5.53% 25 0.08% 8 0.144 16 23.28% 11 29.06% 5 2.13% 24 
26 DOEN 5.61% 26 0.01% 40 0.314 32 20.69% 8 65.81% 28 1.74% 16 
27 DKOK 6.18% 27 0.04% 13 0.485 40 39.66% 29 55.56% 21 2.02% 23 
28 GLNG 6.41% 28 0.05% 11 0.467 38 84.48% 53 88.89% 47 6.27% 48 
29 DOMZ 6.76% 29 0.01% 36 0.47 39 33.62% 26 64.10% 25 2.70% 32 
30 RODB 7.70% 30 0.32% 2 0.074 5 24.14% 12 94.02% 52 1.71% 15 
31 DGRM 8.13% 31 0.10% 7 1.03 47 18.97% 5 70.09% 34 4.04% 41 
32 ZALK 9.28% 32 0.01% 41 0.328 33 44.83% 36 64.10% 27 2.28% 26 
33 ZFER 9.75% 33 0.01% 44 0.663 46 54.31% 42 73.50% 37 3.76% 38 
34 MEGA 10.36% 34 0.40% 1 0.135 14 41.38% 31 89.74% 49 6.56% 49 
35 FORM 11.25% 35 0.00% 50 0.33 34 87.07% 55 96.58% 55 1.94% 21 
36 ZAON 12.18% 36 0.01% 37 0.03 1 75.86% 51 88.89% 45 2.51% 31 
37 TATM 12.23% 37 0.02% 29 0.356 37 31.90% 23 75.21% 38 3.04% 37 
38 PGZK 12.96% 38 0.04% 14 0.205 23 38.79% 28 51.28% 18 4.04% 40 
39 KRAZ 13.59% 39 0.01% 45 4.2 53 70.69% 50 82.91% 42 13.00% 54 
40 DRMZ 14.50% 40 0.01% 34 1.16 49 47.41% 38 65.81% 31 4.67% 44 
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41 DNAZ 14.72% 41 0.12% 6 0.569 43 55.17% 43 71.79% 36 3.99% 39 
42 ZHEN 15.17% 42 0.02% 28 0.079 6 77.59% 52 88.89% 46 2.47% 30 
43 KREN 18.36% 43 0.03% 22 0.093 9 62.07% 45 78.63% 39 4.67% 45 
44 NFER 18.54% 44 0.00% 53 0.237 27 87.07% 54 82.91% 43 1.63% 12 
45 HANZ 18.73% 45 0.03% 21 0.222 26 43.97% 35 64.10% 26 2.90% 35 
46 AZOT 22.29% 46 0.01% 42 0.336 35 62.93% 46 92.31% 50 2.97% 36 
47 SHKD 25.34% 47 0.02% 25 1.46 50 10.34% 2 89.74% 48 4.64% 43 
48 DMPZ 27.29% 48 0.01% 38 1.05 48 56.03% 44 80.34% 41 6.27% 47 
49 USCB 28.17% 49 0.01% 46 0.353 36 46.55% 37 65.81% 30 4.17% 42 
50 YAMZ 32.01% 50 0.00% 54 - - 18.97% 6 99.15% 56 8.44% 51 
51 HMBZ 34.42% 51 0.02% 31 1.76 51 39.66% 30 79.49% 40 11.01% 53 
52 SVGZ 37.32% 52 0.06% 10 0.632 45 53.45% 40 67.52% 33 26.79% 55 
53 SFER 38.37% 53 0.00% 55 9.44 54 68.10% 48 86.32% 44 7.87% 50 
54 DMZK 43.34% 54 0.02% 32 0.169 20 69.83% 49 93.16% 51 8.91% 52 
55 HMON 50.00% 55 0.02% 24 - - 100.00% 56 94.02% 54 0.00% - 
56 ALMK 70.19% 56 0.00% 56 2.05 52 64.66% 47 94.02% 53 6.22% 46 





The results suggested by the turnover liquidity measure (Table 5.2, columns 5-6) 
vary considerably from those based on the quoted bid-ask spreads. Some companies 
from the top ten list by quoted bid-ask spreads appear to be in the bottom-ten list by 
turnover. For example, UTEL and AZST have quoted bid-ask spreads of 1.7% and 
3.7% respectively but turnovers of only 0.004%. At the same time a company with 
one of the highest bid-ask spreads, SVGZ (bid-ask spread 37.3%) appears in the top-
ten list by turnover with turnover of  0.056%. The result is possibly due to different 
levels of free float for many companies in the Ukrainian stock market. A lower free 
float for a company will result in lower turnover just because of a smaller 
proportion of stocks in the circulation and therefore lower potential for trading the 
stock in the stock market. In fact, the free floats of UTEL and AZST were 7.14% and 
2.75% respectively, whereas the free float of SVGZ was 12.8%22. The results give the 
first indication that turnover has a low ability for measuring liquidity of stocks in 
Ukraine. 
 
The estimation results show that Amihud's liquidity measure tends to assign 
liquidity in line with the quoted bid-ask spread. Amihud's measure is found to be 
low for many companies with a low bid-ask spread and high for many companies 
with a high bid-ask spread (Table 2, columns 7-8). For example, UTEL, UNAF, and 
LTPL have ranks 1, 2, and 10 respectively by the quoted bid-ask spread and 3, 2, and 
7 respectively by the Amihud's liquidity measure. SFER, ALMK, and HMBZ have 
ranks 53, 56, and 51 respectively by the quoted bid-ask spread and 54, 52, and 51 
respectively by the Amihud's liquidity measure. 
 
Zero return days are fairly prevalent among the Ukrainian stocks. The proportion of 
zero daily returns vary from 10.3% to 100% (Table 2, columns 9-10). SHKD and 
UTEL had the smallest value of the measure, 10.3%. HMON had the largest value of 
                                                
22 Data from www.fundmarket.com.ua s of February 2009. 
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the measure, having had just 8 trades in the first half of 2006 and having 
experienced no quote change over the time (100% of zero daily returns).  
Proportion of zero daily returns tends, on average, to be low for the companies from 
the top-ten liquidity group by quoted bid-ask spread (for example, UTEL (10.3%), 
MMKI (12.9%), and UNAF (16.4%)) and high for the companies from the bottom-ten 
liquidity group by quoted bid-ask spread (for example DMZK (69.8%), SFER 
(68.1%), and ALMK (64.7%)). The only two exceptions are SHKD and YAMZ that 
were assigned to the bottom-ten group by quoted bid-ask spread (bid-ask spreads of 
25.3% and 32% respectively) but to the top-ten liquidity group by proportion of zero 
daily returns (proportion of zero daily returns of 10.3% and 19% respectively). This 
possibly indicates that the quotes posted by brokers for these companies changed in 
the days when no trading occurred. The reason of the change of the quotes can be 
inflow of new information about the stocks but the expected gain from this 
information in terms of stock return could not exceed the high cost of trading for 
these stocks. Therefore, no trading occurred. These findings give a first indication of 
that proportion of zero daily returns at certain times can inaccurately assign stocks' 
liquidity. 
 
High interrelation between the quoted bid-ask spread and the proportion of no-
trading days is found. The majority of the top-ten liquid companies by quoted bid-
ask spread appear in the top list by proportion of no-trading days, which ranges for 
them from 10.3% to 21.6% (Table 2, columns 11-12). The only exception is DNON 
with 70.1% of no-trading days. All the bottom-ten stocks by the quoted bid-ask 
spread appear in the bottom of the list sorted by the proportion of no-trading days, 
which varies for them from 79.5% to 99.2%.  
 
The volatility of return varies from 0% to 26.8% (Table 2, columns 13-14). For the top 
ten companies by the quoted bid-ask spread volatility ranged between 0.9% and 
2.5%. For the bottom ten companies by the quoted bid-ask spread volatility ranged 
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between 4.2% and 26.8%. Volatility of return seems to be associated with the quoted 
bid-ask spread. 
A problem with this measure can appear if there was no price change for a stock 
over time. It is very probable that no change of a stock price is an indication of low 
liquidity of the stock. But the volatility of return will give an opposite indication. It 
will show 0% volatility for the stock and with this will attribute the highest liquidity 
to this stock, as it was in the case for HMON. An illiquid stock HMON (quoted bid-
ask spread 50%, proportion of no-trading days 94%) had no price change during the 
first half of 2006, which has resulted in 0% volatility and the top liquidity rating by 
the volatility liquidity proxy.  
 
Results of the Correlation Analysis 
 
Three types of correlations are analysed, time-series correlations, cross-sectional 
correlations, and rank correlations.  
 
Time-series correlations are computed for the daily bid-ask spread and the daily 
turnover liquidity measures and for the daily bid-ask spread and the daily 
Amihud's liquidity measures. For the other liquidity measures (proportion of zero 
daily returns, proportion of no-trading days, and the volatility of return), only cross-
sectional correlations are estimated due to the nature of the construction of the 
measures as they can be computed only for a period.  
It is expected that if on a day t turnover for a stock rises, the bid-ask spread will 
narrow for the stock on this day. In the same manner, it is expected that if on a day t 
price impact per unit of volume for a stock (Amihud's liquidity measure) rises, the 
bid-ask spread on this day for the stock will widen. 
If a liquidity measure did not change from one day to another, the day of no change 
is not included in the computation since no variation in one of the two variables can 
lead to a biased estimate of the correlation coefficient. Due to this, the number of 
daily observations during the first half of 2006 for some stocks is as low as 0. The 
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estimation results for the time-series correlations are presented in Table 5.3 and will 
be discussed below together with the results for cross-sectional correlations and 
rank correlations. 
 
The cross-sectional correlations between the liquidity measures are computed based 
on the liquidity measures for each stock during the first half of 2006. For the quoted 
bid-ask spread, turnover, and Amihud's measure, simple averages of the daily 
values are taken during the first half of 2006. Proportion of zero daily returns, 
proportion of no-trading days, and volatility of return are computed for the period 
of the first half of 2006. The results are presented in Table 5.4. We conclude about 
the efficacy of liquidity measures in measuring liquidity based on the correlation of 
each measure with the quoted bid-ask spread. Though, for additional information, 
Table 5.4 also presents correlations of the liquidity measures with each other.  
 
Correlations between the ranks of stocks by the quoted bid-ask spread and by 
alternative liquidity measures are presented in Table 5.5. All the estimates of the 
rank correlations are expected to have a positive sign since rank 1 represents the 
highest liquidity for any liquidity measure, and rank 56 represents the lowest 
liquidity for any liquidity measure. 
 
The majority of the time-series correlation coefficients for the quoted bid-ask 
spread and turnover are negative, as expected, but insignificantly different from 
zero. Only for 6 out of 54 companies the correlations are negative and significantly 
different from zero at least at the 10% significance level (Table 5.3). The cross-
sectional correlation between the quoted bid-ask spread and turnover is -0.16 and is 
not significantly different from zero (Table 5.4). The rank correlation is 0.1653 and is 
not significantly different from zero. The results support our preliminary findings 
and suggest that turnover has a low applicability for measuring liquidity of stocks 
in Ukraine.  
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Table 5.3. The bid-ask spread and alternative liquidity measure correlations  
 
The time-series correlations are computed based on the daily data for each stock during the 
first half of 2006. Average is weighted by the number of observations.  
*** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, * indicates 




















1 ALMK -0.7557** 0.049 7 -0.8980 0.290 3 
2 AVDK 0.1635 0.212 60 0.0975 0.544 41 
3 AZOT -0.0556 0.887 9 - - 2 
4 AZST -0.3419*** 0.001 84 0.5575*** 0.000 70 
5 BAVL -0.0930 0.424 76 0.0022 0.987 60 
6 CEEN -0.1316 0.271 72 0.3067** 0.020 57 
7 DGRM 0.1302 0.456 35 0.6663*** 0.000 27 
8 DKOK 0.1678 0.234 52 0.0202 0.904 38 
9 DMPZ 0.1169 0.595 23 0.4586 0.253 8 
10 DMZK 0.2542 0.543 8 0.3291 0.671 4 
11 DNAZ -0.2813 0.113 33 -0.2929 0.210 20 
12 DNEN -0.2753** 0.040 56 0.2696* 0.056 51 
13 DNON -0.0238 0.892 35 0.4257** 0.048 22 
14 DNSS -0.0847 0.509 63 0.3008** 0.030 52 
15 DOEN 0.0443 0.786 40 0.0846 0.629 35 
16 DOMZ 0.1799 0.254 42 0.0117 0.950 31 
17 DRMZ -0.1464 0.367 40 0.3467 0.105 23 
18 DTRZ -0.0247 0.833 76 0.2385* 0.060 63 
19 FORM -0.7097 0.290 4 0.0382 0.976 3 
20 GLNG -0.2948 0.328 13 - - 0 
21 HANZ -0.0343 0.829 42 0.2009 0.347 24 
22 HMBZ 0.1709 0.425 24 -0.0039 0.988 18 
23 HMON - - 7 - - 0 
24 KIEN 0.0336 0.824 46 0.1293 0.466 43 
25 KRAZ -0.2746 0.241 20 0.8937*** 0.000 12 
26 KREN 0.0403 0.848 25 -0.0270 0.937 11 
27 KSTL 0.0124 0.939 40 0.3482* 0.075 27 
28 LTPL 0.0317 0.766 91 0.2496** 0.033 73 
29 MEGA -0.3448 0.272 12 0.9994** 0.022 3 
30 MMKI -0.2129* 0.086 66 0.1483 0.254 61 
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31 MSICH 0.1177 0.366 61 0.3567** 0.014 47 
32 MZVM -0.0096 0.936 74 -0.2121 0.120 55 
33 NFER 0.3966* 0.083 20 0.3776 0.622 4 
34 NITR -0.1364 0.234 78 0.3178** 0.013 60 
35 NVTR -0.3307** 0.037 40 0.0861 0.689 24 
36 PGOK 0.1340 0.283 66 0.1454 0.324 48 
37 PGZK 0.2545* 0.056 57 0.1409 0.362 44 
38 RODB -0.1075 0.839 7 -0.5219 0.367 5 
39 SFER -0.0413 0.879 16 -0.4571 0.302 7 
40 SHKD -0.3023 0.340 12 0.7588** 0.048 7 
41 SMASH 0.1100 0.365 70 0.0562 0.678 57 
42 STIR -0.0801 0.557 56 -0.1461 0.327 47 
43 SVGZ -0.336** 0.039 38 0.4908*** 0.009 27 
44 TATM 0.1155 0.551 29 -0.0247 0.907 25 
45 UNAF 0.1402 0.173 96 0.1594 0.158 80 
46 USCB 0.3949** 0.012 40 0.1136 0.543 31 
47 UTEL -0.1585 0.105 106 0.3322*** 0.001 99 
48 YAMZ - - 1 - - 0 
49 YASK 0.0512 0.727 49 0.5243*** 0.000 41 
50 ZACO -0.1987 0.176 48 0.4322** 0.015 31 
51 ZAEN -0.1576 0.210 65 0.0494 0.725 53 
52 ZALK -0.0329 0.836 42 0.0457 0.810 30 
53 ZAON -0.1332 0.664 13 -0.3807 0.527 5 
54 ZFER 0.0951 0.611 31 -0.2515 0.314 18 
55 ZHEN -0.1921 0.529 13 0.5465 0.453 4 
56 ZPST -0.1235 0.266 83 0.3491*** 0.003 70 


















Table 5.4. The cross-sectional correlations between the liquidity measures. 
 
The cross-sectional correlations are computed based on the averages for each measure for 56 
Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006.  
The p-value of the t-statistics is reported in the parentheses. *** indicates significance level at 
1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, * indicates significance level at 10%. 



















1     
 
  (-)      
Turnover -0.1624 1    
 
  (-0.232) (-)     
Amihud 
(*1,000,000) 
0.4428*** -0.1495 1   
 
  (-0.001) (0.281) (-)    
Proportion of zero 
returns 
0.4981*** -0.1678 0.2545* 1  
 
  (0.000) (0.216) (0.063) (-)   
Proportion of no-
trading days 
0.6185*** 0.0407 0.2899** 0.6665*** 1 
 
  (0.000) (0.764) (0.033) (0.000) (-)  
Return Volatility 0.5081*** 0.0268 0.3562*** 0.2197 0.3412*** 
1 
  (0.000) (0.845) (0.008) (0.104) (0.010) (-) 
 
 
Table 5.5. Rank correlations between the liquidity measures. 
 
The estimates are found by correlating the ranks of stocks by the quoted bid-ask spread with 
the rank s of stocks by alternative liquidity measures during the first half of 2006.  
The p-value of the t-statistics is reported in the parentheses. *** indicates significance level at 
1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, * indicates significance level at 10%. 













Quoted bid-ask spread 
0.1653 0.5112*** 0.5958*** 0.8090*** 0.8028*** 
  (0.223) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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The results are in line with the findings in Bekaert et al. (2006) and Lesmond (2005). 
Bekaert et al. (2006) found that for a cross-section of 9 emerging markets, correlation 
between the bid-ask spread and turnover was only -0.2. Lesmond (2005) found that 
turnover was negatively and significantly correlated with the bid-ask spread in only 
9 of the 23 emerging markets studied; the cross-country estimate of the correlation 
coefficient was found very low, just -0.065. Lesmond (2005) concludes: "the most 
telling finding [of the paper's analysis] is the lack of correlation between turnover 
and the bid-ask spread… These results cast doubt on a wide range of studies 
employing turnover as a principal liquidity proxy."  
 
The daily time-series correlations between the quoted bid-ask spread and the 
Amihud's measure for each stock show high level of interrelation between these 
two liquidity measures. For 18 out of 52 companies correlations are significant and 
quite high (from 23.9% to 99.9% at least at 10% significance level, Table 5.3). Cross-
sectional correlation of the two liquidity measures is high, 44.3%, and significantly 
different from zero at 1% significance level (Table 5.4). The rank correlation is 51.1% 
and is also significantly different from zero at 1% significance level. The results 
suggest that Amihud's measure is applicable for liquidity measurement in the 
Ukrainian stock market. Similar conclusion was drawn for the emerging stock 
markets study of Lesmond (2005): "Amihud's measure is very highly (positively) 
correlated with the [quoted bid-ask] spread regardless of country". The study finds 
positive and significant (at 1% significance level) correlations that vary from 18.5% 
for Taiwan to 63.6% for Argentina. Lesmond (2005) adds: "the results for Amihud's 
measure perhaps are surprising given that the bid-ask spread is not often associated 
with price impact costs". Goyenko et al. (2009) find that for the U.S. stocks there are 
also quite high and significantly different from zero cross-sectional and time-series 
correlations of the Amihud liquidity measure with the effective bid-ask spread 
(57.1% and 53.9% respectively). The Amihud liquidity measure seems to work well 
in both emerging and developed markets. 
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The cross-sectional correlations of the proportion of zero daily returns and the 
proportion of no-trading days with the quoted bid-ask spread are 49.8% and 61.9% 
and respectively, and both are significant at 1% significance level (Table 5.4). The 
rank correlations are 59.6% and 80.9% respectively (Table 5.5). Therefore both 
measures are well applicable for measuring liquidity in the Ukrainian stock market. 
Higher correlation coefficient of the proportion of no-trading days suggest better 
applicability of this measure compared to the proportion of zero daily returns 
measure. The finding is in line with the assumption, on which the proportion of 
zero daily returns measure is based. Lesmond et al. (1999) and Bekaert et al. (2006) 
explain that the measure is applied as a proxy for the proportion of no-trading days 
based on the assumption that on no-trading days zero return will be observed. The 
assumption is not always true, therefore it is not surprising that the proportion of 
no-trading days performs better than its proxy.  
Higher correlations of the two measures with the quoted bid-ask spread relative to 
Amihud's measure suggest higher ability of these two measures than Amihud's 
measure to measure liquidity in Ukraine. This result is possibly related to no 
dependence of the two measures to the volume, which is, as proved by the low 
significance of turnover, not a good proxy for liquidity.  
Our results for the proportion of zero daily returns are in line with the findings in 
Bekaert et al. (2006) and Goyenko et al. (2009). Bekaert et al. (2006) also find that the 
proportion of zero daily returns measure is highly correlated, 48% on average, with 
the mean bid-ask spread across all 9 emerging markets for which the bid-ask 
spreads are available. Goyenko et al. (2009) documented that for a cross-section of 
400 U.S. stocks, correlation between zero daily returns and effective bid-ask spread 
is quite high, 42.7% for monthly data frequency and 59.0% for annual data 
frequency. 
 
The volatility of return has a high and significantly different from zero cross-
sectional and rank correlations with the quoted bid-ask spread, 51% (Table 5.4) and 
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80% (Table 5.5) respectively, which suggest that this measure has power in 
measuring liquidity of stocks in the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
To summarize, four measures out of the five applied (Amihud's measure, the 
proportion of no-trading days, the proportion of zero daily returns, and volatility) 
have shown quite high time-series (where applicable), cross-sectional, and rank 
correlations with the quoted bid-ask spread. Therefore they are concluded to have a 
high ability in measuring liquidity of stocks in the Ukrainian stock market. Out of 
them, the proportion of no-trading days has shown the highest (and significant) 
correlations (both cross-sectional and rank) with the quoted bid-ask spread and 
therefore is considered as a superior measure for measuring liquidity of stocks in 
Ukraine. It is followed by the proportion of zero daily returns, volatility of return, 
and, finally, Amihud's measure. Turnover has shown a very low association with 
the quoted bid-ask spread and is concluded to be inappropriate for measuring 
liquidity of stocks in the Ukrainian stock market.  
 
 
Comparison of the Ukrainian Stock Market Liquidity to the Liquidity of Other 
Emerging Markets 
 
To see the place of the Ukrainian stock market by liquidity among other emerging 
markets, liquidity measures estimated for Ukraine in this chapter are compared to 
the liquidity measures estimated for emerging markets in other literature. The 
comparison will also show how to use different liquidity measures and will present 
the interrelationships between different liquidity measures. 
 
There are very few available academic studies on liquidity in the emerging stock 
markets. Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006) are some of the few papers in the 
area. 
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The liquidity measures for Ukraine estimated in this chapter are compared to the 
liquidity measures for other emerging markets estimated in Lesmond (2005) based 
on the quoted bid-ask spread, turnover, Amihud's measure, and the proportion of 
zero daily returns liquidity measures. Also, the proportion of zero daily returns in 
Ukraine is compared to the proportion of zero daily returns estimated in Bekaert et 
al. (2006) for other emerging markets. Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006) do 
not include Ukraine in their datasets.  
 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) argue that in the universe of emerging stock markets, the 
markets of Chile and Colombia are the least liquid and the markets of Korea and 
Taiwan are the most liquid. The estimates for the Ukrainian stock market are 
compared to those for Chile, Colombia, Korea, Taiwan, and to a number of Eastern 
European stock markets – Poland, Czech Republic, and Russia to also show the 
liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market relative to its neighbour markets. 
 
Our dataset covers a greater part of the Ukrainian listed stocks (56 out of 262 listed) 
than the dataset in Lesmond (2005). Due to the limitations with the available data, 
the number of the companies for each country included in the dataset in Lesmond 
(2005) is quite limited. For example, only 30 companies are included for India (out of 
4,763 listed in 200523), 178 companies for Malaysia (out of 1,020), 4 companies for 
Argentina (out of 101), 5 companies for Czech Republic (out of 36), 25 companies for 
Poland (out of  248), 7 companies for Russia (out of  96)). The source of the data in 
Lesmond (2005) is Datastream, a database that provides data only for the most 
liquid companies in emerging markets. Therefore, the liquidity estimates found in 
Lesmond (2005) are to be attributed to the stocks with higher liquidity rather than to 
the markets as a whole. On average, 12% of the number of the listed stocks for each 
country was covered by the dataset in Lesmond (2005).  
                                                
23 The data on the number of listed companies for each of the markets is taken from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators 2006. 
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To make the liquidity estimates found for Ukraine in this chapter comparable to the 
liquidity estimates in Lesmond (2005), we recalculate the liquidity measures for 
Ukraine and include only 12% of the all quoted stocks in Ukraine, which is roughly 
30 stocks, in the computations of the liquidity measures. The liquidity estimates for 
emerging markets from Lesmond (2005) and our recalculated estimates are 
presented in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6. The liquidity estimates for a selection of countries from Lesmond 
(2005) and the adjusted liquidity estimates for Ukraine. 
 
The estimates for all countries, except Ukraine, are the liquidity estimates from Lesmond 
(2005). The estimates are found based on data period from 1987 to 2000. The estimates for 
Ukraine are own calculations. The calculations for Ukraine are based on the data for only top 
30 companies ranked by liquidity (measured by the quoted bid-ask spread). The companies 
represent 12% of the number of the quoted companies in the Ukrainian stock market (as of 
end of 2006). The estimates are equally weighted averages of the estimates for individual 
stocks. The sample is created to make the results for the Ukrainian stock market comparable 
to the results in Lesmond (2005). The Ukrainian estimates are found based on the data 



























Chile - - 0.28% 5 0.15% 4 42.27% 7 
Colombia 4.52% 5 0.06% 7 0.00% 1 50.94% 8 
Czech 
Republic 
8.15% 6 1.25% 2 0.43% 5 32.28% 5 
Korea 1.95% 2 1.58% 1 0.01% 2 15.33% 2 
Poland 3.13% 3 0.33% 4 1.90% 6 19.37% 3 
Russia 47.22% 7 0.22% 6 4.88% 7 41.55% 6 
Taiwan 1.09% 1 1.21% 3 0.04% 3 11.57% 1 
Ukraine 4.49% 4 0.02% 8 18.60% 8 25.48% 4 
*Turnover is a ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. 
 
 
It is important to note that liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market in 2006 is 
compared to liquidity of other stock markets in 1990s. Comparison of Ukraine to the 
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other stock markets in 2006 would give more accurate results, though liquidity 
estimates for emerging markets in 2006 are not available in literature.  
 
The comparison of liquidity of Ukraine with other emerging markets shows that by 
volume-related measures of liquidity (turnover and Amihud's) Ukraine has the 
worst rating, 8, among all the emerging markets considered. The reason of this is 
probably the peculiar feature of the Ukrainian stock market – very low free float. 
Because of the low free float, turnover (the ratio of shares traded to shares 
outstanding) in Ukraine is extremely low. Also due to the low number of stocks in 
circulation in the stock market, an increase in daily volume traded causes 
considerable price impact in Ukraine, which is reflected in the high value of 
Amihud's measure relative to other countries. 
 
The comparison of liquidity of Ukraine based on non-volume liquidity measures 
(the quoted bid-ask spread and the proportion of zero returns) with Korea, Taiwan, 
Chile, and Colombia shows that Ukrainian stock market is less liquid than the stock 
markets of Korea and Taiwan, though more liquid than the stock markets of Chile 
and Colombia. Lower proportion of zero daily returns for Ukraine than for Chile 
and Colombia shows that even though the free float in Ukraine is very low, the 
circulation of the free float in Ukraine is more active than in Chile and Colombia. 
Since volume-related liquidity measures are found in literature as less reliable for 
measuring liquidity in the emerging stock markets than non-volume-related, we 
give more credence to the comparison results based on the quoted bid-ask spread 
and the proportion of zero returns. 
 
The comparison of liquidity of Ukraine based on non-volume related liquidity 
measures (the quoted bid-ask spread and the proportion of zero returns) with Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Russia shows that Ukrainian stock market in 2006 was less 
liquid than the stock market in Poland and more liquid than stock markets in Czech 
Republic and Russia in 1990s (Table 5.6). The results emphasize low development of 
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the Ukrainian stock market as the stock market of Poland, a country comparable to 
Ukraine by the size of the economy, the level of industrialization, and the time of 
beginning of transition to the market economy, had a more liquid than in Ukraine 
stock market already a decade ago. 
 
Bekaert et al. (2006) presents estimates of the proportion of zero daily returns for a 
number of emerging markets. The estimates are done based on the dataset from the 
Datastream research files, which covers the majority of the companies traded in a 
market, for example, 892 for India, 815 for Malaysia, and 83 for Argentina. Therefore 
the liquidity estimates in Bekaert et al. (2006) can be directly compared with those 
computed in this chapter. The estimates for Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and Colombia as 
well as our estimates for Ukraine are presented in Table 5.7. The ranks of the 
countries by the proportion of zero daily returns based on the results in Bekaert et 
al. (2006) are in line with those based on the results in Lesmond (2005): Ukraine is 
found more liquid than Chile and Colombia, though less liquid than Taiwan and 
Korea. 
 
Table 5.7. The estimates of the proportion of zero daily returns for a selection of 
countries from Bekaert et al. (2006) and the proportion of zero daily returns for 
Ukraine. 
 
The estimates for all countries, except Ukraine, are the liquidity estimates from Bekaert et al. 
(2006). The estimates are found based on the data period from 1987 to 2000. The estimates for 
Ukraine are own calculations. The Ukrainian estimates are found based on the data period of 







Korea 8.20% 2 
Taiwan 6.60% 1 
Chile 46.60% 4 
Colombia 51.90% 5 





This chapter applies a number of liquidity measures for assessing firm-level 
liquidity in the Ukrainian stock market, studies their efficacy, and points out the 
place of Ukraine by liquidity among other emerging stock markets of the world. The 
liquidity measures applied in the chapter are the quoted bid-ask spread, turnover, 
Amihud’s measure (Amihud, 2002), the proportion of zero daily returns (Lesmond 
et al., 1999), the proportion of no-trading days (Lesmond, 1999), and the volatility of 
return.  
 
The liquidity costs range widely across the Ukrainian stocks. For example, the bid-
ask spread varies  from 1.7% for UTEL to 70.2% for ALMK, which underlines 
importance of accurate liquidity measurement for investors and portfolio managers 
when making their investment decisions, as well as for researchers who employ 
stock liquidity in their studies. 
 
The correlation analysis allows to assess efficacy of different liquidity measures in 
measuring liquidity of the Ukrainian stocks. Four measures out of the five applied 
(Amihud's measure, the proportion of no-trading days, the proportion of zero daily 
returns, and volatility) have shown high correlation with the quoted bid-ask spread. 
Therefore they are concluded to have a high ability in measuring liquidity of stocks 
in the Ukrainian stock market. Out of them, the proportion of no-trading days has 
shown the highest (and significant) correlations (both cross-sectional and rank) with 
the quoted bid-ask spread and therefore is considered as a superior measure out of 
the other measures applied. It is followed by the proportion of zero daily returns, 
volatility of return, and, finally, Amihud's measure.  
High efficacy of the proportion of zero daily returns in measuring liquidity of 
emerging stock markets was also found in Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006). 
Though this measure does not seem to be effective for measuring liquidity in the 
developed stock market of the U.S. (Goyenko et al., 2009). 
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Amihud's measure was found quite effective for measuring stock liquidity in both 
emerging and developed markets (Lesmond (2005), Goyenko et al. (2009), and the 
results of our study). 
Turnover has shown a very low association with the quoted bid-ask spread and is 
concluded to be inappropriate for measuring liquidity of stocks in the Ukrainian 
stock market. The result is in line with the findings for emerging stock markets in 
other literature (Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006)). 
 
It is argued that in the universe of emerging stock markets, the markets of Korea 
and Taiwan are the most liquid and the markets of Chile and Colombia are the least 
liquid. Comparison of liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market to these four markets 
have shown that based on non-volume-related liquidity measures (quoted bid-ask 
spread and proportion of zero daily returns), Ukrainian stock market is less liquid 
than those of Korea and Taiwan and more liquid than those of Chile and Colombia. 
Based on the volume-related liquidity measures (turnover and Amihud's), 
Ukrainian stock market was found less liquid than all the four markets. Since non-
volume related liquidity measures are found to be more reliable for measuring 
liquidity of emerging stock markets than volume-related liquidity measures 
(Lesmond (2005), Bekaert et al. (2006), own results in the chapter), we give more 
credence to the comparison of the markets' liquidity based on the quoted bid-ask 
spread and the proportion of zero daily returns. 
 
Low liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market is seen as an important reason of the 











The bid-ask spread, or more correctly the effective bid-ask spread, is the major cost 
of equity trading. It is therefore an important economic phenomenon, which 
researchers have tried to understand.  
 
The theory suggests that there are three main sources of the bid-ask spread: i) order 
processing cost, ii) inventory holding cost, and iii) information asymmetry, or 
adverse selection cost. 
The order processing cost is the oldest identified in literature. It refers to different 
kinds of administrative costs related to order execution, like office rent, salaries to 
the employees, costs of finding counterparts for a trade, etc. 
Some authors argue that market makers use spread to compensate for some 
unwanted inventory positions. Because of their role of liquidity suppliers, market 
makers are obliged to constantly post quotes and must be ready to play as 
counterparts for each trade; as a result, they falling an inventory risk due to 
positions away from their desired target level. The relationship between the spread 
and inventory costs has been studied, among others, by Stoll (1978), Ho & Stoll 
(1981) and Amihud & Mendelson (1980). 
The existence of the information asymmetry cost, or adverse selection cost, grounds on 
the idea that a market maker always loses to informed traders, but recovers his 
losses with the gains he earns from transactions with uninformed traders. The 
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relationship between information asymmetry and the bid-ask spread has been the 
object of numerous studies (Copeland & Galai (1983), Glosten & Milgrom (1985), 
Easley & O’Hara (1987), etc.). 
 
Since the mid 1980s, many researchers have attempted to empirically estimate the 
components of the bid-ask spread. Their methods essentially vary in (i) the number 
of components into which the bid-ask spread is decomposed (some methods 
decompose the bid-ask spread into all the three components, while other can group 
some of the components together) and (ii) the way they try to identify the 
considered components (one class of methods is based on the serial covariance 
properties of price changes, while another estimates the spread components by 
running regressions using a variable that indicates the direction of each trade). 
 
The spread decomposition models have been largely used in empirical studies for 
various purposes. The examples given hereunder are far from being exhaustive. By 
comparing the spread components between open outcry auction and automated 
order execution on the Sydney Futures Exchange, Wang (1999) showed that floor 
traders are better able to assess the presence of adverse information than screen 
traders. Saporta et al. (1999) found that a reduction in the delay of reporting on the 
London Stock Exchange in January 1996 did not have any impact on the relative 
components of the spread, thereby suggesting that this change did not affect market 
liquidity. Menyah and Paudyal (2000) studied how the spread components were 
affected by stock liquidity on the London Stock Exchange. Dennis and Weston 
(2001) analysed the relationship between the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread and the ownership structure of firms and suggested that institutions 
and insiders were better informed than individual investors. Elder et al. (2004) 
considered the impact of tracking stocks on the adverse selection component of 
spreads posted by market makers. 
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Having shown in Chapter 4 of the thesis that the spreads are much wider in the 
Ukrainian stock market than in the developed and many other emerging markets, 
we are interested in estimation of the components of the bid-ask spread with an aim 
to explain the sources of the substantial width of the spreads.  
The literature on the bid-ask spread decomposition for the Ukrainian stock market 
is very scarce. To our knowledge, only Ryzhkov (2007) studied the components of 
the bid-ask spread in the Ukrainian stock market. The study estimated the model of 
Huang and Stoll (1997) customized for the Prague stock exchange by Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2003). 
 
The level of private information trading in the Ukrainian stock market is viewed as 
high (EBRD, 2008 [1]), transparency of public companies and the ownership 
structure disclosure are low (EBRD, 2008 [1], EBRD, 2008 [2], S&P/FIA, 2007). We 
suspect that an important reason of wide bid-ask spreads is a high level of 
information asymmetry in the Ukrainian stock market.  
 
This chapter estimates the components of the bid-ask spread for the Ukrainian 
stocks by applying Stoll (1989), Huang and Stoll (1997), and  Glosten and Harris 
(1988)) models of the bid-ask spread decomposition. Three different models are 
applied in order to check whether the estimates provided by alternative models are 
plausible and consistent with each other.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides a review of literature, 
Section 6.3 presents the methodology of the bid-ask spread decomposition, Section 
6.4 explains the estimation procedure, Section 6.5 discusses the estimation results, 







6.2. Review of Literature 
 
This part of the chapter gives a general overview of the most frequently cited in 
literature spread decomposition models. A deeper discussion of the models with the 
derivation of the main equations will be presented in the Methodology part. 
 
Early Models of the Bid-Ask Spread 
 
For many decades the existence of the bid-ask spread was explained purely by the 
necessity to compensate brokers their order processing costs. A simple paper by 
Bagehot (1971) has given an origin to a new theory that posited an important role 
for information in determining the bid-ask spread. Bagehot (1971) developed his 
argument based on the fact that there are traders in the market that are better 
informed than the market-maker. They buy when they know that the stock price is 
too low and sell when it is too high. Moreover these informed traders have an 
option not to trade as opposed to the market-maker who always has to quote buy 
and sell prices. As a consequence, the market maker always loses when he trades 
with informed traders. In order to compensate for the losses, the market maker 
widens his bid-ask spread and recovers from the uninformed traders what he has 
lost to the informed traders. This insightful idea about the role of asymmetric 
information in determining assets' buy and sell prices provided a new and 
important direction in the market microstructure research. 
 
The first attempt to formally analyse the concept of information asymmetry was 
done by Copeland and Galai (1983). Their analysis develops a one-period model of 
the market-maker's pricing problem under an assumption that a fraction of traders 
have superior information. The model also assumes that the order processing and 
inventory holding costs are zero and, consequently, the bid-ask spread is induced 
solely by the adverse information component. The market maker's profit function is 
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set and its maximization problem is solved. The results suggest the bid and ask 
prices that an efficient market maker would set. The size of the spread differs with 
various market parameters, in particular the elasticities of traders' demand 
functions and the trading probabilities of informed and uninformed traders but as 
long as there is a positive probability that some of the traders are informed, spread 
is never zero.  
While the model manages to formalize the influence of asymmetric information on 
the posted bid and ask price, it does so in a static one-period framework. Because 
the dealer's decision problem in this framework is simply to balance gains and 
losses, the problem is very similar to the inventory control problems widely 
discussed in earlier literature (Garman (1976), Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980), and Ho and Stoll (1981)). The similarity disappears when dynamic 
considerations are introduced. According to the asymmetric information 
hypothesis, the trade itself conveys information. The continued trading of the 
informed traders provides a potential for uninformed market makers to infer the 
underlying information and to adjust the quotes accordingly. What is missing in 
Copeland and Galai (1983) framework is the realization that the trades in 
themselves could reveal the underlying information and affect future prices. The 
concept that trades themselves are signals of information was developed by Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987). Their models have contributed 
not only to describing the process of price formation but also to the market 
efficiency theory. In previous research the exogeneity of order flow reduced the 
market maker's problem to setting such prices that would balance his gains and 
losses over time. Now, however, the ability to learn from the order flow meant that 
private information revealed through trading can be incorporated into the market 
prices, which means that the price path is not independent of the private 
information. 
The modelling of the process of the brokers' price setting developed by Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) has given an origin to the modern 
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spread decomposition models such as Huang and Stoll (1997), Glosten and Harris 
(1988), and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). 
 
The model by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (further referred to as GM) assumes 
zero order processing and inventory holding costs and focuses on how information 
per se affects prices. Some traders have information about the true value of an asset 
while others do not. Similar to Copeland and Galai (1983), the specialist sets such 
prices so that his expected profit on any trade is zero. The main difference with 
Copeland and Galai (1983) though is that the direction of trade (a purchase or a sale) 
has a signal value and influences the price that the specialist sets. Following a trade, 
the specialist revises his beliefs about the stock value and sets a new trading price. 
The bid and ask prices set by a rational specialist are found by solving a Bayesian 
learning model. The model assumes that the specialist knows the probabilities of 
arrival of a good or a bad news about the stock and the probability of trading with 
an informed or an uninformed trader.  
The model is solved by computing the probabilities of a purchase and a sale24. The 
probability functions depend on two variables: the probability of occurrence of an 
informed/uninformed trade and  the probability of arrival of a good/bad news in the 
market. 
One of the important results of GM is showing that the spread exists independent of 
existence of order processing costs or inventory holding risk. Similar to Copeland 
and Galai (1983), the spread arises due to the asymmetric information in the market. 
Because of the asymmetric information, a specialist aims at setting such bid and ask 
prices that will balance his losses to informed traders with his gains from 
uninformed traders. Though, different to Copeland and Galai (1983), the 
information is revealed dynamically, from the direction of the previous trade.  
 
                                                
24 Even though it is often assumed that buys and sells are equally likely, it is not necessarily 
true, especially when intraday data is considered. If there is a good news, the probability of a 
buy order is higher; if there is a bad news, the probability of a sell order is higher (O'Hara 
(1995)). 
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Easley and O'Hara (1987) develop the Glosten-Milgrom model by allowing traders 
to transact different trade sizes. A trader whose turn is to transact may either buy a 
small or a large quantity, sell a small or a large quantity, or simply not trade. Some 
informed traders would trade a large quantity only if uninformed traders want to 
trade the large quantity. If they did not, then a large trade could only be initiated by 
an informed trader, and market-maker's prices for large trades would then be the 
full information values. Allowing the informed traders to select among trade sizes 
implies that the equilibrium need not be that of the Copeland and Galai (1983) or 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In particular, the price will depend on the beliefs of the 
market-maker about the quantity that an informed trader can choose to trade. 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) demonstrate that in such setting two types of equilibria 
are possible. The informed traders could choose to trade only large quantity and 
with that separate themselves from the small uninformed traders (this will occur if 
an informed trader is able to offset the better price by the ability to trade more 
shares, albeit at a worse price). Alternatively, informed traders could choose to 
submit both large and small orders and thus be pooled with the uninformed traders 
(in order to benefit from a better price due to hiding their identity). If the first case is 
true, then no spread would exist for the trades of small quantity but buy and sell 
prices for the large trades will be separated by a spread. In many active markets 
there are cases of very large blocks to be transacted, suggesting that in such markets 
a separating equilibrium might be expected to prevail (O'Hara (1998, p. 69)). If the 
second case is true, spread will exist for both small and large trades.  
One of the important implications of the model is demonstration that information is 
revealed not only through the direction of an order but also through its size. 
Therefore, examining only small-trade spread cannot provide a comprehensive 






An Introduction to the Spread Decomposition Models 
 
The modelling of the quotes that a rational market-maker would set based on the 
information received from the order flow gave an origin to a further question. If the 
bid-ask spread covers not only order processing costs but also asymmetric 
information costs, what portion of the spread does each of the costs constitute? 
Many models were developed in literature to answer the question though most of 
them can be attributed to one of the two classes: the covariance-based models and 
the trade indicator models. Trade indicator models have proved to be more 
promising and attracted more attention among the researchers.  
Four most frequently cited in literature spread decomposition models are discussed 
below. They are the covariance-based model by Stoll (1989) and three trade 
indicator models by Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll (1997), and 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997). 
 
Some of the spread decomposition models allow us to decompose the bid-ask 
spread into only two rather than three components.  The models of Glosten and 
Harris (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) decompose the bid-
ask spread into asymmetric information component and the sum of the inventory 
holding and the order processing components. Whereas the model of Huang and 
Stoll (1997) (2-way decomposition) groups together the asymmetric information and 
the inventory holding components and estimates separately the order processing 
cost component. The models that allow spread decomposition into all the three 
components are Stoll (1989) and Huang and Stoll (1997) (3-way decomposition).  
 
An important side-benefit of the spread decomposition models is their ability to 
estimate the effective bid-ask spread just from the trade price and trade direction 
data and with no need of the quoted bid-ask spread data, as opposed to the 
benchmark method (used for estimation of the effective bid-ask spread in Chapter 
4). These models have also an advantage over the Roll model of the effective bid-ask 
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spread as they take into account all three sources of the spread (order processing 
costs, inventory holding costs, and asymmetric information costs) whereas the Roll 
model assumes only order processing costs. 
 
The Covariance-Based Spread Decomposition Models 
 
The covariance-based models estimate the spread components based on the serial 
covariances of trade prices or bid-ask quotations. 
One of the most frequently sited in literature covariance-based model is the model 
by Stoll (1989). 
Stoll (1989) starts his analysis with studying the stock price development under 
alternative spread models. In case of the pure order processing cost model, and 
assuming no public information shocks, transactions will occur at the bid or ask 
prices, and these prices will not change in time (Roll (1984)). Stoll (1989) models the 
pure order processing cost model by assigning an expected value to two 
parameters, ∂ and π. ∂ is related to the size of a price reversal, which is given by (1-
∂)S, where S is the spread and 0≤∂≤1. The probability of a price reversal is given by 
π. Under the pure order processing view of the spread, prices simply move between 
the bid and the ask, and the price reversal is equal to the spread (∂=0). In these 
models, it is usually assumed that the inflow of orders is such that the probability of 
a purchase equals the probability of a sale (π=0.5).  
If the spread reflects inventory holding costs, dealers will change the position of the 
spread relative to the "true" price in order to induce public transactions that would 
balance the inventory position of the dealer: the bid and ask prices will be raised 
after a purchase in order to induce more sales, while the bid and ask prices will be 
lowered after a sale in order to induce more purchases (Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll 
(1981)). A similar adjustment of prices will be performed by dealers in case of 
presence of the asymmetric information costs, but for a different reason. After a 
purchase, bid and ask prices will be raised because the transaction conveys 
information that the expected equilibrium price of the security is higher. Similarly, a 
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sale conveys information that causes the dealer to lower the quoted price (Copeland 
and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Stoll (1989) argues that the 
difference in the reason of price change in the two models will result in different 
values of π. In case of the inventory holding cost model, the adjustment of prices is 
intended to modify the probability of a transaction in one direction or the other and, 
as a result, the probability of the price reversal should exceed 0.5. In case of the 
asymmetric information cost model, the probability of price reversal should equal  
0.5 since the dealers will set such bid and ask prices that will result in the 
probability of a purchase and probability of a sale to be equal.  
 
Based on the values of the probable price changes after a purchase and after a sale, 
Stoll works out the values of the new bid and ask prices posted by the dealers and 
finds the covariances of price changes. For estimating the model, Stoll utilizes the 
relation between the bid-ask spread and the covariances of the consecutive price 
changes developed by Roll (1984). By regressing the bid-ask spread on the 
covariances, Stoll is able to estimate the parameters ∂ and π.   
Further, based on the value of the realized spread (a concept in Stoll (1989) similar 
to the effective spread) and the estimated values of ∂ and π, Stoll decomposes the 
quoted bid-ask spread into its three components: order processing cost, inventory 
holding cost, and asymmetric information cost. 
 
Stoll applies data on nearly 750 stocks traded on Nasdaq and estimates the model 
separately for each of the months of October, November, and December 1984. The 
theoretical model assumes application of intraday quotations and prices, though the 
limitations with the data constrain Stoll to applying data on the daily level of 
frequency.  
Stoll finds that the average realized spread (the actual profit earned by the broker) is 
57% of the quoted spread. The remaining 43% are lost due to the adverse stock price 
movement in response to the information learned from the direction of the previous 
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trade. This part of the bid-ask spread is referred to as the asymmetric information 
component.  
The realized spread is then decomposed into the inventory holding and the order 
processing costs. The decomposition is based on the assumption that market maker  
will adjust his quotes upwards (downwards) by half-value of the quoted spread 
following each buy (sell) trade in order to balance his inventory position. Stoll finds 
that the inventory holding cost is 10% of the quoted spread, and the remaining 47% 
of the quoted spread is the order processing cost. 
Stoll runs additional tests to check whether the covariances of price changes and 
quote changes depend on some characteristics of the stocks other than the main 
determinant of the model, which is the quoted bid-ask spread. He includes such 
stock characteristics as average stock price during the month, average daily 
turnover, average daily volume of trading, and the average number of the market 
makers in a stock and finds that the additional stock characteristics do not play a 
significant role in explaining a stock price behaviour. The finding is predictable  
though, since most of the above mentioned variables are the determinants of the 
bid-ask spread (Harris, 2003, Ch. 14) and their inclusion in the regression, therefore, 
is not expected to increase the regression's explanatory power.  
Stoll (1989) does not view the asymmetric information component as a part of 
realized spread but considers the asymmetric information component to be a 
difference between quoted and realized spread, while the inventory holding and the 
order processing cost components are the constituents of the realized spread. This 
differentiates the Stoll’s (1989) approach from the approach of Glosten and Harris 
(1988), Huang and Stoll (1997), and Madhavan, Richardson, Roomans (1997) that 
consider the asymmetric information component, as well as  the inventory holding 






The Findings of the Trade Indicator Models of Decomposition of the Bid-Ask 
Spread 
 
One of the first trade indicator models was suggested by Glosten and Harris (1988) 
(further referred to as GH). The model allows decomposition of the bid-ask spread 
into the asymmetric information component and the transitory component (the sum 
of the order processing and the inventory holding costs of the brokers). The micro 
foundations of the decomposition lie in the earlier analysis by Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O'Hara (1987) that investigated 
the information content of trades and showed that the order flow of trades for a 
stock can reveal to the market private information about the stock. GH start 
developing their spread decomposition model with defining the true, or 
fundamental, stock price. They suggest that the true stock price at period t equals 
the sum of the stock price at the previous period, the public information shock at 
period t, and a permanent change in price due the private information learned by 
brokers from the order flow (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Following Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987), GH assume that a broker does not 
know whether the incoming order is submitted by an informed or an uninformed 
trader and therefore adjusts his view of the fundamental price only by a certain 
amount, which is positive if the incoming order is a purchase, and negative if it is a 
sale. The value of the adjustment is the asymmetric information component of the 
bid-ask spread. Since the fundamental price is not observed and only purchase and 
sale prices are observed instead, GH add the bid-ask bounce to the fundamental 
price, which captures the order processing costs and the inventory holding costs of 
the brokers and is referred to as a transitory component of the bid-ask spread. The 
transitory component is incorporated through the trade indicator variable, which 
takes value 1 if a trade was a purchase and -1 if a trade was a sale. 
The model takes into account the influence of trade size on the components of the 
spread. Similar to the previous theoretical papers of Easley and O'Hara (1987)  and 
Glosten (1987), the model of GH assumes that the asymmetric information spread 
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component should increase with the quantity traded. An informed trader aims at 
maximizing his return on information that loses its value over time. The peculiarity 
of the GH approach is that it models the asymmetric information component as a 
linear function of the trade size. 
Introduction of first differences in the stock price development model makes the 
model exactly identified and allows estimation of the asymmetric information and 
the transitory components. 
 
To empirically test the model, GH apply the maximum likelihood estimation 
method and employ data on 20 NYSE common stocks chosen in the alphabetical 
order for the period of 1981-1983.  For each stock they select about 700 successive 
price changes. These correspond to approximately three weeks of trading for the 
most actively traded stocks and ten months for the least actively traded ones. 
GH find that the average round trip spread for a trade of 1,000 shares is $0.075 per 
share. A trade of 10,000 shares is more expensive, its round trip spread is $0.310 per 
share. The empirical results have shown no dependence of the transitory component 
on the trade size. The differences in the value of the spreads for smaller and larger 
trades are due solely to the asymmetric information costs and the direction of the 
relation between the asymmetric information component and the trade size was 
found positive, as it was expected. For a trade of 1,000 shares, the share of 
asymmetric information component is 35.5% of the effective spread, and for a trade 
of 10,000 shares it is 84.6% of the effective spread. If take into account that majority 
of the trades in a stock market are small and medium-sized trades, the estimate of 
the asymmetric information component of GH is, on average, close to that found in 
Stoll (1989). 
GH note that their estimate of the asymmetric information component is identical to 
the estimates of the permanent price change following a large trade found in other 
literature (Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987)). 
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The model of Huang and Stoll (1997) (further referred to as HS) suggest another 
way of decomposing the bid-ask spread. The analysis of the model allows 
separating the sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding cost 
components of the bid-ask spread from the order processing cost. The approach of 
HS model is similar to that of GH model. The analysis starts with defining the 
fundamental unobserved stock price, which, as in Glosten and Harris (1988), equals 
the sum of the previous period stock price, the public information shock, and the 
private information learned from the order flow (the asymmetric information 
component). Though, as opposed to GH, HS model formally incorporates the 
inventory holding costs of the brokers. According to the inventory theories of the 
spread (Ho and Stoll (1981) and Stoll (1978)), brokers adjust their quote midpoint 
relative to the fundamental price by a certain proportion to induce trades that will 
balance their inventory position. Therefore, the HS model suggests that the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread is the sum of the fundamental price of a stock and a 
portion of the half-spread attributable to the inventory holding costs. Then, by 
assuming that the bid-ask spread is constant, HS add bid-ask bounce to the 
midpoint (through the trade indicator variable, which takes a value of 1 if a trade 
was a purchase and -1 if a trade was a sale) and present a model of the stock price 
development.   
 
HS also study the dependence of the spread components on the order size. Though, 
opposed to GH, the trade size indicators are not modelled through a linear 
relationship to the value of the spread but are applied in the form of dummy 
variables. This allows capturing the influence of the order size on the spread 
components without any assumptions about the mathematical form of the 
relationship.  
 
To test the model, the data on 19 largest and most frequently traded stocks in NYSE 
during 1992 is applied. The number of observations across the stocks ranges from 
165 to 715 trades per day.  
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The sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding costs 
components range across stocks from 1.9% to 22.3% of the effective (called "traded" 
in HS) spread. The remaining part of the traded spread, 98.1% and 77.7%, 
respectively, is the order processing cost. Given the presumption in numerous 
models that the asymmetric information is a large component of the spread, the 
relatively small estimates of the sum of the asymmetric information and the 
inventory holding cost components are surprising. Though the result seems to be 
reasonable if attention is paid to the dataset employed in HS. As the model by 
Easley et al. (1996) predicts, the risk of information-based trading is lower for active 
securities than for infrequently traded securities. Since the dataset in HS includes 
only liquid NYSE stocks, it is expected that relatively more uninformed traders are 
present for the stocks, which should reduce the probability for a market maker to 
trade with an informed trader and therefore reduce the asymmetric information 
component of the spread. 
The estimates of the spread components relative to the size of trade are also smaller 
than those in GH. For small trades, asymmetric information and inventory holding 
components account, on average, for 3.3% of the traded spread. This increases to 
21.7% for medium-sized trades and further doubles to almost 43% for large trades. 
The small coefficients found for the sum of asymmetric information and inventory 
holding components when the estimation was done without taking into account the 
trade size, suggest that the estimates are heavily influenced by small trades, which 
occur much more frequently. The considerable difference in the components 
estimates for different trade sizes highlights the importance of estimating the 
components of the bid-ask spread taking into account the size of trade. 
 
HS also suggest a 3-way decomposition of the bid-ask spread, which allows to 
separate all the three spread components. The separate decomposition of the 
asymmetric information component and the inventory holding components is based 
on the fact that inventory effects induce negative serial correlation in trade prices. If 
there was a purchase (sale) at t-1, a market maker would make a downward 
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(upward) revision in his posted bid and ask quotes in order to induce trades in the 
opposite direction and due to this to balance his inventory position. Therefore, the 
conditional probability that a trade at t is opposite in sign to a trade at t-1, is 
different from 0.5.  The market is assumed to know the probability of a purchase 
(sale) at time t given the trade direction at t-1 and to take it into account when 
building the expectations about the future stock prices. This allows to distinguish 
between the asymmetric information and the inventory holding cost components in 
the model.  
Though the 3-way decomposition did not bring any plausible results. The 
asymmetric information component was found negative for all the stocks with the 
average value of -3.1%. A negative value of a spread component is not in line with 
the theory and does not have a meaningful interpretation.  
 
The spread decomposition model suggested in Madhavan, Richardson, Roomans 
(1997) (further referred to as MRR) allows estimating the asymmetric information 
component of the bid-ask spread and the sum of the inventory holding and the 
order processing cost components. The model is similar to the models of Glosten 
and Harris (1988) and Huang and Stoll (1997). It starts with setting an equation that 
determines the expected value of a stock and gradually incorporates the influence of 
asymmetric information on the stock price formation. The model differs from those 
of GH and HS by taking on additional parameters such as the probability that a 
transaction takes place inside the spread, and the autocorrelation of the order flow. 
The dataset includes 274 NYSE-listed stocks over 1990 with a high frequency 
intraday trading data, which allows MRR to study the development of the bid-ask 
spread and the information asymmetry during a trading day. MRR estimate the 
model for five intervals during a day25 and find that the asymmetric information 
component of the effective bid-ask spread drops sharply after the opening half-hour 
interval and remains at its level until the final period where it increases slightly. A 
                                                
25 The intervals are the following: 9.30-10.00, 10.00-11.30, 11.30-14.00, 14.00-15.30, and 15.30-
16.00. 
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decline in the bid-ask spread represents less reliance on the signal content of the 
order flow during the day. This can be explained either as a greater reliance of the 
market makers on prior beliefs (the beliefs established in the beginning of the day) 
or larger percentage of liquidity traders during the day. The asymmetric 
information component changes from 4.2 cents (54.7% of the effective bid-ask 
spread) in the beginning of the day to 2.9 cents (38.4% of the effective bid-ask 
spread) in the end of the day. 
The estimate of the asymmetric information component is much higher than in 
Huang and Stoll (1997) and similar to the estimate of Glosten and Harris (1988) for 
the medium-sized trades. 
The intraday patterns of the asymmetric information cost, and the dealer's overall 
trading cost rule the spread's behaviour. In the beginning of the day, information 
asymmetries are large, and, consequently, the spread is wide. During the day, 
asymmetries are resolved through price discovery, which narrows the spreads. 
Toward the end of the day, the asymmetric information component is small but the 
overall cost of trading is higher (possibly reflecting the risks of carrying inventory 
overnight). 
 
The spread decomposition models discussed above were developed for the NYSE, 
an exchange with a "hybrid"  trading system. A "hybrid"  trading system combines 
consolidated electronic order books and obligatory quotes by designated market 
makers. The market makers are obliged to post quotes at which they must be 
prepared to trade. Some of the stock exchanges (like f.i. Paris Bourse and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange) have a pure electronic limit order book trading systems, a system 
with no designated market makers. In such systems the inventory holding 
component is not relevant any more and the spread decomposition models are often 
estimated under assumption that the inventory holding component equals to zero 




The spread decomposition models have also been applied to decompose the bid-ask 
spread in the Eastern European emerging stock markets. Some of the peculiarities of 
these markets are low trading frequency, low level of information disclosure, and 
high level of informed trading, which urge the brokers to post wider bid-ask 
spreads.  Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) decompose the bid-ask spread into three 
components using a modification of Huang and Stoll's (1997) model for the Czech 
stock market. They argue that Huang and Stoll's (1997) model in its original form 
holds only for a single-dealer market structure, like NYSE. For a multiple-dealer 
market structure (like Nasdaq or Prague stock exchange), market-makers behave 
differently due to the less demanding inventory rebalancing needs. In competitive 
dealer trading systems market makers may react significantly weaker to general 
trading pressure because general trading pressure falls not on a single specialist but 
is instead dispersed among a larger capital base of multiple competing dealers. But, 
as Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) notice, during the unusual periods of serious 
selling or buying pressure, inventory rebalancing trades between dealers increase 
sharply, which urges many dealers in the market to revise bid and ask quotes due to 
inventory reasons. 
Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) find that asymmetric information component takes 
only 17% of the effective bid-ask spread. The low value of the component given the 
evidence of a high level of informed trading in the Prague stock exchange was 
found surprising. All the estimates of the asymmetric information component for 
individual stocks were statistically significant and varied between 13% and 22%. 
 
To our best knowledge, the only study of the spread components available for the 
Ukrainian stock market is Ryzhkov (2007).  Ryzhkov (2007) applies the Hanousek 
and Podpiera (2003) variation of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model for a cross-
section of 10 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The study finds that 
the asymmetric information component ranges from 5.9% to 16.3% across the stocks, 
with an average value of 10%, and is significantly different from zero for five out of 
the ten stocks examined. The inventory holding cost component is insignificantly 
 191 
different from zero for the majority of the stocks. The remaining 90% of the bid-ask 
spread, on average, is attributed to the order processing cost. The low estimate of 
the asymmetric information spread component seems to be inadequate to the scope 
of informed trading in the Ukrainian stock market. Ryzhkov (2007) suggests that the 
result can be caused by the fact that a large portion of equity trades in Ukraine 
cannot be included in the study because they are not registered timely in the trading 
system. Due to this, the dataset may not include many of the really informed trades. 
When accounting for the trade size, Ryzhkov (2007) finds that the asymmetric 
information spread component falls with the trade size. 
 
Relation Between the Asymmetric Information and the Inventory Holding Cost 
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Both inventory models and the asymmetric information models predict that prices 
move in the direction of order flow but the reasons of the movement are different, 
which results in a predicted temporary price change in case of inventory theory and 
a predicted permanent price change in case of asymmetric information theory.   
 
Inventory theory (Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981)) sees the market maker as a 
trader who is willing to change his desired proportion of stock holdings in order to 
fill the trading orders of other market participants. A diversion from the desired 
level of inventory creates a risk for the market-maker, for which he expects to be 
compensated. The costs of the risk are reflected in the bid-ask spreads that the 
market-maker posts. In inventory models, the market maker faces a complex 
problem of balancing his inventory aiming at mitigating considerable deviations 
from the desired inventory level resulting in random inflows and outflows of stocks. 
For this, a market maker increases (decreases) the midquote following a purchase 
(sale) in order to induce trades in the opposite direction. These deviations are, by 
assumption, unrelated to the future value of the stock, and therefore are irrelevant 
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in the long-run. So, the market maker's effect on price is always temporary and 
prices move back to their "true" level if the inventory is balanced. 
 
Asymmetric information theory suggests that under assumption of presence of both 
informed and uninformed traders in the market, purchases are seen by brokers as  
possible signals of positive information about a stock, while sales – as possible 
signals of negative information about a stock. As a result, following a purchase, 
brokers review their beliefs about the true stock value upwards, while following a 
sale, brokers review their beliefs about the true stock value downwards. 
Consequently, private information implied from the order flow results in 
permanent change in price. 
 
Based on the property that the inventory effects are temporary while the 
asymmetric information effects are permanent, researchers separate the inventory 
holding and the asymmetric information components of the bid-ask spread 
(Hasbrouck (1991) and Huang and Stoll (1997)). Though for reliable differentiation 
of the inventory holding cost component, it is important to specify what the desired 
level of inventory is for a broker, what factors (if any) can change it, and how a 
dealer translates his optimal inventory strategy into prices, which is quite a complex 
problem that has not been closely addressed in the existing literature yet (O'Hara, 
1998). If a dealer, for example, trades for speculative reasons, his desired level of 
inventory may vary not only in the short-run but also in the long-run. Madhavan 
and Smidt (1991) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find that dealers are willing to 
depart from their preferred inventory positions over longer (several weeks) cycles, a 
behaviour that has not been predicted by the available spread decomposition 
models. Simplicity of current inventory models may result in difficulties in reliable 





Critique to the Spread Decomposition Models  
 
Spread decomposition models are a well-developed and an established area in the 
microstructure research, nevertheless they have not escaped serious criticism. A 
number of papers call into question whether spread decomposition models actually 
measure what they claim to measure. For example, Van Ness et al. (2001) examine 
the performance of five spread decomposition models by comparing the asymmetric 
information component estimates to other measures of information asymmetry: 
volatility, analysts’ forecast errors, dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and 
others. They also compare the asymmetric information component estimates to two 
measures of informed trading: the number of analysts that follow the stock and the 
percentage of shares owned by institutions. They find that asymmetric information 
components appear unrelated to the measures of uncertainty, and conclude that the 
asymmetric information models measure the level of asymmetric information 
weakly at best. 
Neal and Wheatley (1998) do not find any significant difference between the 
asymmetric information spread components estimated for closed-end funds and for 
a matched sample of common stocks. This result seems puzzling for the authors 
who predicted lower asymmetric information for closed-end funds, because they 
report their net asset values weekly, which eliminates uncertainty about their 
current liquidation value. According to Neal and Wheatley (1998), this suggests that 
the spread decomposition models can be misspecified.  
Low estimated value of the asymmetric information component together with the 
widely discussed facts of high information content of trades in the Prague stock 
exchange and in the Ukrainian stock exchange (PFTS) (Hanousek and Podpiera 
(2000) and Ryzhkov (2007)) contribute to the view of low ability of asymmetric 
information spread component to measure the information asymmetry in the stock 
markets.  
Despite abundant spread decomposition studies, current literature has not yet 
settled on the issue of the relative importance of each of the three spread 
 194 
components – the adverse selection, the inventory holding, and the order processing 
cost.  
 
Spread Decomposition Models Applied in the Thesis 
 
A wide selection of spread decomposition models were developed in literature. This 
requires from an empirical researcher a close consideration of what models to 
choose for an empirical study of a particular market. Among the most frequently 
cited and applied in empirical literature models are the original models by Stoll 
(1989), Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll (1997), and Madhavan, 
Richardson, and Roomans (1997). With time spread decomposition literature grew 
with other researchers building up on or suggesting some modifications to the 
models. For example, George et al. (1991) argued that the spread estimates of the 
Stoll (1989) model were downward biased, because they did not take into account 
the time variation in expected returns and suggested a new approach that used a 
spread measure based on the serial covariance of the difference between transaction 
returns and returns using bid prices. Serednyakov (2005) criticized the Stoll (1989) 
and the Huang and Stoll (1997) (three-way decomposition version) models for 
giving, in many cases, results that cannot be reasonably interpreted as spread 
components. The models required the order flow to be negatively autocorrelated in 
order for the component estimates to make economic sense, though in practice, 
order flow can often be persistent as buy (sell) orders may tend to be followed by 
buy (sell) orders. Taking this into consideration, Serednyakov (2005) built up on the 
model of Stoll (1989) and suggested a new model of the three-way decomposition of 
the bid-ask spread. Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) created a variation of the Huang 
and Stoll (1997) model that was more suitable for the multiple-dealer market 
structure of the Prague Stock Exchange as opposed to the single-dealer market 
structure of NYSE, for which the original model was designed.  
Despite trying to improve the original models, the "improved" versions of the 
original models had their own limitations. For example, George et al. (1991) model 
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allowed to decompose the bid-ask spread in only two components, the order 
processing cost and the asymmetric information cost, while the model of Stoll (1989) 
allowed to decompose the bid-ask spread into all three components. In Serednyakov 
(2005) estimates of the spread components for some stocks still did not have 
economic sense because of their negative sign. The model of Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2003) is similar to the Huang and Stoll (1997) model under assumption of 
zero inventory holding cost. 
 
In spite of the range of modifications to the models of Stoll (1989), Glosten and 
Harris (1988), and Huang and Stoll (1997), recent empirical literature seems to give 
preference to the original models (Clarke and Shastri (2000), Van Ness et al. (2001), 
Silva and Chavez (2002), Declerk (2002), De Winne and Majois (2003), and Henker 
and Martens (2003)).  
Taking into account that the models of Stoll (1989), Glosten and Harris (1988), and 
Huang and Stoll (1997) suit to the Ukrainian stock market because of the similar 
stock market structure in Ukraine and in the U.S., in our research we also chose to 
apply these models. The models named above were developed for a dealership 
market structure of Nasdaq and hybrid market structure of NYSE, where specialists 
post quotes based on their beliefs about the true value of a stock and taking into 
account their inventory positions. Ukrainian stock market is a dealership markets 
and has a similar process of stock price formation. Brokers post quotes and are 
believed to revise them based on their believes about the true value of a stock and 








6.3. Methodology of the Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition 
 
Stoll (1989) Model 
 
Stoll (1989) aims at finding the realized spread based on which the quoted spread 
can be decomposed into its components. The realized bid-ask spread is the average 
difference between the price at which a dealer sells at one point in time and the 
price at which a dealer buys at an earlier point in time. Usually realized spread is 
smaller than quoted spread due to the adverse stock price movements following a 
trade. 
Let S denote the constant bid-ask spread set by a dealer for a stock. If A is the 
specialist’s ask price and B is the bid price, then S = A-B. The model assumes that 
transactions can only occur at the dealer bid or ask. It is assumed that no new 
information arises in the market place, other than that conveyed by the transaction 
itself. If the spread reflects only order processing cost, A and B are set symmetrically 
relative to the "true" price and remain unchanged for each transaction. Sequences of 
purchases at the bid price are ultimately offset by sequences of sales at ask price. 
This is the model suggested by Roll (1984). 
If the spread reflects the inventory holding cost, dealers tend to set bid and ask 
prices that are not symmetrical relative to the "true" price in order to induce public 
transactions that would balance the inventory position of the dealer. Bid and ask 
prices are lowered after a dealer purchase in order to induce dealer sales and raised  
after a dealer sale in order to induce dealer purchases. It is assumed that inventory 
costs are linear in inventory and symmetric with respect to purchases and sales. 
This implies that price changes are symmetric (not to confuse with the fact that bid 
and ask are asymmetric in respect to the "true" price). The bid and ask prices fall by 
0.5S after a purchase and increase by 0.5S after a sale. This process implies that the 
dealer makes 0.5S if a trade is reversed. Over time, the dealer has a balanced 
inventory position because his price adjustments increase the probability of 
transactions that eliminate inventory the dealer has acquired.  
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A is ask price, B is bid price,  π is probability of a price reversal,  ∂ is 
amount of a price continuation as a fraction of the spread, S. The subscripts 
of 0 and 1 refer to the periods 0 and 1 respectively. 
If the spread reflects asymmetric information costs, after a purchase (sale) 
transaction bid and ask prices shift in the same manner as in the case of inventory 
adjustment but for a different reason. A purchase (sale) transaction conveys 
information that the expected equilibrium price of the security is higher (lower). 
The inventory and the asymmetric information models imply that the realized 
spread earned by a dealer is less than the spread quoted by the dealer. 
 
Suppose there is a transaction at B0 (a sale) (see Figure 6.1).  Following the 
transaction the specialist will adjust his bid and ask quotes downward to A1 and B1 
by ∂S, 0 ≤ ∂ ≤ 1, where ∂ is a fraction of spread by which dealer adjusts the previous 
(at t0) price in case of trade continuation. Dealers adjust their quotes due to two 
reasons. First, in order to induce inventory equilibrating trades, and second, in 
order to earn from the uninformed traders what they lose to the informed traders. 
 
Figure 6.1. Possible sequences of transaction prices starting at the bid price.  
 
Let π denote the probability of trade reversal (the probability that a transaction at 
the ask (bid) is followed by a transaction at the bid (ask)). Then 1-π is the probability 
of trade continuation. Under the pure order processing view of the spread π = 0.5 
and ∂ = 0. Under the pure inventory holding cost view of the spread the specialist 
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adjusts the quotes by half of the spread so that to induce inventory equilibrating 
trades (∂ = 0.5) and, therefore, the probability of a trade reversal is greater than 0.5 
(0.5<π <1). In case of pure asymmetric information cost view of the spread, the 
spread is determined by the probability that informed traders will trade with the 
dealer. Because of the price adjustment mechanism aimed at balancing dealer's 
losses from informed traders with gains from uninformed traders (developed in 
Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), the price reversal is 
half the magnitude of the spread and is equal to the price continuation (∂ =0.5). On 
the basis of the information conveyed by the last trade, prices are such that the 
probability of a purchase equals the probability of a sale (π = 0.5). 
 
Under the assumption of constant spread, the possible price changes after a sale are: 
i) if the sale is followed by a buy, then price will change by  
 
S)1(BA 1tt ∂−=− −  with probability π     (6.1) 
 
ii) if the sale is followed by a sale, then price will change by 
 
SBB 1tt −∂=− −  with probability π−1     (6.2) 
 
Then the expected price change conditional on a sale transaction is: 
 
S)()S)(1(S)1()BP(E 1tt ∂−=−∂−+∂−=− πππ∆   (6.3) 
 
Under the assumption of symmetry, the expected price change conditional on a 
purchase transaction is: 
 
S)()AP(E 1tt ∂−−=− π∆      (6.4) 
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The difference between (3) and (4) gives the value of the realized spread: 
 
S)(2adalizedSpreRe ∂−= π
      
(6.5) 
 
The relationship for the realized spread is the corner stone of the Stoll model. 
For an illustration of why the realized spread equals the difference of the 
conditional expected price changes, see Appendix 6.1. 
 
Based on the information on the values of the quoted and realized spreads the 
asymmetric information spread component can be found. The realized spread, 
which is the expected profit per trade, covers only the order processing costs and 
inventory holding costs. If quoted spread was made up of asymmetric information 
cost alone, the expected gross profit per trade would be zero. The asymmetric 
information component of the quoted spread is thus the difference between the 
quoted spread S and the realized spread:  
 
))(21( component n   informatio   Asymmetric ∂−−= πS
   
(6.5.1) 
 
Further, the realized spread can be decomposed into the order processing costs and 
inventory holding costs. Under the inventory holding cost view of the spread 
5.0=∂ . Using this value of ∂  and the estimated value of π , it is possible to 
compute the realized spread in the absence of the order processing costs, which is 
the inventory holding cost component:  
 
S)5.0(2  component  cost  holding Inventory −= π




It is important to mention that the inventory holding cost component of the spread 
compensates the dealer for bearing the risk resulting from a loss of diversification 
and is not a compensation for a normal risk associated with holding a security. The 
latter is earned by holding the security.  
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The order processing cost component of the spread is the remainder of the realized 
spread after subtracting the inventory holding cost component: 
 
S)21(  component  cost  processing  Order ∂−=
   
(6.5.3) 
 
The transaction price and quote data allow estimating the parameters π and ∂ . The 
estimation is done following the approach suggested by Roll (1984) by finding the 
covariances of price changes and covariances of quote changes: 
 
)]21()21([S)P,Pcov(cov 2221ttT ∂−−−∂=≡ − ππ∆∆   (6.6) 
 
)21(S)Q,Qcov(cov 221ttQ π∆∆ −∂=≡ −  , Q equals either A or B.    (6.7) 
 
Where Pt is  the transaction price at time t, At and Bt are the quoted ask and bid 
prices at time t. 
 
Under the assumption of a constant spread, Qcov  can be calculated either from bid 
price changes as )B,Bcov(cov 1ttB −≡ ∆∆ , or from ask price changes, as 
)A,Acov(cov 1ttA −≡ ∆∆ . 
To find the coefficients of the interest empirically, both covariances are regressed 
against a cross-section of the squared quoted spreads S in the following regression 
form: 
 
uSaacov 210T ++=      (6.8) 
vSbbcov 210Q ++=  ,       Q equals either A or B.    (6.9) 
 
where u and v are random errors and  
)21()21(a 221 ∂−−−∂= ππ     (6.10) 
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)21(b 21 π−∂=      (6.11) 
Under the assumption of market efficiency, parameters a0 and b0 should be equal to 
zero. The estimates of 1a and 1b  allow then to find the coefficients ∂ (magnitude of a 
price change expressed as a fraction of the spread), and π (the probability of price 
reversal). 
Equations (6.8) and (6.9) are estimated by applying OLS method. 
 
Since the estimation of the model is based on the principal assumption that the 
direction of previous trade causes a change in the quoted bid and ask prices issued 
following the trade, the estimation of the model implies application of intraday 
trade and quote data. The dataset available in Stoll (1989) contains data at a lower, 
daily frequency. Application of daily data can lead to distortions in the estimates of 
the spread components so as a big portion of information on the process of price 
formation and the influence of the previous trade on the next quote will be lost. 
Nevertheless, unavailability of data at a higher frequency forces Stoll (1989) to 
empirically test his model with the data at daily frequency. 
There is some criticism to the Stoll (1989) model.  George, Kaul, and Nimalendran 
(1991) argue that Stoll's estimates may be biased since they are nonlinear 
transformations of the linear parameters, which were obtained from regressing 
covariances of price changes and quote revisions on mean spreads. 
 
 
Glosten and Harris (1988) Model 
 
Glosten and Harris (1988) suggest a model that allows to estimate two spread 
components: the transitory component (the sum of the order processing cost and the 
inventory holding cost components) and the asymmetric information component. 
 
An important contribution of the model is that it takes into account the influence of 
the order size on the components of the spread. 
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The "true", or fundamental, value of a stock develops through a process that is 
driven by the arrival of new public information and the information a broker learns 
from the direction of the incoming order: 
 
ttt1tt ZQFF ε++= −      (6.12) 
 
Where Ft is the unobserved true value of a stock, which reflects all the publicly 
available information immediately following a transaction at time t (this price 
includes any information revealed by that transaction); Qt - unobserved trade 
indicator variable, it takes value 1 if  the transaction t was initiated by a buyer and -1 
if by a seller; Zt – asymmetric information spread component; tε  - unobserved 
innovation in the ‘true’ values between transactions at t-1 and t due to the arrival of 
new public information about the stock. (Some notations in equation (6.12) are 
different from the original notations in Glosten and Harris (1988) in order to keep 
the model comparable to the other models discussed in this chapter. In the original 
model mt is used instead of Ft ).  
 
Since a broker does not know whether the next order is submitted by informed or 
uninformed trader, he makes only a certain adjustment in his beliefs about the true 
value of the stock, which is positive if  the incoming order is a purchase and 
negative if it is a sale. This adjustment is the asymmetric information spread 
component. 
Since the broker incurs costs related to the processing of orders, he trades at such 
prices that would allow him to cover the costs: 
 
tttt CQFP +=     (6.13) 
 
where Pt is the observed price and Ct is the transitory spread component.  
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Following Easley and O'Hara (1987), the model assumes that the asymmetric 
information spread component increases with the quantity traded. The asymmetric 
information and the transitory spread components are assumed to be linear 
functions of the trade size: 
 
t10t VzzZ +=      (6.14) 
t10t VccC +=      (6.15) 
where z0 and c0 are constants, z1 and c1 are the slope coefficients, and Vt is trade 
volume. 
It is expected that the equation (6.14) has zero intercept and a positive slope. Since it 
is unlikely that a small trade is initiated by an informed trader, its execution should 
lead to little revision in expectations. Therefore, the intercept, z0, is expected to be 
zero. Theoretical models by Easely and O'Hara (1987) and Glosten (1989) argue that 
the asymmetric information spread component should increase with the quantity 
traded because well-informed traders are interested in maximizing their return on 
information that looses value over time. Therefore, the slope, z1, is expected to be 
positive. 
Theoretical explanations concerning the expected coefficients for equation (6.15) are 
ambiguous. Overall, the transitory component has to be positive since brokers do 
incur inventory holding and order processing costs. Though the sign of the volume 
coefficient c1 depends on whether per-share transitory costs have decreasing, 
constant, or increasing pattern in order size. If the pattern is constant, c0 will be 
positive and c1 will be zero. If it is increasing (when with larger trades a broker takes 
on a higher inventory risk, as the inventory models suggest), c1 will be positive. If it 
is decreasing (when either variable costs of trading decrease with the trade size or 
there are substantial fixed costs), c1 will be negative. 
With the NYSE data, Glosten and Harris (1988) find that the model with z0=0 and 
c1=0 is the most appropriate specification. It thus suggests that the volume 




By taking the first difference of equation (6.13) and combining it with the equations 
(6.12), (6.14), and (6.15) the main equation of the model is obtained: 
 
ttt1t0tt1t0t VQzQz)VQ(cQcP ε∆∆∆ ++++=   (6.16) 
 
To better understand the development of the price process, let us consider an 
example. If a buy trade at time t-1 is followed by another buy trade at time t, the ask 
price that a broker will set for the time t order will grow by: 
 
tt10t1t VzzVcP ε∆∆ +++=      (6.17) 
 
The empirical results of GH showed that c1 is not significantly different from zero 
(the transitory component does not depend on the trade size). This leaves the 
equation (6.17) with: 
 
tt10t VzzP ε∆ ++=       (6.18) 
 
So, if the incoming trade is a buy, a broker will react to this information by 
increasing the stock price  by the amount of the asymmetric information spread 
component plus the public information shock. 
 
If a sale trade is followed by a buy trade, the price rise will equal the sum of the 
asymmetric information spread component and the public information shock plus 
the part that refers to the bid-ask bounce and equals the doubled transitory spread 
component: 
 
tt100t )Vzz(c2P ε∆ +++=      (6.18.1) 
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Defining V  as the average transaction size, the effective bid-ask spread is found as: 
 
)Vzz(2)Vcc(2S 1010 +++=     (6.19), 
 
The adverse selection component expressed as a fraction of the spread, can be found 








=α    (6.20) 
 
The sum of the inventory holding and the order processing components as a 
fraction of the spread is doubled equation (6.15) divided by the equation (6.19) and 









10   (6.21) 
 
By inserting the appropriate values of V , the spread components can be estimated 
for different trade sizes. 
 
Basic Huang and Stoll (1997) Model 
 
Similar to Glosten and Harris (1988), the development of the Huang and Stoll (1997) 
model starts with establishing a relationship for the stock price development in 
time.  Let S denote the traded (a concept identical to "effective") bid-ask spread, 
which is assumed not to vary in time. Then new information shifts the true value of 
a stock by a certain fixed value 
2
Sα  due to the information learned by a broker 
from the direction of previous trade and due to a serially uncorrelated public 




FF εα ++= −−     (6.22) 
Where Ft is the unobservable fundamental value of the stock in the absence of 
transaction costs; it is determined just prior to the posting of the bid and ask quotes 
at time t, S   is the constant spread, α  is the percentage of the half-spread 
attributable to adverse selection, Qt   is the buy-sell trade indicator variable for a 
transaction at time t . It equals 1 if a transaction is buyer initiated (occurs above the 
midquote), -1 if a transaction is seller initiated (occurs below the midquote), and 0 if 
the transaction occurs at the midquote, and tε   is serially uncorrelated public 
information shock. (Some of the original notations used in Huang and Stoll (1997) 
are changed in order to keep the model comparable to other models discussed in 
this chapter. In the original model Vt is used instead of Ft ). 
 
Huang and Stoll (1997) pay close attention to the modelling of the inventory holding 
spread component. While Ft is a hypothetical construct, the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread, Mt, is observable. According to the inventory theories of the spread, 
liquidity suppliers adjust the quote midpoint relative to the fundamental value on 
the basis of accumulated inventory in order to induce inventory equilibrating trades 
(Ho and Stoll (1981) and Stoll (1978)). The adjustment will depend on the direction 
of previous trades executed by the market maker. Assuming that past trades are of a 











FM β     (6.23) 
 






iQ   is the cumulated inventory from the market open until time t-1, and Q1 
is the initial inventory for the day.  
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In the absence of any inventory holding costs, there would be a one-to-one mapping 
between Ft, and Mt. Equation (6.23) is valid for bid or ask quotes as well as for the 
midquote. 
The first difference of equation (6.23) combined with the equation (6.22) implies that 
quotes are adjusted to reflect the information revealed by the previous trade and to 




)(M εβα∆ ++= −    (6.24) 
 




MP η++=     (6.25) 
 
Where the error term tη  captures the deviation of the observed half-spread, Pt - Mt, 
from the constant half-spread, S/2, and includes rounding errors associated with 
price discreteness. 
By substitution of the expression for Mt (Equation (6.23)) into (6.25), the following 










FP ηβ +++= ∑
−
=
  (6.25.1) 
 
Expression (6.25.1) can be related to the equation (6.13) of the Glosten and Harris 
(1988) model. The two models have identical approaches to defining the ask (bid) 
stock price. The price equals the "true" value of the stock plus (minus) the sum of the 
inventory holding and the order processing costs. (Note: at this stage the model of 
Huang and Stoll already incorporates the public information shock while the model 
of Glosten and Harris yet does not). Though the models differ in the way of 
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modelling the two costs. Huang and Stoll (1997) assume that the inventory holding 
cost depends on the direction of all previous trades during a day and that the order 
processing cost is a fixed portion of the traded spread. Whereas Glosten and Harris 
(1988) do not model inventory holding cost separately from the order processing 
cost and allow the costs vary with the order size (Equation (6.15)). 
 
By taking the first difference of the Equation (6.25) and combining it with the 







P +++= −βα∆∆   (6.26) 
 
Where ttte η∆ε += . 
 
The only explanatory variable in the model is the trade indicator variable. By 
estimating the model the traded half-spread, S/2, and the sum of the asymmetric 
information and the inventory holding cost components (α+β) can be found. 
On the basis of Equation (6.26) alone the adverse selection (α) and the inventory 
holding (β) components cannot be separately identified. However the order 
processing component can be found as (1-(α+β)). 
 
An interesting point to consider is the difference in the error terms in the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) and the Glosten and Harris (1988) models. Since the spread in the 
Huang and Stoll (1997) model is assumed to be constant, the error term, te , captures 
both the public information shock and the deviation of the observed spread from 
the constant spread. There is no need for the latter in the Glosten and Harris (1988) 
model since the spread is not assumed to be constant and its variation is captured 
by the order size variable. So, the error term tε  in Glosten and Harris (1988) 
accounts only for the public information shock, whereas in Huang and Stoll (1997), 
additionally to capturing the public information shock, it also captures the deviation 
of the observed spread from the constant spread. 
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To better understand the development of the price process in the Huang and Stoll 
(1997) model, let us consider an example. If a trade at time  t-1 was a purchase and it 
was followed by another purchase at time t, the trade price at t will increase relative 




)(P ++= βα∆   (6.27) 
 
So, the price will grow by the value of the combined asymmetric information and 
inventory holding spread components plus the error term te .  
 
If a sale trade is followed by a buy trade, additionally to the factors showed in (6.27), 
the new price will also include a shift from a sale to a purchase, which equals to the 










The example also shows an important difference in the assumptions about the way 
of learning the information from the trades in the Glosten and Harris (1988) and 
Huang and Stoll (1997) models. In Glosten and Harris (1988) a market maker learns 
from the incoming trade, while in Huang and Stoll (1997) he learns from the past 
trade. So, if there is a sequence sale-buy (buy-sell), asymmetric information trade 
component leads to a price rise (fall) in the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, and to 







Huang and Stoll (1997) Model With Accounting for Trade Size 
 
As an extension to the basic model, Huang and Stoll (1997) allow different estimates 
for the sum of the information and inventory holding cost components depending 
on the trade size. Three trade size categories are chosen and the equation (6.26) is 






































P +−++−++−+= −−− λλλ∆





t QD =  if the trade t was of small size 
       0=  otherwise; 
t
m
t QD =  if the trade t was of medium size 
       0=  otherwise; 
t
l
t QD =  if the trade t was of large size 
       0=  otherwise. 
Superscripts s, m, and l define the size for small, medium, and large trades 
correspondently; S is the quoted bid-ask spread; λ is the sum of the asymmetric 
information and the inventory holding cost components, et is the error term. 
In Huang and Stoll (1997) small trades are those of less than or equal to 1,000 shares; 
medium-sized trades are trades of more than 1,000 but less than 10,000 shares; and 
the trades of 10,000 shares or more are considered as large trades. 
Unlike in the basic model of Huang and Stoll (1997), the parameter estimates do not 
depend on the sequence of all previous trades. The trade price at time t depends on 





Huang and Stoll (1997) Model: Three-Way Decomposition 
 
To distinguish the adverse selection (α) and inventory (β) components of the traded 
spread, Huang and Stoll (1997) apply the fact that, under inventory models, changes 
in quotes influence the subsequent arrival rate of trades. After a public sale 
(purchase) at the bid (ask), the dealer will increase (decrease) the bid (ask) quote 
relative to the fundamental stock price in order to increase the probability of arrival 
of a public purchase (sale) (see, e.g., Ho and Stoll (1981)). The dealer will then be 
compensated for inventory risk because the expected midquote change is positive 
after a dealer sale and negative after a dealer purchase. Therefore, the probability of 
a purchase (sale) is greater than 0.5 just after a sale (purchase). Such behaviour of 
brokers, under the inventory model, will induce negative serial covariance in trades 
(Qt). As trades reverse, quotes reverse. Consequently, under the inventory models 
negative serial correlation in quote changes (as well as in trades) is induced. This 
implication is used to identify the inventory component.  
 
Equations (6.22)-(6.26) make no assumption about the probability of trades and 
therefore cannot distinguish inventory and adverse information effects. The model 
is modified to reflect the serial correlation in trade flows. The conditional 
expectation of the trade indicator at time t-1 (Qt-1), given the trade indicator at time 
t-2 (Qt-2), can be shown to be: 
 
2t2t1t Q)21()QQ(E −−− −= π     (6.30) 
 
Where π is the probability that the trade at t is opposite in sign to the trade at t-1. 
Once π is allowed to differ from one-half, Equation (6.22) has to be modified to 
account for the predictable information contained in the trade at time t-2. On the 
assumption that the market knows the Equation (6.30), the change in the 








F επαα∆ +−−= −−   (6.31) 
 
Where the second term on the right-hand side subtracts the information in the 
transaction t-1 that is not a surprise. When π = 0.5, the sign of the trade is totally 
unpredictable and Equation (6.31) reduces to Equation (6.22).  







)(M επαβα∆ +−−+= −−  (6.32) 
 
It is important to mention that to get Equation (6.32), Equation (6.23) is used directly 
without modification for the expected sign of the trade. There is inventory risk only 
when inventory is acquired (even if the inventory change was expected), and there 
is no inventory risk if inventory is not acquired (even if the lack of inventory change 
was unexpected). Consequently quote adjustments for inventory reasons depend on 
actual trades, not trade surprises. This distinction is what allows to estimate 
separately the inventory and adverse information components.  










P επαβα∆ +−−−++= −−   (6.33) 
 
which is analogous to equation (6.26). The traded spread S, the three components of 
the spread α, β, and (1-α-β), and the probability of a trade reversal π can be found by 







6.4. Estimation Procedure 
 
The Stoll (1989) model is estimated using OLS procedure. The step by step 
estimation of the model is presented in the Results section of the chapter. 
 
The models of Huang and Stoll (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) can be 
estimated by procedures that impose strong distributional assumptions on the error 
term such as maximum-likelihood (ML) or least squares (LS) methods. Though 
Huang and Stoll (1997) opts for a generalized method of moments (GMM). GMM is 
a robust estimator and, unlike maximum likelihood estimation, it does not require 
information of the exact distribution of the disturbances. This is especially 
important because the error term, et, includes rounding errors. The GMM procedure 
also accounts for the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation of an unknown form, which are likely to be present in the time 
series of stock prices. 
GMM estimation is based upon the assumption that the disturbances in the 
equations are uncorrelated with a set of instrumental variables. The GMM estimator 
selects parameter estimates so that the correlations between the instruments and 
disturbances are as close to zero as possible. By choosing the weighting matrix in 
the criterion function appropriately, GMM provides parameter estimates that are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. 
Many standard estimators can be set up as special cases of GMM. For example, the 
ordinary least squares estimator can be viewed as a GMM estimator, if the 
explanatory variables in the model are uncorrelated with the residual. 
 
Let f(xt, w) be a vector function such that for estimating the basic model (Equation 













)w,x(f     (6.34) 
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where w = (Sλ)' is the vector of parameters of interest. 
 
The basic model implies the orthogonality conditions 0)]w,x(f[E t = . Under the 
GMM procedure, the parameter estimates chosen are those that minimize the 
criterion function: 
 
)w(gS)'w(g)w(J TTTT =    (6.35) 
 
where )w(gT  is the sample mean of )w,x(f t , and ST is a sample symmetric 
weighting matrix. Hansen (1982) proves that, under weak regularity conditions, the 
GMM estimator Tŵ  is consistent and  
 


















ED t0     (6.38) 
])'w,x(f)w,x(f[ES tt0 =   (6.39) 
 
The basic model is exactly identified.  











Estimation Results of the Stoll (1989) Model 
 
Stoll estimates the model based on a short time period (one month) but a wide 
cross-section of stocks. His sample includes stocks with at least 15 observations for a 
month and accounts for approximately 800 stocks.  In our estimation we have a 
shorter cross-section of stocks (15) but will apply a longer time-series of 
observations for each of the stocks, the period of the first six months of 2006. To 
estimate the model of Stoll (1989), we apply a six-month period of 2006 rather than a 
two-year period of 2005-2006 in order to get more accurate estimates of the model. 
The model of Stoll assumes a fixed bid-ask spread, on the contrary to the  Huang 
and Stoll (1997) and the Glosten and Harris (1988) models. During 2005-2006 the 
Ukrainian stock market was developing actively, liquidity of stocks grew 
considerably and, as a consequence, the bid-ask spreads were becoming smaller. An 
assumption of fixed bid-ask spread during 2005-2006 would be very unrealistic and 
could have resulted in biased estimates of the Stoll model.  
 
Following Stoll, daily closing prices and quotations are applied for estimating the 
model. 
In order to allow for comparisons across stocks, we follow Stoll (1989) and apply 
spreads and covariances in proportional terms rather than in the money terms. The 
use of relative terms means that in equations (6.6) and (6.7) the returns 
corresponding to tP∆ , tB∆ , and tA∆  are applied.  
To estimate the model we first compute the following variables: the covariance 
Tcov , the two versions of Qcov , which are Bcov  and Acov , and the proportional 
quoted bid-ask spread S, which is the difference between best closing ask and bid 
quotations divided by the midpoint of the quotations. The quotations data is 
available daily but there were days during the first half of 2006 when no trades were 
recorded for some stocks. In order to keep consistency in the estimates of Tcov  and 
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Qcov , quotations data are used only for those days when at least one trade was 
recorded. The results of the computations are reported in Table 6.1.  
 
All the serial covariances of the closing prices ( Tcov ) are negative. The sign was 
expected because of the presence of the bid-ask bounce in the daily closing prices (it 
is equally likely that a day can close with a purchase and that it can close with a 
sale). The magnitude of the serial relation can be easier assessed if the correlation 
coefficients are considered instead of the covariances. The correlation coefficients 
corresponding to the covariances vary from -13.9% for MZVM  to -42.1% for UNAF 
with an average value of -30.2%.  The numbers show a strong negative serial 
relation between the closing prices. 
 
Table 6.1. The estimates of the covariances and the inside spread for the Stoll 
(1989) model.  
 
The estimates are based on daily data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during the first 
half of 2006. In order to keep consistency in the estimates of covariances, quotations data are 
used only for those days when at least one trade was recorded. 
Tcov  is the serial covariance of daily closing transaction prices, Bcov  is the serial covariance 
of daily closing inside bid quotes, Acov  is the serial covariance of daily closing inside ask 










1 AZST -85.28 -0.45 0.03 7.46% 84 
2 BAVL -5.82 0.02 -0.59 6.65% 76 
3 CEEN -3.48 -1.17 -0.08 7.94% 72 
4 DTRZ -9.96 -0.25 -0.31 8.51% 76 
5 LTPL -9.22 0.08 -0.05 8.02% 91 
6 MMKI -13.44 0.30 -0.15 5.95% 66 
7 MZVM -1.87 0.22 0.02 8.22% 74 
8 NITR -1.77 -0.18 -0.30 5.23% 78 
9 PGOK -368.30 0.32 0.37 8.22% 66 
10 SMASH -70.61 -0.80 1.74 9.40% 70 
11 STIR -27.52 0.61 -0.48 8.22% 56 
12 UNAF -75.62 0.00 0.01 4.24% 96 
13 UTEL -5.04 -0.01 -0.02 3.32% 106 
14 ZAEN -23.14 0.07 -0.11 5.16% 65 




Serial covariances of bid ( Bcov ) and ask ( Acov ) quotes have a variation in sign 
across the stocks. Since there is no bid-ask bounce in a sequence of bid (ask) prices, 
serial covariance of their changes depends solely on the information content of 
trades. If positive and negative news alternate over a period of time, serial 
covariance will tend to have a negative value. If one kind of news prevails over a 
period of time, serial covariance will tend to have a positive value. Again, to assess 
the strength of the serial relation, the correlations of the quotations are considered 
instead of covariances. The serial relation is very weak, the average correlation 
coefficient is -0.5% for the bid quotes and -0.6% for the ask quotes across the 
Ukrainian stocks. This gives the evidence that the previous day closing quote has a 
very low influence on the next day closing quote. It is very probable if the 
information content of the closing quote is absorbed by the next day opening 
quotes. A much weaker serial relation between quotations compared to the serial 
relation between trade prices is also found in Stoll (1989). 
 
Then, the regressions (6.8) and (6.9) are estimated with the cross-sectional 
covariances and spreads data to find the coefficients a1 and b1.. The estimation results 
are presented in Table 6.2. All the estimates for the three regressions are not 
significantly different from zero at 10% significance level. Very low adjusted R-
squared of the regressions (0.3%, -4.9%, and 6.2%) imply that the serial covariances 
across the stocks have low interrelation with the quoted bid-ask spread.  
 
Stoll (1989) finds similar results for the regressions with the quotes ( Bcov  and Acov ). 
For both bid quote and ask quote regressions, the coefficients b0 and b1 are found 
insignificantly different from zero with the adjusted R-squared of 0.0039 and 0.0018 
respectively. Though the covT  regression in Stoll (1989) has a higher explanatory 
power with the coefficient a1 significantly different from zero and the adjusted R-
squared of 0.30. 
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Table 6.2. Results of estimation of regressions (6.8) and (6.9) of the Stoll (1989) 
model. 
The table presents the estimates of Equations (6.8) and (6.9). The estimates are based on daily 
data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during the first half of 2006.  
The parameters k0 and k1 are estimates of a0 and a1 in uSaacov 210T ++= , and  are 









k0 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value of t-stat 0.92 0.84 0.25 
k1 -0.8763 -0.0025 0.0066 
P-value of t-stat 0.33 0.57 0.19 
Adjusted R2 0.0031 -0.0491 0.0615 
 
 
The estimates of a1 and b1 are substituted into the system of equations (6.10) and 
(6.11) to find ∂ and π . The Mathematica package is used to solve the system. There 
are 5 solutions to the system: 
 
( =∂ -1.24195, =π 0.50081) 
( =∂ -0.0569278, =π 0.88571) 
( =∂ 0.000283702 -0.0295221i, =π 0.933817+0.0275599i) 
( =∂ 0.000283702 +0.0295221i, =π -0.933817-0.0275599i) 
( =∂ 0.0507091, =π 0.986114) 
 
Two of the solution have negative values of ∂ , another two give irrational values of 







The estimates of ∂  and π  allow to find the value of the realized spread and the 
values of each of the spread components. The average realized spread is found by 
substitution of ∂ and π into equation (6.5): 
 
S94.0S)0.05-0.99(2adalizedSpreRe ==  
 
The realized spread comprises 94% of the quoted spread.  
The asymmetric information and inventory holding cost components of the spread 
are found by substitution of the estimated coefficients into equations (6.5.1) and 
(6.5.2) respectively. The value of the components are 0.06S, or 6% of the quoted 
spread and 0.49S, or 49% of the quoted spread respectively. 
The order processing cost component is the remainder of the realized spread after 
subtracting the inventory holding cost component and has value of 0.45S, or 45% of 
the quoted spread.  
 
The critique of the Stoll (1989) model suggests that the estimates of the model may 
be biased, firstly, because the model assumes constant bid-ask spread, which is 
often not true, and secondly, because the estimates of the model are nonlinear 
transformations of the linear parameters obtained from regressing covariances of 
price changes and quote changes on mean spreads (George, Kaul, and Nimalendran 
(1991) and Huang and Stoll (1997)), namely, the linear estimates of the coefficients a1 
and b1 are applied for solving a non-linear system of Equations (6.10) and (6.11). 
  
In order to check the validity of the Stoll model estimates, the probability of trade 
reversal is calculated directly from the sequence of trades and then compared to the 
probability of trade reversal found by applying the Stoll model. The value of the 
parameter calculated directly from the sequence of trades is 0.3460, which is much 
lower than 0.9861 estimated from the Stoll model. Since the asymmetric information 
component and the inventory holding cost component in the Stoll model rely 
heavily on the probability of trade reversal, the components estimates can be biased. 
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The asymmetric information component is in inverse relation to the probability of 
trade reversal, therefore if the latter is overestimated, the former will be  
underestimated. The inventory holding component is proportional to the 
probability of trade reversal, therefore if the latter is overestimated, the former will 
be overestimated. As a result, the asymmetric information component in our 
estimation of the Stoll model is likely to be underestimated, while the inventory 
holding cost is likely to be  overestimated. This bias is likely to be a consequence of 
nonlinear transformations of the linear parameters a1 and b1 in the Stoll model. 
 
Table 6.3. Comparison of the estimates of the spread components from the Stoll 

















From -9% to 92%, 
depending on a 
stock. 
Average: 43% 
From -66% to 60%, 




Holding Cost  
49% 10% 
From 1% to 76%, 
depending on a 
stock. 
Average: 35% 
From -12% to 81%, 







From -15% to 
48%, depending 
on a stock. 
Average: 22% 
From 39% to 87%, 
depending on a 
stock. 
Average: 58% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
1 In the chapter, data for 15 most traded Ukrainian stocks for January-June 2006 is applied. 
2 Stoll (1989) uses data on more than 700 NASDAQ stocks for October, November, and 
December 1984. 
3 De Winne and Majois (2004) use data on 19 most traded Belgian stocks from Bel20 index for 
October-December 2002. 
4 Serednyakov (2005) uses data on 20 NYSE stocks comprising the Major Market Index 
(MMI) for three years: 1996, 1999, and 2002. 
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The comparison of our estimates of the spread components with the estimates found 
in other literature are presented in Table 6.3. The empirical results show that the 
value of the components vary greatly across the markets and across the individual 
stocks. For example, the asymmetric information component is 4% for 20 stocks 
comprising the Major Market Index in NYSE, 43% for a large cross-section of 
Nasdaq stocks, and 43% for a sample of 19 most traded Belgian stocks. For the 
individual stocks some of the components have negative values, which is not in line 
with the theoretical predictions of the Stoll (1989) model. 
 
Estimation Results of the Huang & Stoll (1997) Model 
 
The Huang and Stoll (1997) model allows finding the traded half-spread, S/2 and the 
sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding cost components of 
the bid-ask spread, λ. The model is estimated for the 15 most liquid Ukrainian 
stocks during 2005-2006. 
 
The estimates of the Huang and Stoll (1997) trade indicator model (Equation (6.26)) 
are presented in Table 6.4. Following Huang and Stoll (1997), the model is estimated 
using the GMM method (Generalized Method of Moments). The method of 
estimation is chosen because it provides estimates robust to both heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form. Eviews 5 package is used for estimation. The 
row "Total" in the Table 6.4 shows the coefficients found  from estimating Equation 
(6.26)) based on pooled data for all the companies in the sample.  
 
The adjusted R-squared of the regressions is quite high and ranges from 8.9% to 
42.3%. The estimates in Table 6.4 are expressed in the absolute (monetary) terms. 
The values of the relative traded half-spread and the sum of the asymmetric 
information and inventory holding components as a percentage of the bid-ask 
spread, λ,  are presented in Table 6.5. Relative traded spread is found as a ratio of 
Ukrainian hryvna traded half-spread S/2 to the average price for a stock over the 
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period under consideration. The coefficient λ is found as a ratio of the coefficient (λ-
1)S/2 to the coefficient S/2. The standard error of λ is calculated using the formula 
for the standard error of a ratio of two uncorrelated variables26: 
 



















































  (6.34) 
 
where f and g are two variables, { }fsd and { }gsd  are the standard deviations of f 
and g respectively, and N is the number of observations. 
 
Table 6.4. Estimation results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model. 
The table presents results of estimating Equation (6.26). The model is estimated for 15 most 
liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The estimated Ukrainian hryvnya (UAH) traded 
half-spread (S/2) and the coefficient λ(S/2) are shown as well as the value of the adjusted R-
squared. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, and * 
indicates significance level at 10%. 
 
Traded half-spread S/2, UAH Coefficient λ (S/2), UAH 









1 AZST 462 0.3680 0.0650*** 0.0041 15.81 0.0000 0.0124** 0.0048 2.57 0.0104 
2 BAVL 440 0.3168 0.0088*** 0.0007 13.26 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 0.36 0.7198 
3 DNEN 188 0.3217 7.9398*** 0.9393 8.45 0.0000 0.4626 1.1388 0.41 0.6850 
4 DTRZ 273 0.2556 4.0307*** 0.4506 8.95 0.0000 0.4135 0.5465 0.76 0.4499 
5 LTPL 484 0.3907 0.0470*** 0.0035 13.37 0.0000 0.0057* 0.0030 1.89 0.0592 
6 MZVM 389 0.4168 1.1975*** 0.0798 15.00 0.0000 0.1285 0.0990 1.30 0.1949 
7 NITR 359 0.2662 0.7472*** 0.0668 11.18 0.0000 0.1246 0.0766 1.63 0.1047 
8 PGOK 252 0.4160 1.3913*** 0.1257 11.07 0.0000 -0.0741 0.1578 -0.47 0.6392 
9 SMASH 375 0.2484 0.3864*** 0.0437 8.85 0.0000 -0.0364 0.0562 -0.65 0.5177 
10 STIR 251 0.2569 2.4989*** 0.2829 8.83 0.0000 0.2938 0.3232 0.91 0.3641 
11 UNAF 564 0.1899 2.3751*** 0.2132 11.14 0.0000 0.3203 0.2376 1.35 0.1782 
12 USCB 222 0.0889 0.0833*** 0.0190 4.38 0.0000 0.0035 0.0214 0.16 0.8704 
13 UTEL 805 0.3658 0.0132*** 0.0007 19.69 0.0000 0.0014* 0.0008 1.69 0.0920 
14 ZAEN 320 0.3964 2.7315*** 0.2121 12.88 0.0000 0.2485 0.2650 0.94 0.3491 
15 ZPST 570 0.4230 0.1092*** 0.0063 17.25 0.0000 0.0073 0.0084 0.88 0.3815 
  Total 5,975 0.0913 1.2794*** 0.4266 3.00 0.0027 0.2249* 0.1341 1.68 0.0935 
                                                
26 λ is a share of the bid-ask spread, which is assumed to be constant over a period of time. 
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Table 6.5. The estimates of the traded half-spread and the sum of the asymmetric 
information and the inventory holding cost components of the spread (Huang 
and Stoll (1997) model). 
The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. 
Relative traded half-spread is found as a ratio of the Ukrainian hryvnya traded half-spread 
(presented in the Table 6.4) to the average price for a stock over the period under 
consideration. λ is the share of the asymmetric information and inventory holding cost 
component in the traded spread. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates 
significance level at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%.  
 
Relative traded half-spread 
S/227 
λ, the sum of the 
asymmetric information and 
the inventory holding cost 
components   Company 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
1 AZST 2.52%*** 0.16% 19.07%*** 7.52% 
2 BAVL 1.97%*** 0.15% 2.94% 8.18% 
3 DNEN 2.08%*** 0.25% 5.83% 14.36% 
4 DTRZ 1.30%*** 0.15% 10.26% 13.61% 
5 LTPL 2.31%*** 0.18% 12.08%* 6.45% 
6 MZVM 2.24%*** 0.15% 10.73% 8.30% 
7 NITR 1.57%*** 0.14% 16.67% 10.36% 
8 PGOK 2.96%*** 0.27% -5.32% 11.36% 
9 SMASH 2.28%*** 0.26% -9.42% 14.59% 
10 STIR 2.42%*** 0.28% 11.76% 13.00% 
11 UNAF 0.91%*** 0.08% 13.48% 10.08% 
12 USCB 4.35%*** 1.00% 4.19% 25.68% 
13 UTEL 1.48%*** 0.08% 10.26%* 6.10% 
14 ZAEN 1.88%*** 0.15% 9.10% 9.73% 
15 ZPST 1.92%*** 0.11% 6.70% 7.66% 
  Total 1.83%*** 0.21% 17.58%*** 5.83% 
 
The value of the relative traded half-spread varies between 0.91% for UNAF and 
4.35% for USCB. All the estimates are significantly different from zero at 1% 
significance level. The traded half-spread for the cross-section of all stocks is 1.83% 
and is close to the estimate of the effective half-spread found using the benchmark 
method (2.17%) in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                
27 Relative traded half-spread is a ratio of the absolute traded half-spread to the spread midquote. 
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The value of λ, the sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding 
cost components, varies between -9.4% for SMASH and 19.1% for AZST. Most of the 
estimates are not significantly different from zero at 10% significance level. For the 
overall sample of stocks, λ is 17.6% and is significantly different from zero at 1% 
significance level. The estimate for the overall sample of stocks is significant 
probably due to the higher number of observations compared to the number of 
observations for individual stocks. The remaining part of the traded spread, 82.4%, 
is the order processing cost component. 
 
The sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding cost components 
found by applying the Stoll (1989) model, 55%, is much higher than the estimate 
found by applying the Huang & Stoll (1997) model. Taking into account the 
criticism in literature to the Stoll (1989) model, we tend to give less credence to the 
results from the Stoll (1989) model than to the results from the Huang & Stoll (1997) 
model. 
Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) argue that the inventory holding cost component in 
the markets with multiple dealers (like Ukrainian stock market) is zero because 
trading pressure does not fall on a single specialist but is instead dispersed among a 
larger capital base of multiple competing dealers. The value of the inventory 
holding cost component, which is close to zero, implies that the value of lambda of 
17.6% found from estimation of the Huang & Stoll (1997) model can be attributed 
solely to the asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread. A similar 
value of the asymmetric information component was found in Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2003) for the Prague Stock Exchange (17%) and in Ryzhkov (2007) for the 
Ukrainian stock market (10%). Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) consider such a low 
value of the asymmetric information component surprising given the evidence of a 
high level of informed trading in the Prague Stock Exchange (Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2002)). As insider trading is considered a serious risk in Ukraine with the 
practices of investigation and prosecution being limited (EBRD (2008 [1]), the 
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estimate of the asymmetric information component of just 17.6% seems to be too 
low. 
 
Estimation Results of the Huang & Stoll (1997) Model With Accounting for Trade 
Size 
 
Since the average trade size differs considerably across Ukrainian stocks, rather than 
applying absolute trade size, as it is done in Huang & Stoll (1997), relative trade size 
is applied. Relative trade size for each trade is calculated as a ratio of the trade size 
to the normal market size (NMS) for the stock (for more details on determination of 
trade size, see Chapter 3).  
The estimates of the Huang and Stoll (1997) trade indicator model with accounting 
for trade size (Equation (6.29)) are presented in Table 6.6. The explanatory power of 
the regressions is quite high with adjusted R-squared between 9.2% and 42.4%. 
Table 6.7 reports the inferred values of the relative traded half-spread and λ. The 
relative traded half-spread is found as a ratio of the Ukrainian hryvnya traded half-
spread S/2 to the average price for a stock over the period under consideration. λ is 
a ratio of coefficient (λ-1)S/2 to the coefficient S/2. Its standard error is calculated 
using formula (6.34). 
 
The relative traded half-spread has the same pattern for small, medium and large 
trades as the effective half-spread estimated using the benchmark method (Chapter 
4). The estimated values of the half-spread in Huang and Stoll (1997) model are very 
close, though slightly smaller than those of the benchmark method. Traded half-
spread is the smallest for the medium-sized trades (1.3%). They are followed by 
large trades (1.5%), and then small trades (1.7%). The estimates of the effective half-
spread using benchmark method were 1.9%, 2.1%, and 2.3% for medium-sized, 
large, and small trades respectively (Chapter 4). The comparison of the results 
shows that the Huang and Stoll (1997) model provides reliable estimates of the 
effective bid-ask spread. 
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For the overall sample, the estimate of λ, the sum of the asymmetric information and 
the inventory holding cost components of the bid-ask spread, is positive and 
significantly different from zero only for small trades, 15.7%. For individual stocks, 
the estimates of λ  for small trades are mostly insignificantly different from zero. 
Only for the stocks with larger number of observations (such as AZST, UTEL, and 
ZPST) lambdas tend to be significantly different from zero. 
For medium and large trades, lambdas are negative and not significantly different 
from zero both for the overall sample and for individual stocks. Huang and Stoll  
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Table 6.6. Estimation results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model with accounting for trade size. 
The table presents results of estimating Equation (6.29). The model is estimated for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The estimated 
Ukrainian hryvnya (UAH) traded half-spread (S/2) and the coefficient (λ-1)(S/2) are shown for the trades of small, medium, and large size, as well as the 
value of the adjusted R-squared. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
 
Traded half-spread S/2, UAH 
SMALL trades MEDIUM trades LARGE trades  Company Obs 
Adjusted 
R-sq 
Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. 
1 AZST 462 0.3817 0.0723*** 0.0047 15.45 0.0000 0.0458*** 0.0090 5.08 0.0000 0.0314** 0.0157 1.99 0.0467 
2 BAVL 440 0.3133 0.0088*** 0.0008 10.76 0.0000 0.0089*** 0.0015 5.88 0.0000 0.0089*** 0.0015 5.89 0.0000 
3 DNEN 188 0.3254 9.3210*** 1.1691 7.97 0.0000 5.9097*** 2.0679 2.86 0.0047 4.0771 2.4745 1.65 0.1009 
4 DTRZ 273 0.2473 4.0113*** 0.5521 7.26 0.0000 4.0891*** 0.8916 4.59 0.0000 3.9895** 1.5516 2.57 0.0106 
5 LTPL 507 0.3561 0.0483*** 0.0040 12.14 0.0000 0.0529*** 0.0078 6.82 0.0000 0.0309*** 0.0106 2.92 0.0037 
6 MZVM 389 0.4162 1.2066*** 0.0953 12.67 0.0000 1.0259*** 0.1717 5.97 0.0000 1.5454*** 0.2554 6.05 0.0000 
7 NITR 359 0.2654 0.8066*** 0.0815 9.90 0.0000 0.5896*** 0.1423 4.14 0.0000 0.6698*** 0.1759 3.81 0.0002 
8 PGOK 252 0.4216 1.6114*** 0.1533 10.51 0.0000 0.8554*** 0.2919 2.93 0.0037 1.0197*** 0.3427 2.98 0.0032 
9 SMASH 375 0.2440 0.3921*** 0.0520 7.54 0.0000 0.3770*** 0.1033 3.65 0.0003 0.3414** 0.1384 2.47 0.0140 
10 STIR 251 0.2729 2.8775*** 0.3525 8.16 0.0000 1.2727** 0.5992 2.12 0.0345 2.9802*** 0.7060 4.22 0.0000 
11 UNAF 564 0.1865 2.4918*** 0.2488 10.01 0.0000 1.9369*** 0.5813 3.33 0.0009 2.1516*** 0.5173 4.16 0.0000 
12 USCB 222 0.1341 0.1213*** 0.0082 14.85 0.0000 0.0980*** 0.0151 6.47 0.0000 0.1198*** 0.0240 5.00 0.0000 
13 UTEL 805 0.3694 0.0144*** 0.0008 18.53 0.0000 0.0108*** 0.0014 7.53 0.0000 0.0077*** 0.0027 2.86 0.0043 
14 ZAEN 320 0.3936 2.9084*** 0.2491 11.68 0.0000 2.3896*** 0.5457 4.38 0.0000 2.1274*** 0.6140 3.46 0.0006 
15 ZPST 570 0.4237 0.1177*** 0.0077 15.38 0.0000 0.0861*** 0.0131 6.57 0.0000 0.1041*** 0.0213 4.88 0.0000 





Table 6.6, cont. Estimation results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model with accounting for trade size. 
Coefficient, (λ-1)S/2, UAH 
SMALL trade MEDIUM trade LARGE trade  Company 
Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. 
1 AZST -0.0554*** 0.0047 -11.79 0.0000 -0.0356*** 0.0090 -3.96 0.0001 -0.0703*** 0.0159 -4.41 0.0000 
2 BAVL -0.0084*** 0.0008 -10.24 0.0000 -0.0078*** 0.0015 -5.19 0.0000 -0.0101*** 0.0015 -6.67 0.0000 
3 DNEN -7.5957*** 1.1565 -6.57 0.0000 -8.0056*** 2.0889 -3.83 0.0002 -7.0702*** 2.4996 -2.83 0.0051 
4 DTRZ -3.3786*** 0.5463 -6.18 0.0000 -4.1260*** 0.8968 -4.60 0.0000 -3.9068** 1.5879 -2.46 0.0144 
5 LTPL -0.0418*** 0.0040 -10.50 0.0000 -0.0570*** 0.0078 -7.35 0.0000 -0.0448*** 0.0106 -4.23 0.0000 
6 MZVM -1.1006*** 0.0961 -11.45 0.0000 -0.9393*** 0.1714 -5.48 0.0000 -1.1777*** 0.2511 -4.69 0.0000 
7 NITR -0.5760*** 0.0831 -6.93 0.0000 -0.6294*** 0.1397 -4.51 0.0000 -0.7836*** 0.1757 -4.46 0.0000 
8 PGOK -1.5176*** 0.1501 -10.11 0.0000 -1.5140*** 0.3002 -5.04 0.0000 -1.1899*** 0.3394 -3.51 0.0005 
9 SMASH -0.4000*** 0.0525 -7.62 0.0000 -0.5279*** 0.1021 -5.17 0.0000 -0.3940*** 0.1380 -2.85 0.0045 
10 STIR -2.5268*** 0.3541 -7.14 0.0000 -0.9995* 0.5969 -1.67 0.0951 -3.0426*** 0.7050 -4.32 0.0000 
11 UNAF -2.0664*** 0.2492 -8.29 0.0000 -1.8274*** 0.5818 -3.14 0.0018 -2.1750*** 0.5158 -4.22 0.0000 
12 USCB -0.1021*** 0.0082 -12.48 0.0000 -0.1222*** 0.0152 -8.0333 0.0000 -0.1023*** 0.0239 -4.28 0.0000 
13 UTEL -0.0119*** 0.0008 -15.40 0.0000 -0.0118*** 0.0014 -8.23 0.0000 -0.0112*** 0.0027 -4.15 0.0000 
14 ZAEN -2.4605*** 0.2484 -9.90 0.0000 -2.7533*** 0.5481 -5.02 0.0000 -2.3449*** 0.6129 -3.83 0.0002 
15 ZPST -0.1003*** 0.0077 -13.06 0.0000 -0.1061*** 0.0131 -8.08 0.0000 -0.0897*** 0.0213 -4.22 0.0000 







Table 6.7. Estimation results of the relative traded half-spreads and lambdas (the sum of the asymmetric information and the 
inventory holding cost components) with accounting for trade size (Huang and Stoll (1997) model).  
The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. Relative traded half-spread is found as a ratio of the Ukrainian 
hryvnya traded half-spread S/2 (presented in Table 6.6) to the average price for a stock over the period under consideration. λ is the share of the 
asymmetric information and inventory holding cost component in the traded spread. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level 
at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
Relative traded half-spread S/2 
λ, the sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory 
holding cost components of the bid-ask spread 
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 Company 
Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
1 AZST 2.81%*** 0.18% 1.78%*** 0.35% 1.22%*** 0.61% 23.36%*** 8.18% 22.23% 24.89% -124.18% 123.43% 
2 BAVL 1.96%*** 0.18% 1.97%*** 0.34% 1.98%*** 0.34% 5.13% 12.79% 11.69% 22.68% -13.42% 25.70% 
3 DNEN 2.44%*** 0.31% 1.55%*** 0.54% 1.07%*** 0.65% 18.51% 16.08% -35.47% 59.13% -73.41% 121.80% 
4 DTRZ 1.29%*** 0.18% 1.32%*** 0.29% 1.29%*** 0.50% 15.77% 17.89% -0.90% 31.06% 2.07% 55.09% 
5 LTPL 2.43%*** 0.20% 2.66%*** 0.39% 1.55%*** 0.53% 13.60% 10.88% -7.77% 21.56% -45.04% 60.39% 
6 MZVM 2.26%*** 0.18% 1.92%*** 0.32% 2.89%*** 0.48% 8.79% 10.74% 8.44% 22.67% 23.80% 20.56% 
7 NITR 1.70%*** 0.17% 1.24%*** 0.30% 1.41%*** 0.37% 28.59%** 12.57% -6.76% 35.01% -16.99% 40.41% 
8 PGOK 3.42%*** 0.33% 1.82%*** 0.62% 2.17%*** 0.73% 5.82% 12.93% -77.00% 69.85% -16.68% 51.43% 
9 SMASH 2.32%*** 0.31% 2.23%*** 0.61% 2.02%*** 0.82% -2.01% 19.04% -40.01% 46.95% -15.38% 61.82% 
10 STIR 2.78%*** 0.34% 1.23%*** 0.58% 2.88%*** 0.68% 12.19% 16.34% 21.46% 59.72% -2.09% 33.83% 
11 UNAF 0.95%*** 0.10% 0.74%*** 0.22% 0.82%*** 0.20% 17.07% 12.98% 5.66% 41.28% -1.09% 34.14% 
12 USCB 6.33%*** 0.47% 5.12%*** 0.81% 6.25%*** 1.27% 15.81%* 8.81% -24.62% 24.72% 14.58% 26.27% 
13 UTEL 1.60%*** 0.09% 1.20%*** 0.16% 0.86%*** 0.30% 16.86%** 7.02% -9.33% 19.68% -45.09% 61.65% 
14 ZAEN 2.00%*** 0.17% 1.64%*** 0.38% 1.46%*** 0.42% 15.40% 11.20% -15.22% 34.91% -10.22% 42.92% 
15 ZPST 2.07%*** 0.13% 1.51%*** 0.23% 1.83%*** 0.37% 14.77%* 8.56% -23.20% 24.18% 13.83% 26.99% 




(1997) expect that the asymmetric information and inventory holding costs should 
grow in trade size as large trades are expected to be more informative and to 
involve higher inventory holding risk. The expected result was found in Huang and 
Stoll (1997) for NYSE data: λ was estimated at 3.3% for small trades, 21.7% for 
medium trades, and 42.9% for large trades. We presume that negative and 
insignificantly different from zero lambdas for medium and large trades found for 
Ukrainian stocks are not a consequence of low information content of larger trades 
but rather a result of low power of the regression due to the low number of 
observations. While there were 4,794 small trades, the number of medium trades 
was lower by more than three times (1,333 observations), and the number of large 
trades was lower by more than six times (755 observations). A longer time-series 
data is necessary for finding reliable estimates of lambda for different trade sizes. 
Also, it is important to mention that the estimate of lambda for the overall sample is 
heavily dominated by the lambda for small trades due to the predominance of the 




Estimation Results of the Huang & Stoll (1997) Model: Three-Way Decomposition 
of the Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Table 6.8 reports the results of estimation of Equations (6.30) and (6.33), while Table 
6.9 reports the estimates of alpha, beta, and gamma inferred from the regression 
coefficients with their standard errors found by applying Formula (6.34). 
 
Most of the estimates of the asymmetric information component, alpha, are negative 
and not significantly different from zero. Negative coefficients do not have a 
rational explanation since alpha is a share of the bid-ask spread and therefore  
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Table 6.8. Estimation results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model of the three-way decomposition of the bid-ask spread. 
The table presents results of estimating Equations (6.30) and (6.33). The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-
2006. The estimated Ukrainian hryvna (UAH) traded half-spread (S/2) and the coefficient (Alpha+Beta-1)S/2 and -AlphaS/2(1-2Pi) are shown as well as 
the value of the adjusted R-squared. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
 







Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. 
1 AZST 461 0.3682 0.0658*** 0.0042 15.69 0.0000 -0.0514*** 0.0043 -12.07 0.0000 -0.0044 0.0042 -1.05 0.2964 
2 BAVL 439 0.3175 0.0087*** 0.0007 12.99 0.0000 -0.0088*** 0.0007 -12.43 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.85 0.3957 
3 DNEN 187 0.3216 7.8927*** 0.9509 8.30 0.0000 -7.6420*** 0.9727 -7.86 0.0000 0.8458 0.9509 0.89 0.3747 
4 DTRZ 272 0.2613 4.0829*** 0.4533 9.01 0.0000 -3.7239*** 0.4646 -8.01 0.0000 0.1690 0.4525 0.37 0.7091 
5 LTPL 506 0.1385 -0.0382*** 0.0039 -9.83 0.0000 0.0097** 0.0039 2.49 0.0131 0.0042 0.0039 1.09 0.2756 
6 MZVM 388 0.4167 1.1900*** 0.0809 14.72 0.0000 -1.0813*** 0.0818 -13.22 0.0000 0.0685 0.0809 0.85 0.3981 
7 NITR 358 0.2717 0.7297*** 0.0671 10.87 0.0000 -0.6655*** 0.0699 -9.52 0.0000 0.1278* 0.0673 1.90 0.0582 
8 PGOK 251 0.4193 1.4061*** 0.1265 11.11 0.0000 -1.4811*** 0.1287 -11.50 0.0000 0.0036 0.1263 0.03 0.9773 
9 SMASH 374 0.2546 0.3746*** 0.0440 8.52 0.0000 -0.4379*** 0.0442 -9.92 0.0000 0.1011** 0.0439 2.30 0.0218 
10 STIR 250 0.2558 2.5360*** 0.2930 8.66 0.0000 -2.1617*** 0.2954 -7.32 0.0000 -0.1967 0.2938 -0.67 0.5038 
11 UNAF 564 0.1910 2.3635*** 0.2138 11.05 0.0000 -2.1604*** 0.2272 -9.51 0.0000 0.2923 0.2138 1.37 0.1721 
12 USCB 221 0.0971 0.0807*** 0.0191 4.22 0.0000 -0.0918*** 0.0202 -4.55 0.0000 0.0351* 0.0192 1.83 0.0684 
13 UTEL 804 0.3653 0.0133*** 0.0007 19.54 0.0000 -0.0118*** 0.0007 -17.03 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.44 0.6593 
14 ZAEN 319 0.3986 2.6984*** 0.2128 12.68 0.0000 -2.5527*** 0.2168 -11.77 0.0000 0.2695 0.2131 1.26 0.2068 
15 ZPST 569 0.4243 0.1080*** 0.0064 16.92 0.0000 -0.1029*** 0.0064 -16.14 0.0000 0.0102 0.0064 1.60 0.1092 




Table 6.9. Estimation results for the relative traded half-spread and the three 
components of the spread (the Huang and Stoll (1997) model of the three-way 
decomposition of the bid-ask spread).  
The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The 
estimates are referred from the estimation results presented in Table 6.8. Standard errors are 
found by applying formula (6.34). Pi is the probability of trade reversal, alpha is asymmetric 
information component, beta is inventory holding cost component, and gamma is order 
processing cost component. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance 
level at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
 
Alpha Beta Gamma 
  
Company Pi 
Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
1 AZST 0.3481 21.95% 21.05% -0.03% 12.89% 78.08%** 33.94% 
2 BAVL 0.3021 -16.52% 19.48% 15.59%* 8.25% 100.93%*** 27.73% 
3 DNEN 0.3665 -40.14% 45.39% 43.32% 28.42% 96.82% 73.80% 
4 DTRZ 0.3727 -16.25% 43.56% 25.04% 28.32% 91.21% 71.88% 
5 LTPL 0.4094 61.25% 56.48% 13.23% 45.90% 25.52% 102.38% 
6 MZVM 0.3865 -25.34% 30.01% 34.47%* 20.77% 90.87%* 50.77% 
7 NITR 0.3318 -52.04%* 27.81% 60.85%*** 15.08% 91.19%** 42.89% 
8 PGOK 0.3953 -1.22% 42.89% -4.11% 29.72% 105.33% 72.61% 
9 SMASH 0.4150 -158.77%** 71.45% 141.87%*** 53.36% 116.90% 124.81% 
10 STIR 0.3322 23.11% 34.63% -8.35% 19.37% 85.24% 54.00% 
11 UNAF 0.3133 -33.11% 24.40% 41.70%*** 11.72% 91.41%*** 36.13% 
12 USCB 0.3218 -122.07%* 72.71% 108.26%*** 35.94% 113.81% 108.64% 
13 UTEL 0.3574 7.90% 17.93% 3.05% 10.99% 89.05%*** 28.92% 
14 ZAEN 0.3936 -46.94% 37.31% 52.34%** 26.34% 94.60% 63.64% 
15 ZPST 0.4358 -73.84% 46.24% 78.53%** 38.08% 95.31% 84.33% 
  Total 0.3664 -16.80% 16.48% 25.57%*** 1.59% 91.23%*** 18.07% 
 
cannot be negative. A similar result of the majority of the alphas being negative was 
also found in Huang and Stoll (1997) who admit that their three-way decomposition 
methodology does not seem to be able to correctly decompose the bid-ask spread 
into its three components.  Huang and Stoll (1997) explain that the result is due to 
the estimates of π (probability of trade reversal) that turn out to be less than 0.5. 
When π is less than 0.5, changes in tV∆  are attenuated, which becomes clear from 
examining Equation (6.31). When the change in the stock's underlying value in 
reaction to a trade is reduced (because the sign of the trade is anticipated), the 
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change in the stock's quote midpoint ascribed to inventory effects is increased. 
Consequently the net effect is in reduction of a (up to a negative value) and increase 
of β.  
Both the results of our estimation and the results in Huang and Stoll (1997) point at 
that the model of the three-way decomposition of the bid-ask spread is not able to 
correctly decompose the bid-ask spread into its three components. 
 
Estimation Results of the Glosten and Harris (1988) Model 
 
The model of Glosten and Harris (1988) is estimated for 15 most liquid Ukrainian 
stocks during 2005-2006. Table 6.10 presents the GMM estimates of the Glosten and 
Harris (1988) trade indicator model (equation (6.16)) for individual stocks and for 
the pooled sample of all stocks (presented in the row "Total" in the table). The 
regressions have quite high explanatory power with R-squared varying from 9.4% 
to 43.3%.  
 
The estimates of the constant part of the transitory component, c0, and of the 
asymmetric information component, z0, for the overall sample are positive and 
significantly different from zero at 1% significance level. Though the trade-size-
related constituents of the both spread components, c1 and z1, are insignificantly 
different from zero for the overall sample. This implies that the values of the 
transitory component and the asymmetric information component do not depend 
on the trade size. The results do not conform with the predictions of the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) model, where the bid-ask spread is expected to depend on the trade size.  
A possible reason of the problem can be a very high weight that large trades are 
allowed to exert on the coefficients in the GH model. Glosten and Harris (1988) 
point out that many of the very large trades are arranged off the floor and do not 
necessarily reflect all the information available at the time, when the trade was 
crossed. Therefore GH suggest to truncate all the large trades at their lower bound  
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Table 6.10. Estimation Results of the Glosten & Harris (1988) model, basic specification. 
 The table presents results of estimating Equation (6.16). The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The 
estimated Ukrainian hryvna (UAH) constituents of the order processing spread component (c0 and c1) and of the asymmetric information spread 
component (z0 and z1) are shown as well as the value of the adjusted R-squared. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 
5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
 






R-sq. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. Error t-stat Prob. Coeff. St. 
Error 




1 AZST 462 0.375 0.0499*** 0.0046 10.83 0.000 0.0738 0.0503 1.47 0.143 0.0189*** 0.0054 3.53 0.000 -0.1890*** 0.0697 -2.71 0.007 
2 BAVL 440 0.316 0.0083*** 0.0007 11.78 0.000 0.0002 0.0002 0.99 0.321 0.0005 0.0008 0.65 0.517 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.88 0.378 
3 DNEN 188 0.327 7.8725*** 1.0163 7.75 0.000 -245.00 345.00 -0.71 0.478 0.7823 1.2302 0.64 0.526 -340.00 517.00 -0.66 0.511 
4 DTRZ 273 0.251 3.5813*** 0.5076 7.06 0.000 41.60 317.00 0.13 0.896 0.3725 0.6042 0.62 0.538 58.90 441.00 0.13 0.894 
5 LTPL 507 0.356 0.0484*** 0.0033 14.48 0.000 -0.0099 0.0096 -1.03 0.302 0.0052 0.0044 1.18 0.237 -0.0077 0.0140 -0.55 0.583 
6 MZVM 389 0.415 1.0890*** 0.0847 12.86 0.000 -4.1600 6.9800 -0.60 0.552 0.0978 0.1072 0.91 0.362 6.7700 8.6700 0.78 0.436 
7 NITR 359 0.264 0.6083*** 0.0737 8.25 0.000 2.3600 4.4900 0.53 0.600 0.1521* 0.0860 1.77 0.078 -4.1700 5.8700 -0.71 0.477 
8 PGOK 252 0.412 1.4520*** 0.1352 10.74 0.000 1.5300 5.5300 0.28 0.783 -0.0662 0.1689 -0.39 0.695 -1.0600 7.5300 -0.14 0.888 
9 SMASH 375 0.246 0.4289*** 0.0473 9.06 0.000 -0.4670 1.9400 -0.24 0.810 -0.0274 0.0605 -0.45 0.651 -1.2000 2.4400 -0.49 0.622 
10 STIR 251 0.253 2.1468*** 0.2996 7.17 0.000 29.80 46.90 0.63 0.526 0.3119 0.3505 0.89 0.374 -6.8400 59.8000 -0.11 0.909 
11 UNAF 564 0.188 2.0537*** 0.2181 9.42 0.000 -1.83 19.20 -0.10 0.924 0.2996 0.2445 1.23 0.221 10.90 26.60 0.41 0.683 
12 USCB 222 0.089 0.0876*** 0.0204 4.31 0.000 -0.0319 0.0523 -0.61 0.543 0.0052 0.0229 0.23 0.819 -0.0398 0.0697 -0.57 0.568 
13 UTEL 805 0.367 0.0118*** 0.0007 15.87 0.000 0.0008 0.0027 0.30 0.767 0.0021** 0.0009 2.29 0.022 -0.0065* 0.0039 -1.66 0.097 
14 ZAEN 320 0.394 2.4467*** 0.2295 10.66 0.000 25.50 62.00 0.41 0.681 0.3131 0.2857 1.10 0.274 -51.50 82.10 -0.63 0.531 
15 ZPST 570 0.434 0.0899*** 0.0072 12.44 0.000 0.5140*** 0.1510 3.41 0.001 0.0118 0.0096 1.23 0.220 -0.2430 0.2100 -1.16 0.247 
  Total 5,975 0.094 1.1255*** 0.1279 8.80 0.000 -0.1250 0.0836 -1.50 0.134 0.1787*** 0.0566 3.16 0.002 0.0144 0.0792 0.18 0.856 
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of 10,000 shares.  That is, if a trade with size of 30,000 shares was executed, the 
truncated figure of 10,000 is to be used instead of 30,000.   
Since Ukrainian trades are quite large and 10,000 shares is often a normal trade size 
for many trades in Ukrainian stocks, we apply a different truncation rule. We 
truncate our data at 6 NMS, which is a lower bound for a large trade in our sample 
(more details on NMS can be found in Chapter 3 ). That is, if a trade is larger than 6 
NMS, the trade size corresponding to 6 NMS for the stock is applied instead of the 
actual size of the trade. 
 
The results of estimating the GH model with truncation are presented in Table 6.11. 
The values and significance of c0 and z0 coefficients stayed approximately the same 
as in the model without truncation (c0 had estimated value of 1.13 without 
truncation and 1.15 with truncation, while z0 had estimated value of 0.18 both 
without and with truncation). Though the coefficient c1 (the size-related constituent 
of the transitory spread component) was found significantly different from zero at 
1% significance level. The coefficient z1 (the size-related constituent of the 
asymmetric information spread component) stayed insignificantly different from 
zero. The finding suggest that per-share transitory costs are decreasing in the trade 
size, while the asymmetric information spread component does not depend on the 
trade size. 
 
Table 6.12 shows the effective half-spreads and the components of the spread 
inferred from the estimates of the GH model with truncation. The relative effective 
half-spread is found as a ratio of Equation (6.19) to the mean stock price divided by 
two. The coefficient α is found by substitution of the estimated coefficients into 
Equation (6.20); the coefficient (β+γ) is found as (1-α). 
The asymmetric information component α is 14.1% and is significantly different 
from zero at 5% significance level. For the individual stocks α varies between -9.6% 
and 29.3% and is not significantly different from zero. The statistical significance of  
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Table 6.11. Estimation Results of the Glosten & Harris (1988) model with truncation. 
The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. In order to avoid giving too much weight in the estimation to 
the block trades, the trade volume is truncated at 6NMS (normal market size). That is if a trade size is more than 6 NMS, the truncated figure that 
corresponds to 6NMS for a stock is used instead of actual trade size. The table presents results of estimating Equation (6.16). The estimated Ukrainian 
hryvnya (UAH) constituents of the order processing spread component (c0 and c1) and of the asymmetric information spread component (z0 and z1) 
are shown as well as the value of the adjusted R-squared. *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, and * indicates 
significance level at 10%. 
 









t-stat Prob. Coeff. 
St. 
Error 
t-stat Prob. Coeff. 
St. 
Error 




1 AZST 462 0.381 0.0530*** 0.006 9.50 0.000 0.0003 0.120 0.00 0.998 0.0252*** 0.007 3.84 0.000 -0.432*** 0.158 -2.74 0.006 
2 BAVL 440 0.318 0.0080*** 0.001 10.55 0.000 0.0012* 0.000 1.77 0.078 0.0006 0.001 0.77 0.440 -0.0010 0.001 -1.06 0.292 
3 DNEN 188 0.346 8.2327*** 1.286 6.40 0.000 -1337.00 2146 -0.62 0.534 2.5793 1.591 1.62 0.107 -5493.0* 2902 -1.89 0.060 
4 DTRZ 273 0.256 3.1849*** 0.621 5.13 0.000 914.00 879.0 1.04 0.299 0.3745 0.787 0.48 0.634 17.30 1204 0.01 0.989 
5 LTPL 507 0.237 0.0826*** 0.028 2.96 0.003 -0.0401 0.050 -0.80 0.425 0.0289 0.022 1.30 0.194 0.0995 0.089 1.12 0.263 
6 MZVM 389 0.415 1.0846*** 0.111 9.81 0.000 -5.8700 42.8 -0.14 0.891 0.0514 0.144 0.36 0.721 41.00 56.0 0.73 0.465 
7 NITR 359 0.268 0.5796*** 0.084 6.88 0.000 10.6000 13.3 0.80 0.424 0.2368** 0.101 2.34 0.020 -28.10* 16.5 -1.70 0.089 
8 PGOK 252 0.432 1.6496*** 0.173 9.54 0.000 -43.80* 26.2 -1.67 0.095 0.0965 0.224 0.43 0.666 -34.20 34.2 -1.00 0.317 
9 SMASH 375 0.246 0.4234*** 0.062 6.80 0.000 -0.0197 7.950 0.00 0.998 -0.0034 0.079 -0.04 0.966 -6.0600 10.0 -0.60 0.549 
10 STIR 251 0.254 2.1341*** 0.394 5.42 0.000 88.9000 276.0 0.32 0.748 0.5351 0.443 1.21 0.228 -269.00 335.0 -0.80 0.422 
11 UNAF 564 0.189 2.1145*** 0.264 8.01 0.000 -65.80 169.0 -0.39 0.697 0.3994 0.299 1.34 0.181 -85.60 195.0 -0.44 0.661 
12 USCB 222 0.132 0.1456*** 0.027 5.46 0.000 -1.070*** 0.340 -3.11 0.002 -0.0023 0.029 -0.08 0.938 0.0576 0.432 0.13 0.894 
13 UTEL 805 0.372 0.0118*** 0.001 12.56 0.000 0.0010 0.010 0.13 0.894 0.0036*** 0.001 3.04 0.003 -0.0251** 0.010 -2.57 0.010 
14 ZAEN 320 0.394 2.4007*** 0.286 8.38 0.000 128.00 294.0 0.44 0.662 0.4470 0.352 1.27 0.204 -317.00 368.0 -0.86 0.390 
15 ZPST 570 0.424 0.0937*** 0.009 10.24 0.000 0.4090 0.350 1.16 0.248 0.0231* 0.013 1.84 0.066 -0.817* 0.483 -1.69 0.091 
  Total 5,975 0.096 1.1508*** 0.129 8.93 0.000 -0.627*** 0.130 -4.69 0.000 0.1823*** 0.058 3.12 0.002 0.0108 0.418 0.03 0.979 
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Table 6.12. Estimates of the components of the bid-ask spread and the effective 
bid-ask spread based on the Glosten and Harris (1988) model with truncation. 
The effective half-spreads and the components of the spread presented in the table are found 
based on the GH model estimation results (Table 6.11). The results are based on the data for 
15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. The relative effective half-spread is found 
as a ratio of Equation (6.19) to the mean stock price divided by two. The coefficient α is 
found by substitution of the estimated coefficients into Equation (6.20); the coefficient (β+γ) is 
found as (1-α). *** indicates significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, * 
indicates significance level at 10%. 
 
Effective half-
spread, as a 
















Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
1 AZST 31,080 2.52%*** 0.81% 18.22% 18.66% 81.78%*** 29.91% 
2 BAVL 463,064 1.93%*** 0.51% 2.07% 14.05% 97.93%*** 28.50% 
3 DNEN 407 2.10% 1.29% 4.30% 34.60% 95.70% 64.59% 
4 DTRZ 473 1.29%* 0.77% 9.57% 34.37% 90.43% 59.96% 
5 LTPL 45,764 5.74%** 2.84% 29.26% 27.14% 70.74% 43.81% 
6 MZVM 1,814 2.24%** 0.81% 10.48% 20.78% 89.52%** 35.94% 
7 NITR 3,887 1.57%** 0.63% 17.04% 23.13% 82.96%** 38.01% 
8 PGOK 4,660 2.94%** 1.44% -4.54% 27.79% 104.54%* 55.53% 
9 SMASH 5,586 2.28% 1.43% -9.64% 35.54% 109.64% 74.05% 
10 STIR 949 2.42% 1.37% 11.20% 31.11% 88.80% 56.80% 
11 UNAF 908 0.91%*** 0.34% 13.54% 20.65% 86.46%** 36.93% 
12 USCB 51,944 4.74% 5.01% 0.79% 56.67% 99.21% 115.84% 
13 UTEL 90,964 1.47%*** 0.41% 10.00% 15.94% 90.00%*** 27.89% 
14 ZAEN 641 1.88%*** 0.73% 8.95% 21.82% 91.05%** 39.51% 
15 ZPST 18,799 1.92%*** 0.66% 7.11% 19.96% 92.89%*** 34.99% 
  Total 57,447 1.76%*** 0.30% 14.10%** 6.78% 85.90%*** 17.91% 
 
 
the result for the overall sample is possibly driven by a larger sample size. The value 
of the component is much smaller than in Glosten and Harris (1988) and in 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) for the NYSE (on average, 47.4% and 
46.6%, respectively), and similar to the result of Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) for 
the Prague Stock Exchange (17%) and Ryzhkov (2007) for the Ukrainian stock 
market (10%). Taking into account that the level of informed trading in the Prague 
Stock Exchange and in the Ukrainian stock market is considered much higher than 
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in NYSE, it is surprising that the asymmetric information component for these two 
markets was found much lower than for NYSE. 
 
Both studies of Hanousek and Podpiera (2003) and Ryzhkov (2007) assume that the 
inventory holding cost component in a market with multiple brokers is zero since 
there is no pressure on a particular broker to trade in order to support liquidity 
unlike in NYSE, where there is a pressure on market makers. Taking into account 
that the sum of the asymmetric information and the inventory holding cost 
components found by applying Huang and Stoll (1997) model for the Ukrainian 
stock market was 17.6% and the asymmetric information component found by 
applying Glosten and Harris (1988) model was 14.1%, it is very likely that the 
inventory holding cost component in the Ukrainian stock market is actually close to 
zero. In this case, the value of 17.6% found by estimating Huang and Stoll (1997) 
model, can be attributed solely to the asymmetric information component. The 
remaining part of the spread can attributed to the order processing cost component 
(82.4% in case of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model and 85.9% in case of the Glosten 
and Harris (1988) model. 
 
Quite low estimate of the asymmetric information component found for the Prague 
Stock Exchange and for the Ukrainian stock market can be viewed as 
complementary evidence in support of the evidence-based critique of the spread 
decomposition models. Van Ness et al. (2001) examined the performance of five 
spread decomposition models by comparing the asymmetric information 
component estimates to other measures of information asymmetry (for more details 
on the study, see Section 7.2 "Review of Literature"). The study found that 
asymmetric information components appear unrelated to measures of uncertainty, 
and concluded that the asymmetric information models measure the level of 
asymmetric information weakly at best. Neal and Wheatley (1998) did not find any 
significant difference between the asymmetric information spread components 
estimated for closed-end funds and for a matched sample of common stocks. This 
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result seemed puzzling to the authors who predicted lower asymmetric information 
for closed-end funds, because they report their net asset values weekly, which 
eliminates uncertainty about their current liquidation value. According to Neal and 
Wheatley (1998), this suggested that the spread decomposition models can be 
misspecified. Though, to our best knowledge, literature does not suggest solid 
critique of the methodology of the trade indicator spread decomposition models 
(such as Huang and Stoll (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) models) and the 
models are widely applied in various settings for measuring informational content 
of trades. 
 
Estimation Results of the Glosten and Harris (1988) Model for Different Trade Sizes 
 
By substitution of the mean volume of shares per trade for different trade sizes in 
the equations (6.19) and (6.20) the estimates of the effective spread and the 
components of spread can be found. The estimates of the coefficients c0, c1, z0, and z1 
that are substituted in the equations are those presented in Table 6.11.  
As in the estimation of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model with accounting for trade 
size, all the trades are divided into three groups: small, medium, and large based on 
the relative trade size for each stock (more details on division of stocks into size 
groups can be found in Chapter 3). Within each size group, mean volume of shares 
per trade is found individually for each stock.  
 
The effective half-spreads and the spread components for different trade sizes are 
presented in Table 6.13.  
Effective half spread for small, medium and large trades is 1.80%, 1.76%, and 1.34% 
respectively. Similar to the results from Huang and Stoll (1997) model and the 
estimation of the effective half-spread by applying the benchmark method (Chapter 
4), small trades are found the most expensive to execute. Though the results from 
Huang and Stoll (1997) model and the benchmark method have shown that medium  
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Table 6.13. Estimates of the effective bid-ask spread and the components of the bid-ask spread relative to the trade size based on the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) model with truncation. 
 
All the trades are divided into three groups by trade size: small, medium, and large based on the relative trade size for each stock. For each stock and 
each group the mean volume of shares per trade is found and substituted in the equations (6.19) and (6.20) together with the estimates of the 
corresponding coefficients (from Table 6.11). The results are based on the data for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks during 2005-2006. *** indicates 
significance level at 1%, ** indicates significance level at 5%, and * indicates significance level at 10%. 
 
Effective half-spread Asymmetric Information Spread Component, α Mean volume per trade, 
shares Small Medium Large Small Medium Large   
PFTS 
Code 
Small Medium Large Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. 
1 AZST 13,189 69,413 240,400 0.0282*** 0.006 0.0188 0.012 -0.0099 0.031 0.2693** 0.133 -0.0982 0.369 3.0813 9.699 
2 BAVL 59,031 393,223 5,875,016 0.0191*** 0.004 0.0193*** 0.005 0.0221 0.024 0.0657 0.100 0.0284 0.134 -0.4998 0.818 
3 DNEN 9,623 40,726 253,622 -0.1438 -0.135 -0.7001 0.546 -4.5078 3.360 0.9156 1.012 0.8271 0.785 0.8078 0.739 
4 DTRZ 285 979 3,961 0.0123* 0.007 0.0144 0.011 0.0234 0.031 0.0992 0.300 0.0875 0.445 0.0611 0.771 
5 LTPL 20,285 171,633 918,195 0.0567** 0.027 0.0612 0.037 0.0835 0.089 0.274 0.249 0.3775 0.384 0.7241 0.995 
6 MZVM 9,080 31,105 157,602 0.0272 0.022 0.0417 0.062 0.1248 0.296 0.2912 0.504 0.5953 1.227 0.9761 2.677 
7 NITR 881 4,089 29,661 0.0169*** 0.005 0.0157** 0.007 0.0063 0.023 0.2647 0.161 0.1636 0.236 -1.3823 4.588 
8 PGOK 1,628 13,196 57,364 0.0344*** 0.011 0.0152 0.025 -0.058 0.082 0.0252 0.173 -0.4949 1.251 0.6837 1.256 
9 SMASH 1,529 12,743 67,926 0.0243** 0.010 0.0202 0.022 0.0004 0.081 -0.0307 0.230 -0.2352 0.657 -1.2236 4.757 
10 STIR 3,535 15,065 80,018 0.0197 0.029 -0.0004 0.097 -0.1136 0.481 -0.2046 0.856 0.7002 1.504 1.7876 7.918 
11 UNAF 260 1,541 14,235 0.0094*** 0.003 0.0087** 0.004 0.0014 0.022 0.1524 0.147 0.1173 0.269 -1.8555 4.283 
12 USCB 375 3,035 26,009 0.0746*** 0.029 0.0732** 0.030 0.0611 0.040 -0.0158 0.204 -0.015 0.216 -0.0066 0.344 
13 UTEL 17,695 56,482 327,000 0.0167*** 0.003 0.0156*** 0.003 0.0084 0.009 0.2109** 0.097 0.1557 0.128 -0.6122 0.857 
14 ZAEN 285 1,352 11,677 0.0192*** 0.006 0.0178* 0.011 0.0044 0.058 0.1276 0.168 0.0071 0.328 -1.7622 4.783 
15 ZPST 15,416 88,249 293,462 0.0194*** 0.006 0.0142 0.017 -0.0005 0.047 0.0952 0.183 -0.606 0.990 1.5321 5.231 
  Total 10,207 60,189 557,076 0.0180*** 0.003 0.0176*** 0.003 0.0134** 0.007 0.1375*** 0.051 0.1412** 0.069 0.1903 0.309 
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trades are the cheapest to execute, while in the Glosten and Harris (1988) model 
large trades are found the cheapest. The reason of the difference lies in the different 
approaches to modelling of the effective spread relative to the trade size. Glosten 
and Harris (1988) assume linear relationship between the two parameters, while 
Huang and Stoll (1997) do not assume any functional form of relationship between 
the two parameters. As the results of applying the Huang and Stoll (1997) model 
and the benchmark method show, the relationship between the effective spread and 
the trade size in Ukraine is not linear, and, therefore, the Glosten and Harris (1988) 
model is not able to correctly capture it. 
 
The estimation results of the Glosten and Harris (1988) model suggest that the 
effective bid-ask spread depends on the trade size not because of the variable part of 
the asymmetric information component (z1 is not significantly different from zero), 
but because of the variable part of the transitory component (c1 is significantly 
different from zero). If our assumption about the equality of the inventory holding 
cost component to zero is correct, the result means that the order processing cost 
component in Ukraine depends on the trade size, in particular, it falls with the trade 
size and, as a consequence, effective spread falls with the trade size. Glosten and 
Harris (1988) expected that the order processing cost component should not depend 
on the trade size and their empirical results supported the expectation. In case of 
Ukraine, dependence of the order processing cost component on the trade size is 
unexpected too. Negative value of the coefficient c1 can mean that per unit cost of 
trading is higher for small orders than for the larger orders and can be due to two 
reasons: either decreasing per share cost of supplying liquidity services or  
substantial fixed costs of filling an order. From our knowledge of the trading 
process in the Ukrainian stock market, we do not have grounds to consider either of 
the reasons plausible. On the contrary, we think that the reason of the negative and 
significantly different from zero value of the coefficient c1 is in that the coefficient 
captures the impact of another factor. As explained in Chapter 4, larger trades in the 
Ukrainian stock market tend to be negotiated and receive price improvement, while 
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smaller trades are executed at a price, which is close to the bid/ask quote. As a 
result, larger trades have smaller effective spread than smaller trades and the reason 
of the difference in spreads is not a higher information content or larger order 
processing cost of small trades but a necessity of brokers to give price improvement 
to the clients that they value. The model of Glosten and Harris (1988) does not take 
price concessions into account and, as a result, the transitory component of the 
model captures it. So, we tend to conclude that negative dependence of the 
transitory component on the trade size is not the consequence of larger per share 
cost of execution of small trades but the consequence of price improvement 
suggested by brokers for larger trades. This conclusion adds to previously 
expressed concern (related to the linear modelling of the spread components) about 
inappropriateness of the Glosten and Harris (1988) model for decomposition of the 
bid-ask  spread in the Ukrainian stock market. 
 
The asymmetric information component, α, is found not to depend on the trade size 
as its variable component, z1, is not significantly different from zero. This suggests 
that larger trades in the Ukrainian stock market are not more informative than small 
trades, which does not seem to be realistic. Possible reason of this result can again 
lie in the linear modelling of the dependence of the component on the trade size, 
which does not have to be necessarily true. The model of Huang and Stoll (1997) 
does not assume any functional form for the relationship and therefore seems to be 
more appropriate for the Ukrainian stock market. Though we were not able to find 
statistically significant estimates of the asymmetric information component for 
different trade sizes by applying Huang and Stoll (1997) model due to too low 
number of observations.  
 
 
Spread decomposition models are widely applied in literature for measuring 
information contents of trades. Researchers that apply the models are often content 
with the results and, to our best knowledge, no solid critique was suggested to the 
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methodology of the spread decomposition for the trade indicator models (apart 
from the evidence-based critique). At the same time, the true value of the spread 
components is unknown because the components are not observable. Different 
models suggest different results. For example, George et al. (1991) find that the 
asymmetric information cost component represents between 8 and 13% of the 
spread (the study is based on the NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq data for 1969-1987). 
Huang et Stoll (1997) conclude that the sum of the asymmetric information and the 
inventory holding cost components ranges across stocks from 1.9% to 22.3% of the 
spread (the study is based on the data for 19 NYSE firms during 1992). Lin et al. 
(1995) find that the information asymmetry component is larger, 39.2% of the spread 
(the study is based on the data for 150 NYSE firms during 1998), while Madhavan, 
Richardson, and Roomans (1997) observe a gradual decrease in the asymmetric 
information cost during the trading day, from 54.7% of the spread in the beginning 
of the day to 38.4% of the spread in the end of the day (the study is based on the 
data for 274 NYSE firms during 1990). Since within the same market there is no 
benchmark for the asymmetric information spread component, it is difficult to judge 
whether different spread decomposition models correctly estimate the component. 
But the knowledge that information trading has a higher risk in emerging markets 
than in developed markets gives us grounds to expect the asymmetric information 
component in emerging markets to be higher than in developed markets. Since the 
estimation results for the Ukrainian stock market and for the Prague Stock Exchange 
did not support the expectation, it was reasonably concluded the spread 
decomposition models applied could not correctly estimate the asymmetric 
information component of the bid-ask spread in the markets. 
In this chapter, we applied the most frequently applied in literature spread 
decomposition models, though they do not seem to be appropriate for 
decomposition of the bid-ask spread in Ukraine. Whether it is due to inapplicability 
of the models to Ukrainian data or due to the fundamental inability of the models to 
correctly decompose the bid-ask spread, stays an open question. 
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6.6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Three bid-ask spread decomposition models are applied for estimation of the spread 
components for 15 most liquid Ukrainian stocks. 
Summary results of estimating the models of Stoll (1989), Huang and Stoll (1997), 
and  Glosten and Harris (1988) are presented in Table 6.14. 
 
Table 6.14. Summary of results of estimating the models of Stoll (1989), Huang 











Stoll (1989) 6% 49% 45% 
Huang and Stoll (1997) 17.6%*** 82.4% 
Glosten and Harris (1988) 14.1%** 85.9% 
 
According to the model of Stoll (1989), the asymmetric information component takes 
6% of the bid-ask spread, the inventory holding cost component takes 49% of the 
bid-ask spread, and the order processing cost component takes 45% of the bid-ask 
spread. The estimation results of the Stoll model differ considerably from the results 
of the other two models estimated in the chapter. Taking into account the George, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) and Huang and Stoll (1997) critique of the Stoll (1989) 
model and the substantial differences in the estimates of the model found in 
literature, we tend to give little credence to the estimates of the spread components 
based on the model of Stoll (1989).  
 
The results of estimation the Huang and Stoll (1997) model suggest that the sum of 
the asymmetric information component and the inventory holding cost component 
is 17.6%. As the inventory holding cost component is usually assumed in literature 
to be zero in the multiple dealer markets (as Ukrainian stock market PFTS), the 
value of 17.6% is attributed solely to the asymmetric information component. The 
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estimation results of the Glosten and Harris (1988) model give a very close estimate, 
14.1%. Similar result for the asymmetric information component for the Ukrainian 
stock market was found in Ryzhkov (2007), 10%, and for the Prague Stock Exchange 
in Hanousek and Podpiera (2003), 17%. It is surprising that the value of the 
asymmetric information component was found that low for these markets given 
that insider trading is considered a serious risk in Ukraine and the Czech Republic 
and practices of investigation and prosecution are limited (EBRD (2008 [1]), 
Hanousek and Podpiera (2002)). The low estimates seem to be even more surprising 
when taking into account that the asymmetric information component was found 
much higher in NYSE (47.4%, on average, in Glosten and Harris (1988) and 46.6%, 
on average, in Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)), where the information 
trading is not as widespread as in the emerging markets. 
 
A low estimate of the asymmetric information component found for the Prague 
Stock Exchange and for the Ukrainian stock market, can be viewed as evidence in 
support of the general criticism of the spread decomposition models that accuses the 
models in that they do not measure what they claim to measure (Neal and Wheatley 
(1998) and Van Ness et al. (2001)). 
 
The value of the asymmetric information component relative to the trade size could 
not have been reliably estimated for the Ukrainian stock market. The specification of 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model assumes linear relationship between the 
component and trade size, which is not true for Ukraine (the benchmark method 
(Chapter 4) has shown that the medium-sized trades are the cheapest to execute in 
Ukraine). Huang and Stoll (1997) model does not assume any specific functional 
form of the relationship between the effective spread and the trade size but a too 
low number of observations do not allow to find reliable estimates for Ukraine. 
 
Despite the critique of the spread decomposition models related to their ability of 
estimating the components of the bid-ask spread, Huang and Stoll (1997) model has 
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shown high ability in estimation of the effective bid-ask spread, both overall and 
relative to the trade size. The pattern of the effective bid-ask relative to the trade size 
was found the same and the values were found very close to the estimates of the 
effective bid-ask spread based on the benchmark method (Chapter 4). Glosten and 
Harris (1988) model was found able to estimate the overall effective bid-ask spread 
but did not do well in estimating the effective bid-ask spread relative to the trade 
size due to the assumption of the model of linear relationship between effective 










A study of transaction costs would not be complete if it did not include the analysis 
of how transaction costs influence returns of portfolios of stocks. 
To show the impact of trading costs on portfolio returns we perform a study of a 
simple trading strategy and estimate returns that the strategy generates with and 
without accounting for the cost of trading. There is a wide selection of trading 
strategies that are considered as those that can help an asset manager to constantly 
outperform the market, for example, momentum strategies, value strategies, and 
growth strategies. Based on our data availability we have chosen to test a 
momentum strategy as analysing momentum strategies requires data only on the 
past stock returns.  
The aim of our study is to demonstrate the importance of inclusion of the cost of 
trading when analysing a portfolio performance rather than prove or refute 
profitability of a momentum strategy in the Ukrainian stock market.  
 
Momentum, or relative strength strategy is a strategy of maintaining a long position 
in past strong performers and a short position in past weak performers. There is a 
substantial evidence that momentum strategies earn abnormal returns over a three 
to twelve month horizon (Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas 
(1989), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999)). This evidence is at odds with 
classical theory of market efficiency. Different explanations to this phenomenon are 
found in literature. Some of them are attributed to a certain inertia in investor 
behaviour, which creates persistent arbitrage opportunities, for example, 
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expectation extrapolation (DeLong et al. (1990), conservatism in expectations 
updating (Barberis et al. (1998)), biased self-attribution (Daniel et al. (1998)), and 
selective information conditioning (Hong and Stein (1999)). The opponents of the 
strategy argue that the abnormal returns found in literature cannot be attained in 
practice due to the frictions in the real market. Chasing momentum can generate 
high turnover, which may result in dissipation of potential profit because of 
transaction costs (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999)).  
 
Many studies that analyse returns of momentum strategies do not take into account 
the cost of trading and conclude that momentum strategies bring abnormal returns 
(Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok (1999)). Though a number of studies does test the profitability of 
momentum strategies taking into account transaction costs. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) find that momentum strategies bring returns that exceed trading costs. On the 
contrary, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhow (2004) argue that the estimates of the trading 
costs in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are unrealistically low. They suggest a more 
accurate estimate of the cost of trading and show that returns associated with 
momentum strategies are lower than the cost of trading. The conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the composition of the momentum strategy portfolios is 
heavily weighted toward trading stocks with particularly high transaction costs. 
 
Momentum strategy assumes a possibility of short selling as underperformers in the 
past period have to be short sold in order to follow the strategy. Even though short 
selling is not allowed in the Ukrainian stock market, in order to make the results of 
our study comparable to other literature, we assume that short selling is allowed in 
Ukraine. This assumption is not contradictory with the aim of our study, which is to 
show the influence of the costs of trading on portfolio returns rather than to prove 
or refute whether investors can earn abnormal returns by following a momentum 
strategy in the Ukrainian stock market.  
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The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 explains the approach to portfolios 
construction, section 3 describes the way of estimating the cost of trading, section 4 
analyses the characteristics of momentum portfolios, section 5 discusses the 
profitability of momentum strategies, and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
7.2. Approach to Portfolios Construction 
 
We examine conventional momentum strategies over a period from February 2005 
to November 2006. Our portfolios construction procedure follows Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).  
We define poor performers and strong performers in two different ways: i) top 10% 
and bottom 10% (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1999)) and ii) top 30% and bottom 30% (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)). 
 
Stocks are grouped into one of the three portfolios (poor performers, moderate 
performers, or strong performers) based on their mean monthly return over a half-
year period preceding the date of portfolio construction.  
 
On the portfolio construction day, which is the last day of a month, all stocks are 
sorted based on their mean monthly return during the previous half-year (for 
example, on 31 July 2005 all stocks are sorted based on their mean monthly return 
during February-July 2005). Two different strategies of portfolio construction are 
applied. For 10-80-10 strategy, bottom 10% of all stocks sorted by mean monthly 
return are attributed to the poor performers portfolio (P1), top 10% of all stocks 
sorted by mean monthly return are attributed to the strong performers portfolio 
(P3), the rest of the stocks are attributed to the moderate performers portfolio (P2). 
A similar approach is taken for the 30-40-30 strategy of portfolio construction but 
instead of bottom 10% and top 10%, bottom 30% and top 30% of all stocks are 
attributed to the P1 and P3 portfolios respectively. 
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Momentum strategy assumes maintaining a long position in the best performers 
and a short position in the worst performers. For example, on 31 July 2005, an 
investor opens a long position with the stocks attributed to portfolio P3 and opens a 
short position with the stocks attributed to portfolio P1. (The stocks were attributed 
to the P3 and P1 portfolios based on their mean monthly returns during February-
July 2005). After 6 months, on 31 January 2006, the positions are closed and new 
positions are opened based on the mean monthly returns of all stocks in the market 
during August 2005 – January 2006. To follow the strategy requires paying full bid-
ask spread on each of the two positions as long position is opened in the beginning 
of the holding period and closed in the end of the holding period as well as the 
short position. Even though short selling is not permitted in Ukraine, we assume 
that it is allowed, to make the results of our study comparable with the results in 
other literature. 
 
In order, on the one hand, to increase the number of observed periods and, on the 
other hand, not to allow specific market conditions in one of the periods to shift our 
average estimates, rolling periods are considered. It means that portfolios are 
constructed in the end of each month starting 31 July 2005, according to the rules 
described above. Rolling average returns for portfolios P1, P2, and P3 over the 
period of observation are then computed.  
 
Summary statistics for individual stocks are presented in Table 7.1. Mean monthly 
return for a stock over a period is computed as geometric average of monthly 
returns for the stock over the period. Monthly return for a stock is computed as 
percentage difference between the midquote for the stock on the last day of a month 
and the midquote for the stock on the last day of the previous month. Midquote is 
the average between closing bid and ask prices.  
Mean monthly return varies from -15.1% for ALMK in 2006 to 22.4% for AVDK in 
2005. Market capitalization of stocks varies from USD 37.3 mln. for DMZK in 2005 to 
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USD 17,660 mln. for KSTL in 2006. The stock price was the lowest for DNAZ  in 
2005, USD 0.005, and the highest for RODV in 2006, USD 794. 
 
Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for Ukrainian stocks in 2005 and 2006. 
(Sorted by mean monthly return) 
The table reports mean monthly return, market capitalization and mean price for a sample of 
Ukrainian stocks in 2005 and 2006. Mean monthly return is computed as geometric average 
of monthly returns over the period. Monthly return is found based on the midquote of the 
best closing quote for a stock in the end of the month. Market capitalization is estimated 
based on the stock price and shares outstanding at the beginning of each year.  
 

























AVDK 22.43% 2.32% 4,114.0 3.63 SVGZ 15.16% 6.31% 172.3 26.41 
PGOK 16.10% 4.17% 6,474.0 9.30 HMBZ 12.58% 7.50% 145.3 0.28 
YASK 15.21% 2.36% 317.8 0.33 DTRZ 9.65% 2.04% 495.7 71.84 
HANZ 11.23% 5.64% 1,306.0 0.32 KREN 7.49% 1.97% 562.3 0.34 
USCB 11.11% 8.48% 15,500.0 0.37 LTPL 7.04% 2.36% 431.8 0.47 
MZVM 10.59% 2.63% 827.1 10.86 DMZK 6.27% 2.02% 90.7 0.15 
ZHEN 10.49% 1.35% 367.2 0.51 NITR 5.12% 0.96% 4,130.0 12.43 
BAVL 9.21% 1.05% 5,760.0 0.07 ZAON 4.69% 1.02% 1,063.0 1.11 
STIR 8.75% 1.20% 3,825.0 26.03 DOEN 4.62% 0.61% 951.7 6.17 
ZACO 7.55% 5.81% 773.1 1.27 UNAF 4.51% 1.09% 16,240.0 59.28 
NITR 6.86% 0.77% 2,419.0 7.62 DNEN 3.37% 0.61% 2,235.0 79.56 
LTPL 6.26% 3.10% 269.6 0.23 HMON 3.35% 1.23% 249.0 0.41 
HMON 5.41% 1.55% 269.2 0.30 CEEN 3.32% 1.16% 2,202.0 0.84 
DKOK 4.90% 0.06% 311.4 0.25 ZHEN 2.84% 1.06% 466.3 0.70 
NFER 3.94% 1.97% 2,352.0 1.54 DNON 2.83% 0.44% 1,555.0 46.36 
DNON 3.47% 0.76% 1,183.0 36.41 BAVL 2.56% 1.52% 6,974.0 0.10 
UNAF 3.32% 0.64% 11,130.0 37.82 ZAEN 2.56% 0.66% 2,786.0 30.61 
SMASH 2.41% 2.05% 1,217.0 3.19 UTEL 2.55% 1.31% 15,870.0 0.19 
ZFER 1.59% 0.64% 793.0 0.14 TATM 1.22% 1.64% 657.0 0.37 
ALMK 0.95% 3.04% 11,750.0 0.32 AZOT 1.20% 1.05% 866.0 1.82 
ZALK 0.63% 2.14% 529.3 0.17 RODB 0.99% 0.63% 405.0 793.80 
DOMZ 0.13% 2.73% 429.2 0.26 DNSS 0.94% 0.41% 958.4 175.49 
KIEN -0.28% 0.51% 823.8 1.51 USCB 0.91% 3.63% 6,537.0 0.35 
MSICH -0.61% 0.89% 969.9 99.28 SMASH 0.89% 1.48% 1,178.0 3.87 
GLNG -0.65% 1.40% 681.0 0.01 KSTL 0.75% 0.63% 17,660.0 0.78 
ZPST -0.66% 0.55% 605.7 1.10 NVTR 0.67% 0.46% 457.8 6.65 
NVTR -0.84% 0.37% 363.0 6.22 
 
GLNG 0.65% 1.14% 585.0 0.01 
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TATM -1.15% 0.59% 592.6 0.29 PGOK 0.42% 1.83% 5,037.0 11.02 
DOEN -1.20% 1.10% 516.7 4.12 MZVM 0.38% 1.22% 701.3 11.10 
AZST -1.69% 0.85% 7,522.0 0.58 KIEN -0.43% 0.54% 813.0 1.49 
ZAEN -1.81% 0.49% 1,688.0 24.92 HANZ -0.60% 1.09% 1,204.0 0.31 
UTEL -1.92% 0.70% 12,970.0 0.14 YASK -0.71% 2.35% 212.4 0.35 
DNEN -2.40% 0.67% 1,126.0 60.35 ZALK -0.95% 0.75% 420.3 0.16 
MMKI -3.10% 1.16% 8,296.0 0.56 MMKI -1.09% 0.87% 7,576.0 0.55 
CEEN -5.50% 0.14% 1,053.0 0.67 DRMZ -1.15% 0.85% 297.8 0.27 
SVGZ -5.80% 3.91% 121.2 20.77 NFER -1.46% 0.50% 1,821.0 1.37 
SFER -5.88% 2.49% 451.1 0.01 ZACO -2.25% 1.47% 659.1 1.24 
DMZK -6.34% 0.62% 37.3 0.07 MSICH -2.78% 0.73% 811.5 77.25 
DNAZ -7.61% 3.17% 914.2 0.005 MEGA -2.80% 1.99% 226.5 1.28 
KREN -7.97% 2.24% 164.4 0.20 AVDK -2.90% 1.61% 1,873.0 3.20 
ZPST -3.11% 1.38% 382.3 0.93 
DGRM -3.27% 1.07% 72.7 0.35 
DKOK -4.24% 1.48% 140.4 0.19 
DNAZ -4.34% 0.60% 685.6 0.01 
ZFER -4.45% 0.64% 439.2 0.10 
STIR -4.53% 1.13% 1,939.0 18.87 
AZST -4.65% 0.61% 5,221.0 0.41 
KRAZ -4.98% 0.82% 434.8 0.09 
SFER -5.34% 2.49% 271.3 0.03 
DMPZ -6.41% 1.33% 77.2 0.03 
DOMZ -6.44% 1.14% 190.2 0.15 
PGZK -6.58% 1.67% 884.4 0.08 
FORM -6.91% 1.18% 1,534.0 7.52 
  ALMK -15.07% 1.88% 2,277.0 0.10 
 
 
Table 7.2 reports monthly returns of each of the portfolios constructed following 10-
80-10 strategy and the cost of trading for each portfolio in terms of the quoted bid-
ask spread. The cost of trading will be discussed in Section Stocks in each portfolio 
are equally weighted. Average monthly return for P1 portfolio is -0.80%, for P2 
portfolio it is 0.24%, and for P3 portfolio it is 0.56%. Since portfolios are held for 6 
months, average semi-annual return is also presented. It is found using the 
continuous compounding formula: 
 
1)R1(R 6monthlyannualsemi −+=−  (7.1) 
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Where annualsemiR −  is semi-annual portfolio return and monthlyR  is monthly portfolio 
return. 
Average semi-annual returns for P1, P2, and P3 portfolios are -4.68%, 1.44%, and 
3.44% respectively. Portfolio P1 underperforms portfolio P2, while portfolio P3 
overperforms portfolio P2, which supports momentum phenomenon. 
 
Table 7.2. Monthly returns and the cost of trading for portfolios following 10-80-
10 strategy. 
 
The table reports buy-and-hold returns (%) for the six-month holding periods and trading 
cost estimates (%) associated with portfolio P1 (weak performers), portfolio P2, and portfolio 
P3 (strong performers) for 10-80-10 momentum strategy. 
The sample is composed of 59 Ukrainian stocks during February 2005-November 2006. 
Relative strength portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks by the return performance over 
the previous 6 months. Firms are classified into three portfolios based on the respective 
break point percentiles of past performance. 
 





construction P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
31-Jul-05 2.19% 3.73% 6.50% 11.08% 23.41% 20.20% 
31-Aug-05 1.37% 1.95% 7.44% 42.34% 20.31% 8.89% 
30-Sep-05 1.03% 1.45% 4.10% 47.44% 19.88% 8.30% 
31-Oct-05 -0.84% 2.05% 2.41% 34.17% 20.01% 7.74% 
30-Nov-05 6.58% -0.40% -3.11% 35.95% 19.78% 26.88% 
31-Dec-05 8.21% -0.36% -8.49% 48.34% 21.03% 21.29% 
31-Jan-06 -4.53% -0.75% 3.03% 62.32% 18.99% 31.40% 
28-Feb-06 -5.74% -1.29% 0.98% 54.13% 19.18% 30.04% 
31-Mar-06 -9.08% -1.61% -3.38% 53.99% 21.64% 18.59% 
30-Apr-06 -5.74% -1.61% -4.23% 50.83% 17.50% 45.41% 
31-May-06 -0.78% -0.38% 2.17% 41.34% 19.87% 38.47% 
Geometric 
Average 




-4.68% 1.44% 3.44%    
 
 
Table 7.3 reports monthly returns of each of the portfolios constructed following 30-
40-30 strategy. Stocks in each portfolio are equally weighted. In the same way as for 
10-80-10 strategy, it is found that for 30-40-30 strategy average semi-annual returns 
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for P1, P2, and P3 portfolios are -3.64%, -0.60%, and 8.11% respectively. Portfolio P1 
underperforms portfolio P2, while portfolio P3 overperforms portfolio P2, which 
supports momentum phenomenon. 
 
Table 7.3. Monthly returns and the cost of trading for portfolios following 30-40-
30 strategy. 
 
The table reports buy-and-hold returns (%) for the six-month holding periods and trading 
cost estimates (%) associated with portfolio P1 (weak performers), portfolio P2, and portfolio 
P3 (strong performers) for 10-80-10 momentum strategy. 
The sample is composed of 59 Ukrainian stocks during February 2005-November 2006. 
Relative strength portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks by the return performance over 
the previous 6 months. Firms are classified into three portfolios based on the respective 
break point percentiles of past performance. 
 





construction P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
31-Jul-05 0.80% 3.03% 7.87% 14.19% 19.65% 32.48% 
31-Aug-05 2.82% -0.16% 5.30% 24.71% 13.70% 27.68% 
30-Sep-05 2.26% 1.41% 1.51% 23.56% 21.28% 20.37% 
31-Oct-05 2.15% 0.43% 3.23% 18.12% 23.78% 17.44% 
30-Nov-05 1.64% -2.00% 0.98% 22.70% 20.29% 23.99% 
31-Dec-05 1.78% -1.65% -0.64% 33.59% 16.27% 24.01% 
31-Jan-06 -2.65% 0.35% -0.30% 34.97% 12.70% 29.97% 
28-Feb-06 -2.89% -0.96% -0.88% 29.89% 19.31% 23.54% 
31-Mar-06 -5.68% -0.21% -2.20% 30.33% 17.39% 27.54% 
30-Apr-06 -3.75% -1.96% -1.45% 31.42% 14.20% 29.45% 
31-May-06 -2.78% 0.75% 1.43% 29.81% 20.59% 23.38% 
Geometric 
Average 















7.3. The Cost of Trading Estimate 
 
We study net profitability of momentum strategies by comparing gross returns from 
short position in portfolio P1 and long position in portfolio P2 to the respective 
transaction costs related to maintaining the positions. 
 
We apply two different estimates of transaction costs: quoted bid-ask spread and 
effective bid-ask spread. 
 
Lesmond, Schill, and Zhow (2004) use transaction cost estimate from the period that 
precedes the portfolio holding period. We give a preference to the transaction cost 
estimate from the same period as the portfolio holding period since the relative 
strength stocks are actually bought and sold in the beginning and at the end of the 
holding period. As returns from relative strength strategies are equally weighted, 
the trading costs for a portfolio are also equally weighted. Our trading cost 
estimates represent the average round trip cost of trading the stocks within the 
respective portfolios. 
 
The cost of trading for each portfolio is estimated in the following way. First, 
monthly estimates of the bid-ask spreads are found for each stock as the closing 
quoted bid-ask spread for the stock on the last day of the month. Second, the 
monthly estimates for each stock are averaged (by using geometric average) over 
half-year periods that correspond to the holding periods for portfolios. Finally, the 
cost of trading for each portfolio is found as equally-weighted average of the mean 
semi-annual bid-ask spreads for all stocks in the portfolio.  
For example, if a portfolio was constructed on 31 July 2005 and consisted of 10 
certain stocks, the cost of trading for this portfolio will be estimated as follows. First, 
for each of the ten stocks monthly closing bid-ask spreads will be found for the 
period of August 2005-January 2006. Then the monthly numbers for each stock will 
be averaged (by using geometric average) to find one semi-annual estimate of the 
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bid-ask spread for each stock. After this, semi-annual estimates across the ten stocks 
will be averaged (by using equal weights since the stocks in the portfolio are equally 
weighted) to find the cost of trading for the portfolio. Later, the cost of trading for 
the portfolio will be subtracted from the portfolio return to find net portfolio return. 
 
The estimates of the quoted spreads for 10-80-10 strategy are presented in Table 7.2 
and for 30-40-30 strategy – in Table 7.3. Quoted spreads for P1 and P2 portfolios are 
higher than quoted spread for P2 portfolio. For 10-80-10 strategy, to trade P1 and P3 
portfolios stocks cost 43.17% and 22.82% respectively, while the cost of trading for 
portfolio P2 is 20.14% (Table 7.2). For 30-40-30 strategy, to trade P1 and P3 portfolios 
stocks cost 26.51% and 25.37% respectively, while the cost of trading for portfolio P2 
is 18.06% (Table 7.3). The results are in line with Lesmond, Schill, and Zhow (2004) 
who also find that relative strength portfolios are more costly to trade than the 
portfolio of stocks with medium returns. 
 
Literature generally considers effective spread as one of the most reliable estimates 
of the cost of trading, while quoted bid-ask spread is viewed as an overstated 
estimate of the cost of trading because trades are often executed within the quoted 
bid-ask spread (for more details see Chapter 4). So, our cost of trading estimate 
based on the quoted bid-ask spread may appear large to some traders. 
Unfortunately, due to low trading frequency, it is not possible to find reliable 
monthly estimates of the effective bid-ask spread for many of the Ukrainian stocks 
by applying any of the standard methodologies of effective spread estimation. 
Though from Chapter 4 we know the estimates of the effective spreads for each 
stock over a two-year period of 2005-2006. From the estimates of the quoted and 
effective bid-ask spreads over 2005-2006, we will find a coefficient, by which, on 
average, effective spread is less than quoted spread. Then we will divide the 
estimate of quoted spread for a portfolio by this coefficient to find effective spread 
for the portfolio. The data for computation of the coefficient are presented in Table 
7.4. For Ukrainian stocks, quoted bid-ask spread is   larger   than   effective   bid-ask   
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Table 7.4. Quoted and effective bid-ask spreads for Ukrainian stocks during 2005-
2006. 
The table reports average values for quoted and effective spreads for Ukrainian stocks 
during 2005-2006. The values are taken from Table 4.3 of Chapter 4. The detailed explanation 
























ALKZ 123.95% 36.34% 3.41  MEGA 53.28% 29.58% 1.8 
ALMK 62.02% 25.18% 2.46  MMKI 8.53% 5.32% 1.6 
AVDK 37.28% 8.05% 4.63  MSICH 11.58% 5.74% 2.02 
AZOT 57.30% 16.06% 3.57  MZVM 8.79% 5.10% 1.72 
AZST 9.19% 5.01% 1.83  NFER 39.63% 18.45% 2.15 
BAVL 14.74% 4.32% 3.41  NITR 7.66% 3.79% 2.02 
CEEN 10.70% 4.63% 2.31  NVTR 13.59% 7.47% 1.82 
DGRM 19.21% 8.35% 2.3  PGOK 23.22% 8.42% 2.76 
DKOK 31.00% 13.09% 2.37  PGZK 25.27% 12.71% 1.99 
DMPZ 66.47% 40.44% 1.64  RODB 17.48% 8.82% 1.98 
DMZK 104.39% 25.47% 4.1  SFER 78.69% 33.42% 2.35 
DNAZ 46.66% 25.51% 1.83  SHKD 24.29% 12.19% 1.99 
DNEN 14.50% 4.66% 3.11  SMASH 14.14% 6.13% 2.31 
DNON 13.11% 5.22% 2.51  STIR 9.07% 5.13% 1.77 
DNSS 8.82% 5.37% 1.64  SVGZ 104.34% 48.94% 2.13 
DOEN 12.22% 5.50% 2.22  TATM 34.50% 14.21% 2.43 
DOMZ 14.33% 9.11% 1.57  TOEN 120.83% 81.68% 1.48 
DRMZ 31.43% 8.88% 3.54  UNAF 5.56% 2.20% 2.53 
DTRZ 10.40% 3.89% 2.67  USCB 67.97% 14.16% 4.8 
FORM 36.18% 13.29% 2.72  UTEL 4.88% 3.16% 1.54 
GLNG 22.04% 17.18% 1.28  YAMZ 40.24% 11.72% 3.43 
HANZ 41.80% 25.25% 1.66  YASK 24.21% 8.66% 2.8 
HMBZ 86.45% 23.36% 3.7  ZACO 18.95% 10.06% 1.88 
HMON 104.28% 53.49% 1.95  ZAEN 7.54% 3.23% 2.33 
HRTR 129.50% 55.51% 2.33  ZALK 28.70% 13.79% 2.08 
KIEN 14.37% 7.62% 1.89  ZAON 25.56% 11.14% 2.29 
KRAZ 35.97% 17.47% 2.06  ZFER 20.57% 11.87% 1.73 
KREN 87.37% 23.22% 3.76  ZHEN 84.29% 19.27% 4.37 
KSTL 8.63% 3.86% 2.24  ZPST 8.33% 3.66% 2.28 
LTPL 15.53% 6.14% 2.53  Average   2.43 
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spread by 2.43, on average. By dividing the estimate of quoted spread for each of the 
portfolios by 2.43, we find that for 10-80-10 strategy, effective bid-ask spreads for P1, 
P2, and P3 portfolios are 17.77%, 8.29%, and 9.39% respectively. For 30-40-30 
strategy, they are 10.91%, 7.43%, and 10.44% respectively.  
 
 
7.4. Characteristics of the Relative Strength Portfolios  
 
The portfolio characteristics of momentum strategies are presented in Table 7.5. For 
the 10-80-10 strategy, mean semi-annual returns for the portfolios P1, P2, and P3 are 
-4.68%, 1.44%, and 3.44% respectively. A trading strategy that maintains a long 
position in the best performers and a short position in the worst performers (P3 
minus P1) brings semi-annual gross profit of 8.12%.  
 
For the 30-40-30 strategy, mean monthly returns for the portfolios P1, P2, and P3 are 
-3.64%, -0.60%, and 8.11%. A trading strategy that maintains a long position in the 
best performers and a short position in the worst performers (P3 minus P1) brings 
monthly gross profit of 11.75%, which is higher than for 10-80-10 strategy. 
 
Return on portfolio P2 represents benchmark performance and can be viewed as 
market performance. Higher absolute returns of P1 and P3 portfolios compared to 
return of P2 portfolio show that the momentum strategies do bring gross abnormal 
returns in the Ukrainian stock market. The result is in line with the findings in other 
literature (Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1989), and Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999)). 
 
We test whether the returns of extreme performers (P1 and P3) are significantly 
different from those of portfolio P2. For the 10-80-10 strategy we reject the equality 
of returns of portfolios P1 and P2 at 5% significance level and equality of returns of 
portfolios P2 and P3 at 10% significance level. Though for 30-40-30 strategy we 
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cannot reject the equality of returns of portfolios P1 and P2, and of portfolios P2 and 
P3.  
 
Table 7.5. Portfolio characteristics of the momentum strategies. 
 
The sample is composed of 59 Ukrainian stocks during February 2005-November 2006. 
Relative strength portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks by the return performance over 
the previous 6 months. Firms are classified into three portfolios based on the respective 
break point percentiles of past performance. Market capitalization is estimated based on the 
stock price and shares outstanding at the beginning of each year.  
 
    10-80-10 strategy  30-40-30 strategy 
    P1 P2 P3   P1 P2 P3  




-4.68% 1.44% 3.44% 8.12%  -3.64% -0.60% 8.11% 11.75% 
           
Share price Mean 2.57 12.32 7.5   7.8 14.68 8.99  
(USD) Median 0.15 0.99 1.59   0.34 1.62 1.08  
           
Market 
Capitalization Mean 
389 561.6 510.2   497.4 486.1 639.6  
(USD, millions) Median 147.4 194.7 398   185.7 189.3 335.8  
           
     P3+P1     P3+P1 
Mean quoted 
bid-ask spread  
43.17% 20.14% 22.82% 65.99%  26.51% 18.06% 25.37% 51.88% 
           
Mean effective 
bid-ask spread*   
17.77% 8.29% 9.39% 27.16%  10.91% 7.43% 10.44% 21.35% 
           
Proportion of no-
trading days  
72.10% 56.40% 53.40%   60.30% 57.70% 55.00%  
* Found by division of the mean quoted spread by 2.43, which is the proportion by which 
quoted spread exceeds, on average, the effective spread for Ukrainian stocks (See Table 7.4). 
 
The mean share price of stocks within portfolios P1 and P3 is lower than that of 
stocks within portfolio P2: USD 2.57, USD 7.50 compared to USD 12.32 respectively 
for the 10-80-10 strategy and USD 7.80, USD 8.99 compared to USD 14.68 
respectively for the 30-40-30 strategy. A lower mean price for the portfolio of 
winning stocks than for the non-traded portfolio was also documented in Lesmond, 
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Schill, and Zhou (2004). A lower mean price is often associated with riskier stocks, 
which, in turn, have higher cost of trading and are expected to bring higher returns. 
Market capitalization of P2 stocks is higher than that of P1 and P3 stocks for the 10-
80-10 strategy, which gives the evidence that extreme performing stocks are those of 
smaller size. The same finding was also documented in Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou 
(2004). Though for the 30-40-30 strategy the pattern is different, portfolio P2 has the 
lowest market capitalization. This suggests that 20% of best performing stocks in 
Ukraine that follow top 10% performing stocks are the stocks with quite large 
market capitalization. The same holds for 20% of worst performing stocks  that 
follow bottom 10% performing stocks.  
 
When executing the relative strength strategy, the trader does not trade stocks 
within portfolio P2 but trades stocks within portfolios P1 and P3. To execute the 
relative strength strategy, the trader in the beginning of a half-year period has to 
open long position in the best performers, P3, and to open a short position in the 
worst performers, P1. In the end of the half-year period, the trader has to close the 
long and the short positions.  Execution of the full strategy requires paying full bid-
ask spread on both portfolios, P1 and P3. Table 7.5 shows that the cost of trading for 
10-80-10 strategy is 65.99%, while the cost of trading for 30-40-30 strategy is 51.88%. 
 
The estimation results show that the costs of trading the two extreme portfolios are 
larger than the costs of trading portfolio P2 for both 10-80-10 and 30-40-30 strategies. 
For 10-80-10 strategy, the quoted spreads for portfolios P1 and P3 are 43.17% and 
22.82% respectively, whereas the quoted spreads for P2 portfolio is 20.14%. The 
differences in trading costs between portfolios P1 and P2 and P3 and P2 are 
significant at 10% significance level. For 30-40-30 strategy, the quoted spreads for 
portfolios P1 and P3 are 26.51% and 25.37% respectively, whereas the quoted 
spreads for P2 portfolio is 18.06%. The differences in trading costs between 
portfolios P1 and P2 and P3 and P2 are significant at 5% significance level. The 
consistency with which P1 and P3 costs exceed the costs of P2 portfolio is striking, 
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since even the benchmark portfolio P2 is comprised of illiquid stocks to a large 
extent (this will be shown below when considering the proportion of no-trading 
days liquidity measure for each of the portfolios). The results lead us to a conclusion 
that the relative strength portfolios are comprised of stocks with disproportionally 
large trading costs. A similar result was found in Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004). 
For 10-80-10 strategy the costs of trading P1, P2, and P3 portfolios were 5.05%, 
2.98%, and 4.32% respectively. For 30-40-30 strategy they were 6.10%, 4.16%, and 
5.05% respectively. 
The same pattern as for the quoted bid-ask spread holds for the effective bid-ask 
spread. 
 
The fact that P1 and P3 stocks have higher cost of trading than P2 stocks suggests 
that P1 and P3 stocks are less liquid than P2 stocks (the bid-ask spread is considered 
in literature as one of the most reliable measures of liquidity, see Chapter 5 for more 
details). In order to further investigate whether the P1 and P3 stocks are actually less 
liquid, proportion of no-trading days is studied for each of the portfolios. 
Proportion of no-trading days liquidity measure is chosen because it proved to be 
one of the most representative liquidity measures for the Ukrainian stock market 
(see Chapter 5). The liquidity assigned to P1, P2, and P3 stocks by the quoted bid-
ask spread slightly differs from that assigned by the proportion of no-trading days.  
While the losing portfolios (P1) have lower liquidity (higher proportion of no-
trading days) than portfolios P2, the winning portfolios (P3) have higher liquidity 
(lower proportion of no-trading days) than portfolios P2. This holds for both 
strategies. So, we can surely conclude that the worst performing stocks are low 
liquidity stocks, though it is not clear whether the top-performing stocks are more 
or less liquid than the stocks in the non-traded portfolio P2. 
 
To summarize, the relative strength portfolios are comprised of stocks that can be 




7.5. The Profitability of Standard Strategies 
 
Table 7.6 shows the results of examining the before- and after transaction costs 
returns of the momentum strategies. For the 10-80-10 strategy, the long position in 
P3 together with the short position in P1 produces gross semi-annual return of 
8.12%. 
 
Table 7.6. Estimates of the profits of the momentum strategies 
 
The table reports mean six-month buy-and-hold returns (%) associated with a short position 
in portfolio P1 (weak performers) and a long position in portfolio P3 (strong performers) 
from February 2005 to November 2006.  
 






        
    
Mean semi-annual P3-P1 portfolio return before trading costs 8.12%  11.75% 
    
Total cost of trading for the strategy (quoted spreads) 65.99%  51.88% 
Total cost of trading for the strategy (effective spreads) 27.16%  21.35% 
    
Mean return (based on the quoted spread estimate of the 
transaction costs) -57.87%  -40.13% 
Mean return (based on the effective spread estimate of the 
transaction costs) -19.04%   -9.60% 
 
To realize the P3-P1 returns, investor has to open a short position in the worst 
performers (P1) in the beginning of the holding period and to close the short 
position in the end of the holding period. Similarly, investor also has to open a long 
position in the best performers (P3) in the beginning of the holding period and to 
close the long position in the end of the holding period. Therefore the strategy 
requires paying the full spread on both the long and short positions. For the 10-80-
10 strategy, opening and closing short position in P1 is associated with the cost of 
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trading of 43.17% (in quoted bid-ask spreads), while opening and closing long 
position in P3 is associated with the cost of trading of 22.82% (in quoted bid-ask 
spreads). The combined trading cost that a momentum investor faces is the sum 
65.99%. Subtracting the estimated trading costs from the raw P3-P1 returns brings 
net semi-annual return of -57.9%. If the effective bid-ask spread is used as a measure 
of the cost of trading instead of the quoted bid-ask spread, then the 10-80-10 strategy 
would bring -19.04%. The respective net returns on the benchmark portfolio P2 are 
higher: -18.70% and -6.85% (found based on the estimates in Table 7.5). This 
suggests that when the cost of trading is taken into account, the 10-80-10 momentum 
strategy cannot outperform the market any more. The same conclusion was made in 
Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) for the 10-80-10 momentum strategy. 
 
For the 30-40-30 strategy, if quoted bid-ask spread is used as a measure of the cost of 
trading, net return will be -40.13%. If effective bid-ask spread is used as a measure 
of the cost of trading, the strategy will bring net return of -9.60%. The respective net 
returns on the benchmark portfolio P2 are higher: -18.66% and -8.03% (found based 
on the estimates in Table 7.5). This suggests that when the cost of trading is taken 
into account, the 30-40-30 momentum strategy, as well as the 10-80-10 momentum 
strategy, cannot outperform the market any more. Results in Lesmond, Schill, and 
Zhou (2004) for the 30-40-30 momentum strategy suggest the same conclusion. 
 
The realization of the momentum strategies requires trading of very costly stocks, 
whose cost of trading highly exceeds the gross returns of the strategies resulting in 
very high negative net returns. 
 
Case of Actual Turnover 
 
The standard momentum strategy assumes that at the end of the holding period, old  
long and short positions are closed, which means 100% turnover of stocks. Though 
if an investor follows a momentum strategy for a few periods, actually some of the 
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securities in portfolios P1 and P3 can remain in his portfolio from one period to 
another, in case they stay among the top or bottom performers from one period to 
another. Therefore, the investor does not have to close the entire position. Investor 
will keep the stocks from one holding period to the next one and will not incur any 
costs of trading for these stocks.  
 
The mean proportions of P1 and P3 stocks that remain in the same portfolio in the 
subsequent period are reported in Table 7.7. The proportions are found very high. 
For the 10-80-10 strategy they are 53.2% for the portfolio P1 and 64.7% for the 
portfolio P3. For the 30-40-30 strategy they are even higher, 71.9% and 74.4% 
respectively. The numbers show that there is a high persistence in stock returns 
from period to period in the Ukrainian stock market. For example, the proportions 
for the US stocks are much smaller, 22.7% and 15% respectively for the 10-80-10 
strategy and 37.8% and 33.2% respectively for the 30-40-30 strategy (Lesmond, 
Schill, and Zhou (2004)). To better reflect the real returns from following the 
momentum strategy, we adjust the estimate of the cost of trading by the actual 
turnover of stocks in the portfolios. The cost of trading P3-P1 strategy based on 
actual turnover equals the sum of two products: the product of the mean bid-ask 
spread for  portfolio P3 and the ratio of stocks that are turned over in portfolio P3 
and the product of the mean bid-ask spread for the portfolio P1 and the ratio of 
stocks that are turned over in the portfolio P1. The adjusted total cost of realizing 10-
80-10 strategy drops dramatically from 65.99% to 28.28% (in terms of quoted bid-ask 
spread). Though the estimated net return for the strategy is still negative, -20.16%. 
The respective net return on the benchmark portfolio P2 is still higher, -18.70%. 
If the effective bid-ask spread is used as a measure of the cost of trading instead of 
the quoted bid-ask spread, then the 10-80-10 strategy would bring net return of -
3.52%. The respective net return on the benchmark portfolio P2 is smaller, -6.85%, 
suggesting that the strategy does outperform the market. 
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For the 30-40-30 strategy, if quoted bid-ask spread is used as a measure of the cost of 
trading, net return will be -2.19%. If effective bid-ask spread is used as a measure of 
the cost of trading, the strategy will bring net return of 4.35%. The respective net 
returns on the benchmark portfolio P2 are smaller, 18.66% and -8.03% respectively, 
suggesting that the strategy does outperform the market. 
 
Table 7.7. Estimates of the profits of the momentum strategies based on actual 
turnover. 
 
The table reports the mean six-month buy-and-hold returns (%) associated with a short 
position in portfolio P1 (weak performers) and a long position in P3 (strong performers) 
from February 2005 to November 2006.  
The positions retained proportion is the mean ratio of stocks that remain in the respective 
portfolio in the following period and therefore do not have to be traded. Investor therefore 






    
Mean semi-annual P3-P1 portfolio return before trading costs 8.12%  11.75% 
    
Total cost of trading for the strategy based on 100% turnover 
(quoted spreads) 65.99%  51.88% 
Total cost of trading for the strategy based on 100% turnover 
(effective spreads) 27.16%  21.35% 
    
Portfolio positions retained, % of P1 53.17%  71.88% 
Portfolio positions retained, % of P3 64.67%  74.44% 
    
Total cost of trading for the strategy based on actual turnover 
(quoted spreads) 28.28%  13.94% 
Total cost of trading for the strategy based on actual turnover 
(effective spreads) 11.64%  7.40% 
    
Semi-annual P3-P1 portfolio return after trading costs based on 
actual turnover:    
    
Mean return (based on the quoted spread estimate of the 
transaction costs) -20.16%  -2.19% 
Mean return (based on the effective spread estimate of the 
transaction costs) -3.52%  4.35% 




In our analysis we consider portfolio returns without adjusting them for risk. 
Unfortunately, due to very low trading frequency of many of Ukrainian stocks, it is 
not possible to reliably estimate volatility of portfolio return or beta-coefficients for 
portfolios. But taking into account that the cost of trading for portfolios P1 and P3 is 
significantly larger than the cost of trading for portfolio P2, it is expected that the 
momentum portfolios P1 and P3 are more risky than the untraded portfolio P2. 
Anyway, standard momentum strategies (without adjusting for actual turnover) are 
not able to outperform the market even without adjusting the portfolios for their 
higher risk. 
Lesmond, Schill, and Zhow (2004) present beta coefficients for each of the portfolios 
P1, P2, and P3, and mention that P1 and P3 portfolios tend to have higher risk, 
though the study does not include the coefficients into their analysis of returns of 
the momentum portfolios.  
 
It is interesting to document that the momentum strategies do bring an above 
market gross return in Ukraine as well as in many other stock markets as 
documented in literature. The 10-80-10 strategy brings gross semi-annual return of 
8.1% while the P2 portfolio (which is an analogy of market portfolio) brings only 
1.44%. The 30-40-30 strategy brings gross semi-annual return of 11.8% while the P2 
portfolio a near zero return of -0.6%. Though very high costs of trading in the 
market in general, as well as particularly high cost of trading for the stocks that 
comprise the momentum portfolios, hinders investors from realization of the above 
average returns. Instead of receiving 8.1% of semi-annual return for the 10-80-10 
strategy (11.8% for the 30-40-30 strategy), investor actually gains a negative return 
of -19.0% (-9.6% for the 30-40-30 strategy). The strategy does not outperform the 
market any more, as net return on portfolio P2 is higher, -6.85% (-8.03% for the 30-
40-30 strategy). 
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A possibility to receive a positive return will appear only with an increase of the 
portfolio holding period.  Though with increase of the portfolio holding period 
momentum strategy will not be a momentum strategy any more, as the momentum 
phenomenon was documented for the holding periods of three to twelve months.  
 
It is also interesting that the majority of stocks in the momentum portfolios remain 
in the same portfolios from one period to another. A momentum investor therefore 
can save a part of trading costs due to no need of opening and closing positions in 
these stocks. A big portion of costs saved due to this allows to earn -3.5% of net 
semi-annual return for the 10-80-10 strategy and 4.4% of net semi-annual return for 
the 30-40-30 strategy.  
 
The results show that in the majority of the settings analysed, when the cost of 
trading is taken into account, the momentum strategy is not able to outperform the 
market, which is in line with the market efficiency hypothesis. Only when actual 
turnover is considered instead of 100% turnover, 30-40-30 strategy and 10-80-10 
strategy (with the effective spread taken as the estimate of transaction costs) can 
outperform the market. 
 
The estimated high transaction costs explain why Ukrainian investors tend to chose 
for their portfolios such stocks that they expect to hold for at least 3 years. For the 
30-40-30 momentum strategy 73% of stocks were kept from one period to another 
and held altogether for 1.5 years. This was the only strategy that appeared to bring a 
positive net return for investor. The semi-annual return that the strategy brought 
was still quite low, 4.4%. Taking into account quite high risk of many Ukrainian 
stocks compared to that in the developed stock markets, it is not surprising that 
investors into Ukrainian stocks focus on long-term stock holdings, because only 
long-term holdings seem to be able to bring positive returns that would compensate 
for risk and allow investors to earn profit on their investment. 
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Nevertheless, the study achieves its goal and demonstrates the importance of taking 
into account the cost of trading when analysing portfolio returns. Following a 
simple 10-80-10 momentum strategy (30-40-30 momentum strategy) does bring 
investor above market gross return of 8.1% (11.8%), which highly exceeds the 
average market return of 1.4% (-0.6%). But when the cost of trading is taken into 





The study has shown the importance of taking into account the cost of equity 
trading when analysing equity portfolio returns. The results of applying momentum 
strategy in the Ukrainian stock market suggest that positive gross portfolio returns  
considerably decrease or even turn into negative returns after taking into account 
the cost of trading the stocks in the portfolio. 
 
The study of profitability of momentum strategies assumes possibility of short 
selling in the Ukrainian stock market. Even though short selling is not allowed in 
Ukraine, the assumption is important for making the results of the study 
comparable with the results in other literature. Two approaches to definition of the 
best and worst performers are taken: 10-80-10 (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999)) and 30-40-30 (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)). Also, 
the cost of trading is considered in two settings, as the quoted bid-ask spread and as 
the effective bid-ask spread. 
The momentum strategies tested in the study do outperform the market when gross 
returns on the strategies are considered, which is in line with other literature 
(Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1989), and Chan, Jegadeesh, 
and Lakonishok (1999)). But due to particularly high cost of trading for momentum 
stocks, standard momentum strategies fail to outperform the market in terms of net 
returns. A similar result was found in Lesmond Schill, and Zhow (2004). Only when 
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actual turnover is considered (the stocks that remain in the portfolio from one 
period to another are not traded, which significantly saves the costs of trading as the 
percentage of such stocks in Ukraine is very high), momentum strategies are able to 









The thesis examined the cost of equity trading, effective liquidity measures, and the 
components of the bid-ask spread in the Ukrainian stock market PFTS during 2005-
2006. The importance of inclusion of the cost of trading when analysing portfolio 
performance was demonstrated by analysing gross and net returns on a momentum 
trading strategy. 
 
PFTS is a dealership-type market. Independent brokers post their firm quotes 
together with desired quantities in an electronic trading system, which allows 
brokers to trade the PFTS-listed securities, inter-regionally from their offices. The 
trades are done in an on-line mode through a private network. The information 
posted by the brokers such as the name of the stock, bid and ask prices, and bid and 
ask quantities is visible on the screen to all the authorized subscribers to the trading 
system. Trades are performed online by one broker accepting a bid/offer of another 
broker within the specified quantity. Brokers can act as agents (executing an order 





The study has brought the following conclusions: 
 
1. The cost of equity trading in the Ukrainian stock market is very high relative to 
the developed and many other emerging markets. 
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Two measures of the cost of trading were analysed in the thesis, the quoted bid-ask 
spread and the effective bid-ask spread. 
It was found that quoted bid-ask spread for Ukrainian stocks is large compared to 
many other stock markets and varies from 4.9% for the most liquid stocks to 129.5% 
for the least liquid stocks. The relative quoted bid-ask spread is lower in all 
developed and many emerging markets. For comparison, relative quoted bid-ask 
spread for liquid stocks is 0.2% in NYSE, 0.9% in the London Stock Exchange, 1.2% 
in the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and 4.6% in the Bucharest Stock Exchange (Jain 
(2003)). 
A more accurate measure of the cost of trading, effective bid-ask spread, varies 
across the Ukrainian stocks of different liquidity from 2.2% to 81.7%. In line with the 
findings in other literature, effective bid-ask spread is less than quoted bid-ask 
spread, which gives evidence that trades in the Ukrainian stock market are often 
executed within the quoted bid-ask spread. In other words, traders are able to 
negotiate price improvement from brokers relative to the quoted stock prices. The 
reason of suggesting price improvement in the dealership market, like PFTS, is an 
intention of brokers to keep long-term relationships with their clients in order to 
secure future deals with them.  
 
2. The reasons of the high cost of trading are seen in the specific features of the 
Ukrainian stock market, mainly very low free float, low information transparency of 
public companies, and weak system of property rights protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 
Many large industrial companies, which are interesting to investors, have very 
small free floats (about 4% of their market capitalization) as large stakes in them 
belong either to the financial-industrial groups or to the state. Low number of stocks 




Information transparency of Ukrainian public companies is low. Index of 
informational transparency of public companies estimated by Standard & Poors' 
and Financial Initiatives Agency for Ukraine was only 23.9% in 2007 out of the 
highest possible score of 100%. The reason of such a low level of disclosure is seen 
not only in the low regulatory disclosure requirements but also in a lack of 
motivation of the stock issuers for the disclosure. The importance of the stock 
market as a source of capital is not high in Ukraine due to its low liquidity and high 
availability of bank capital. 
 
The level of protection of shareholders' rights in Ukraine is low and equal treatment 
of shareholders is not guaranteed (EBRD, 2007). A significant number of violations 
are present in the market, primarily violations of shareholders' rights during 
additional share issuances (share dilution resulting from issuing additional shares at 
below fair market value) and asset stripping (the sale or transfer of company assets 
by management to a related party for below fair market value) (SCSSM, 2006). Weak 
legal enforcement adds to the problems caused by unsatisfactory (until very 
recently) legislation in Ukraine in the area of corporate governance. 
 
The results of the interviews conducted with the investment practitioners supported 
the findings described above. 
 
3. The study of the cost of trading relative to the trade size have shown that the 
effective bid-ask spread is the lowest for the medium-sized trades, higher for large 
trades, and the highest for small trades.  
 
That the cost of trading for the trades of small size is higher than for the trades of  
larger size was also documented in other literature for dealership markets (Reiss 
and Werner (1996), Hansch et. al (1999), and Huang and Stoll (1996)). The reason for 
this is that small trades are not viewed as valuable for brokers and therefore price 
improvement is not suggested for them and they have to be executed at the prices, 
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which are near to the quotes. Larger trades are those that bring the most valuable 
business to the brokers and, in order to keep the relationship with the clients in the 
long-term, price improvement is suggested for these trades. The finding that the 
cost of trading for very large orders starts growing in the order size is in line with 
the findings in Reiss and Werner (1996) and Bernhard et al. (2005) for the London 
Stock Exchange. According to Bernhard et al. (2005), the reason of this is that 
temptation to refuse to offer price improvement rises with trade size. 
 
4. The study of the influence of the trade direction on the cost of trading has shown 
that the average cost of trading for an institutional sale is higher than that for an 
institutional purchase in the Ukrainian stock market in any market condition (rising, 
falling, or neutral market) for the reasons that are not entirely understood. 
Empirical findings in other literature tend to show that institutional purchases are 
more expensive than sales in a rising market, while the opposite is true in the falling 
market (Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Keim and Madhavan (1998), Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004) and Bikker et al. (2007)). 
At the same time, relative cost of trading in the Ukrainian stock market during 
falling and rising market conditions compared to the cost of trading during neutral 
market condition follows the pattern predicted in Chiyachantana et al. (2004): in the 
falling market the cost of trading sales rises more than the cost of trading purchases 
relative to their values in the neutral market, while in the rising market the opposite 
is true. 
 
5. The study of the determinants of the cost of trading has shown that quoted and 
effective bid-ask spreads depend on the stock liquidity (measured as the number of 
no-trading days and the number of trades per day28) with higher liquidity stocks, as 
expected, having narrower bid-ask spreads. Also, proportional quoted and effective 
bid-ask spreads depend on the risk of the adverse price change for a stock 
                                                
28 Number of trades per day was found significantly different from zero only for the quoted spread 
regression and not for the effective spread regression. 
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(measured as return volatility and stock price) with more risky stocks having wider 
bid-ask spreads. The results are in line with the findings for other exchanges, in 
particular, NYSE and Nasdaq (Stoll (2000)), London Stock Exchange (Naik and 
Yadav (2003)), and Euronext Paris (Gajewski and Gresse (2007)). Firm size 
(measured as market capitalization) was found not important in determining the 
width of the bid-ask spread, which is probably the result of a specific feature of the 
Ukrainian stock market that for many large companies the free float is very low. 
The empirical results on the determinants of the cost of trading are in line with the 
findings about the reasons of the high cost of trading in Ukraine drawn from the 
analytical studies and discussed in the point 2 of the conclusion. 
 
 
6. The study of efficacy of different liquidity measures for measuring liquidity of the 
Ukrainian stock market has shown that four measures out of the five applied 
(Amihud's measure, the proportion of no-trading days, the proportion of zero daily 
returns, and volatility) have shown high correlation with the quoted bid-ask spread. 
Therefore they are concluded to have a high ability in measuring liquidity of stocks 
in the Ukrainian stock market. Out of them, the proportion of no-trading days has 
shown the highest (and significant) correlations (both cross-sectional and rank) with 
the quoted bid-ask spread and therefore is concluded to be a superior measure out 
of the other measures applied. It is followed by the proportion of zero daily returns, 
volatility of return, and, finally, Amihud's measure.  
High efficacy of the proportion of zero daily returns in measuring liquidity of 
emerging stock markets was also found in Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006). 
Though this measure does not seem to be effective for measuring liquidity in the 
developed stock market of the U.S. (Goyenko et al., 2009). 
Amihud's measure was found quite effective for measuring stock liquidity in both 
emerging and developed markets (Lesmond (2005), Goyenko et al. (2009), and the 
results of our study). 
Turnover has shown a very low association with the quoted bid-ask spread and is 
concluded to be inappropriate for measuring liquidity of stocks in the Ukrainian 
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stock market. The result is in line with the findings for emerging stock markets in 
other literature (Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2006)). 
 
It is argued that in the universe of emerging stock markets, the markets of Korea 
and Taiwan are the most liquid and the markets of Chile and Colombia are the least 
liquid. Comparison of liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market to these four markets 
have shown that based on the non-volume-related liquidity measures (quoted bid-
ask spread and proportion of zero daily returns), Ukrainian stock market is less 
liquid than those of Korea and Taiwan and more liquid than those of Chile and 
Colombia.  
Low liquidity of the Ukrainian stock market is seen as an important reason of the 
high cost of trading in this market. 
 
7. Application of three bid-ask spread decomposition models (Stoll (1989), Huang 
and Stoll (1997), and  Glosten and Harris (1988)) has given the following estimates 












Stoll (1989) 6% 49% 45% 
Huang and Stoll (1997) 17.6%*** 82.4% 
Glosten and Harris (1988) 14.1%** 85.9% 
 
The estimation results of the Stoll model differ considerably from the results of the 
other two models estimated in the chapter. Taking into account the George, Kaul, 
and Nimalendran (1991) critique of the Stoll (1989) model and the substantial 
differences in the estimates of the model found in literature, we tend to give little 




The results of estimation the Huang and Stoll (1997) model suggest that the sum of 
the asymmetric information component and the inventory holding cost component 
is 17.6%. As the inventory holding cost component is usually assumed in literature 
to be zero in the multiple dealer markets (as Ukrainian stock market PFTS), the 
value of 17.6% is attributed solely to the asymmetric information component. The 
estimation results of the Glosten and Harris (1988) model give a very close estimate, 
14.1%. Similar result for the asymmetric information component for the Ukrainian 
stock market was found in Ryzhkov (2007), 10%, and for the Prague Stock Exchange 
in Hanousek and Podpiera (2003), 17%. It is surprising that the value of the 
asymmetric information component was found that low for these markets given 
that insider trading is considered a serious risk in Ukraine and the Czech Republic 
and practices of investigation and prosecution are limited (EBRD (2008 [1]), 
Hanousek and Podpiera (2002)). The low estimates seem to be even more surprising 
when taking into account that the asymmetric information component was found 
much higher in NYSE (47.4%, on average, in Glosten and Harris (1988) and 46.6%, 
on average, in Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)), where the information 
trading is seen not as widespread as in the emerging markets. 
 
A low estimate of the asymmetric information component found for the Prague 
Stock Exchange and for the Ukrainian stock market, can be viewed as evidence in 
support of the general criticism of the spread decomposition models that accuses the 
models in that they do not measure what they claim to measure. For example, a 
study that compared the asymmetric information component estimates to two 
measures of informed trading (the number of analysts that follow the stock 
and the percentage of shares owned by institutions) have found that 
asymmetric information components appeared unrelated to the measures of 
uncertainty (Neal and Wheatley (1998)). 
 
Despite the critique of the spread decomposition models related to their ability of 
estimating the components of the bid-ask spread, Huang and Stoll (1997) model has 
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shown high ability in estimation of the effective bid-ask spread, both overall and 
relative to the trade size. The pattern of the effective bid-ask relative to the trade size 
was found the same and the values were found very close to the estimates of the 
effective bid-ask spread found from the comparison of the trade price to the 
midquote (Chapter 4). Glosten and Harris (1988) model was found able to estimate 
the overall effective bid-ask spread but did not do well in estimating the effective 
bid-ask spread relative to the trade size due to the assumption of the model of linear 
relationship between effective spread and trade size, which is not true for Ukraine. 
 
8. The study of profitability of a momentum strategy in the Ukrainian stock market 
has shown a considerable difference between the gross and net returns for the 
strategy and emphasized the importance of taking into account the cost of equity 
trading when analysing equity portfolio returns.  
The results of applying a momentum strategy (in a few different settings and under 
the assumption that short selling is allowed, though it is not allowed in Ukraine yet) 
have shown that in the Ukrainian stock market the momentum strategy return does 
outperform the market when gross return on the strategy is considered, which is in 
line with other literature (Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas 
(1989), and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999)). But due to particularly high 
cost of trading for momentum stocks, the momentum strategy fails to outperform 
the market in terms of net returns. A similar result was found in Lesmond Schill, 
and Zhow (2004).  
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
The study is limited by some problems with the data. Despite the quality of the data 
in PFTS is very high, which is not typical for many emerging stock markets, the 
PFTS data has a few considerable drawbacks. 
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First, it does not reflect all the trades executed with PFTS-listed securities as some of 
the trades can be performed over the counter with no reporting to PFTS. Though the 
proportion of such trades in the total number of trades is expected to be low.  
Second, some of the trades performed directly between a PFTS broker and an 
outside investor (the "third party trades") could have been voluntarily (though not 
obligatory) reported to PFTS before the opening of the trading session (before 11 
a.m.) during the next two trading days after the trade execution. As a result, a 
portion of the third party trades, which stayed unreported, are lost for our study. 
Though, taking into account that the reported third party trades take quite a large 
portion of the total trades (44.2% of the total PFTS volume and 34.8% of the total 
PFTS number of trades), we tend to conclude that the majority of the third party 
trades were actually reported to PFTS. This means that our dataset reflects actual 
PFTS trading volume quite accurately.  
Finally, an important limitation of the data is that the reported data on the third 
party trades do not contain actual time of trade execution but only the time of trade 
reporting. Since our study in Chapters 4 and 6 requires data on the actual time of 
trade execution, all the third party trades are lost for the study, which considerably 
decreases our dataset.  
 
Another limitation of the study is a result of low liquidity in the Ukrainian stock 
market. Due to the low number of executed trades with the stocks of medium and 
low liquidity, the effective bid-ask spread, the cost of trading relative to the trade 
size, the cost of trading relative to the trade direction, and the components of the 
bid-ask spread could have been estimated only for the 15 stocks with the highest 







Most Interesting Findings of the Thesis and Directions for Further Research 
 
In the opinion of the author, very interesting results were found for the trades with 
different trading characteristics. In particular, the medium-sized trades were found 
to be cheaper to execute than small and large trades. This differs the Ukrainian stock 
market (which is a dealership market) from the electronic order book markets, 
where small trades are the cheapest to execute. This also differs the Ukrainian stock 
market from many other dealership markets, where large trades are usually the 
cheapest to execute. The finding is due to the prevalence of institutional trades in 
the Ukrainian stock market, which results in the larger, on average, size of the 
orders. So, medium-sized trades in the Ukrainian stock market can be compared in 
size to the large trades in many other markets. When the difference is taken into 
account, the results for the Ukrainian stock market become in line with the findings 
for other dealership markets. Another interesting result is that sales were found 
more costly to execute than purchases in PFTS at any market condition, while in 
other markets purchases are often found to be more expensive than sales during 
rising market. 
Also, it was interesting to find that the proportion of no-trading days and the 
proportion of zero daily returns, the measures that are not widely applied in 
literature, are the most effective liquidity measures for the Ukrainian stock market, 
while turnover, a measure that has proven to be effective for developed stock 
markets, is not able to measure liquidity well in the Ukrainian stock market. 
An unexpected finding is inability of the established spread decomposition models 
to correctly decompose the asymmetric information spread component in the 
Ukrainian stock market. The estimated asymmetric information spread component 
seems to be too low for the Ukrainian stock market, a market with low 
informational transparency and a high risk of informed trading. 
A promising finding is that, under assumption of no short-selling constraints, the 
momentum strategy (with no accounting for the cost of trading) is actually able to 
outperform the market. With time the Ukrainian stock market will become more 
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liquid, the cost of trading will decrease, and the short selling will be allowed. Maybe 
then the momentum strategy will allow investors to earn abnormal returns. 
 
One of the directions for further research can be estimation of the price impact of 
large trades. As there are many large trades in the Ukrainian stock market and the 
market depth is low, estimation of the temporary and permanent price impact of the 
large trades on the stock price can shed more light on the process of price formation 
in the market.  
Another direction for further research can be a study of the influence of the stock 
liquidity on the stock's expected return, which has not been studied for Ukraine yet. 
The effective liquidity measures found in the thesis will help for shaping of the 
study. 
Development of a model that can estimate the asymmetric information spread 
component in the Ukrainian stock market can add to knowledge as existing spread 
decomposition models cannot cope with the task. Also, formalisation of the 
relationship between various informational factors such as, for example, low 
informational transparency and weak property rights protection, and the 
asymmetric information spread component, can help to estimate the influence of 
these factors on the width of the bid-ask spread in the Ukrainian stock market.  
Another direction for further research is to test the profitability of other 
conventional trading strategies and to see their performance in such a quickly 













Age group                                                          21-30  31-40  41-50   50+ 
Education (Highest qualification) 
 
 
I. Stock Market of Ukraine 
 
1. How can you evaluate investment activity in Ukraine in comparison with 
that in the developed stock markets? 
 
2. Which industries are the most attractive for investment in Ukraine? Why? 
 
 
3. Is there a balance between the demand for the stock market equity and the 
supply of equity in the stock market?  
 
4. What are the characteristic features of companies that enter PFTS listing? 
(f.i. industry, size, age)  
 
5. Does the stock market price the equity correctly?  
 
6. In your opinion, what are the main problems of the investment market of 
Ukraine?  
 
7. What have been the main changes in the stock market of Ukraine during the 
last three years?  
 
8. In your opinion, what are the main reasons of the small number of foreign 







II. Asset Management 
 
1. Does your company do fund management for Ukrainian clients? 
 
2. What are the criteria for selecting a company for the investment portfolios of 
your company? 
 
3. How important is each of the criteria for the decision making about the 
investment in equity of a potential company?  
 
4. What are the company valuation methods that you use?  
 
5. Can you always trust the company accounting reports?  
 
6. Please describe the process of decision making on choosing a stock for the 
investment portfolios of your company.  
 
7. Are there any legal requirements or restrictions regarding the investment 
portfolios composition and management?  
 
8. Does your company have any formalized requirements for its own 
investment portfolios?  
 
9. What are the transaction costs for equity transactions? Do they considerably 
differ in each case?  
 
10. How long, on average, do you keep certain equity in the investment 
portfolios of your company?  
 
11. What are the risks that an investor has to falling when he invests in 
Ukrainian equity? 
 
12. What is the average (minimum) profitability of the companies you invest in?  
 
13. How many companies are there in Ukraine, in equity of which an investor 
can invest a large amount of capital ($5-10 mln.).  
 
14. How fast would it be possible to buy such a package? 
 






III. Prospects of the stock market of Ukraine 
 
1. How do you see the investment market of Ukraine in 3 years? 
 
2. In your opinion, what is the potential of the Ukrainian stock market? 
 
3. Are there large companies with good prospects in the Ukrainian economy 
that are not listed on PFTS yet? 
 
4. In your opinion, will the free float of large companies grow? 
 
5. When can one expect that activity on the Ukrainian stock market will reach 
the stock market activity of such countries as Poland and Czech Republic? 
 
6. In your opinion, what are the necessary steps to be undertaken for active 

































An illustration of why the realized spread in the Stoll (1989) 
model equals the difference of the expected price change 
conditional on sale trade and the expected price change 
conditional on buy trade 
The discussion below shows why realized spread equals the difference between 
equations (6.3) and (6.4). 
Let us assume that a broker executed a sale trade at t0, and then executed a purchase 
at t1. It is also assumed that no new public information about the stock arrived in the 
market during this time (to exclude the influence of the error term). Our goal is to 
show that the realized spread of the broker (in other words, his profit) as a 
consequence of the two transactions equals the expected price change after a sale 
less the expected price change after a purchase. This relationship is a corner stone of 
the Stoll model. 
Figure A.1. The development of a stock price following a sale and a purchase 
trades.  
B0, B1, and B2 are the bid prices at times t0, t1, and t2 correspondently. A0, A1, and A2 are the 
ask prices at times t0, t1, and t2 correspondently. A0-B0, A1-B1, and A2-B2 are the values of the 
bid-ask spread at times t0, t1, and t2 correspondently. K is the value of the decrease of bid and 
ask quotes following a sale trade at time t0. Q is the quoted spread, R is the realized spread.  
 
 
After a sale at t0 the bid and ask prices have decreased to B1 and A1 (due to the 
brokers' adjustment of prices in order to balance his inventory holdings and 
asymmetric information costs). After a purchase at t1   the bid and ask prices rose to 
B2 and A2 (for the same reason). As a result of the two transactions, the broker has 
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sold the stock at B0 and then has bought it at A1. So, his realized spread, in other 
words, his profit, should equal to (A1-B0). Let us denote the realized spread as R:   
01 BARadalizedSpreRe −==  
And the quoted spread as Q:  
221100 BABABAQadQuotedSpre −=−=−==  
According to Stoll (1989), the realized spread is the expected price change after a 
broker purchase less the expected price change after a broker sale. From the 
following expression we can see that this is true: 
RKQ)BA()BA(AABB)AA()BB(PP 0211120112012t1t =−=−−−=+−+−=−−−−=− ∆∆
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